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ABSTRACT

The Woman We Don’t Want to Be: The Anti-Heroine in American Women’s Modernisms
by
Madison Priest

Advisor: Hildegard Hoeller

Anita Loos’ Lorelei has a baby because “a kid that looks like any rich father is as good as money
in the bank.” Edith Wharton’s Undine uses hers as a pawn in divorce negotiations with the
child’s father. Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Angela abandons her sister so her boyfriend won’t guess
she’s black, and Nella Larsen’s Helga frustrates and alienates everyone she loves. Yet these
protagonists were subject not just to gleeful mockery and sanction, but to furtive pity,
uncomfortable recognition, even envy. Each age calls for its own bogeys; and the anti-heroine
was, I contend, the perfect instantiation of American modernity’s fears and foibles. She tells of
modernity’s fragmented selfhood and a “lost generation” of sorts—what Dorothy Parker,
speaking to the League of American Writers in 1939, called “a ladies auxiliary of the legion of
the damned.”
Of course, the “lost generation” of young men has long served as a standard-bearer for
American modernist literature. Offering a deliberate rebuke to the mythology of the self-made
man, the modernist anti-hero reports upon a rapidly contracting world and personifies the
period’s existential dread and powerlessness. The story of U.S. modernisms that emerges as a
result tells of a characteristic literary response to two brutal world wars and the devaluation of
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masculine labor, offering up a generalized masculine disenchantment. But what of feminine
disenchantment? The anti-heroine, I suggest, bears witness not just to modernity’s contractions,
but to its rapidly expanding possibilities: the new opportunities it offered for things like travel,
communication, sex and sexuality, and even love.
This dissertation tells of American literary modernisms by way of a theoretical and
historical analysis the period’s anti-heroines. Femininity gone awry, this figure, whom I call “the
Woman We Don’t Want to Be,” delimits the parameters of the systems that create her and into
which she feeds. In recovering women’s writing from the period, feminist scholars have for
obvious reasons tended to value feminist texts. Yet the anti-heroine is a bad feminist agent; she
either fails to attain self-fulfillment, much less empowerment, or succeeds by buying into and
profiting off of patriarchal, racist systems. And in reproducing her, her authors also reproduce, to
varying degrees, the racist and sexist ideologies by which she is judged. As a result, these texts
don’t fit into the existing feminist schema by which we have recovered and framed women’s
writing.
If this figure fits poorly into these rubrics, however, I argue that she perfectly reflects the
period’s hesitancy towards feminist ideas. In this dissertation, I describe American modernisms’
relationship to what I call, following the lead of a 1925 Harper’s Monthly column, “feminism’s
awkward age”—a marked ambivalence, on both sides of the color line, towards feminism as a
collective project. If first- and second-wave feminism looked outwards in order to figure out
what was wrong with women’s lives, modernity’s women looked within.
In documenting this turn towards bad, uncomfortable or wrong feminine interiority, this
dissertation reframes the fragmented self—long considered a hallmark of modernist writing—by
exploring its stakes in modernity’s constructions of gender and race. In a period preoccupied
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with self-making, in the sense of the self-made man, The Woman We Don’t Want to Be offers a
fun-house image of her era, embodying the repulsive and fascinating possibilities of the un-made
feminine self.
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THE WOMAN WE DON’T WANT TO BE

“We were little black ewes that had gone astray; we were a sort of ladies auxiliary of the
legion of the damned. And boy, were we proud of our shame! When Gertrude Stein spoke
of a ‘lost generation,’ we took it to ourselves and considered it the prettiest compliment
we had.” — Dorothy Parker, “Sophisticated Poetry—and the Hell with It,” (New
Masses, 1939)
American modernist literature is full of despicable women. Alternately hateful and pathetic,
enviable and unsavory, these women tested the limits of acceptable femininity for their readers
and writers. Anita Loos’ Lorelei, for instance, has a baby because “a kid that looks like any rich
father is as good as money in the bank.” Edith Wharton’s Undine uses hers as a pawn in divorce
negotiations with the child’s father. Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Angela abandons her sister so her
boyfriend won’t guess she’s black, and Nella Larsen’s Helga frustrates and alienates everyone
she loves. These women tell of modernity’s fragmented selfhood and a “lost generation” of
sorts—what Dorothy Parker, speaking to the League of American Writers in 1939, called “a
ladies auxiliary of the legion of the damned.”
The “lost generation” of young men has long served as a standard-bearer for American
modernist literature. Offering a deliberate rebuke to the mythology of the self-made man, the
modernist anti-hero reports upon a rapidly contracting world and personifies the period’s
existential dread. Hemingway’s Jake Barnes is literally impotent; Eliot’s Prufrock is
metaphorically so, wondering, while “the women come and go,” if he even dares “to eat a
peach,” much less to enjoy what the peach might represent. (“I grow old … I grow old …/ I shall
wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled”). They are victims, who cannot forge complete selves in
the face of a fragmented existence. The story of U.S. modernisms that emerges as a result tells of
a characteristic literary response to two brutal world wars, offering up a generalized masculine
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disenchantment. But what of feminine disenchantment? The anti-heroine, I suggest, bears
witness not just to modernity’s contractions, but to its rapidly expanding possibilities: the new
opportunities the era offered for things like travel, communication, sex and sexuality, even love.
Briefly put, this project tells of American literary modernisms by way of a theoretical and
historical analysis the period’s anti-heroines. Femininity gone awry, this figure, whom I call “the
Woman We Don’t Want to Be,” delimits the parameters of the systems that create her and into
which she feeds. In recovering women’s writing from the period, feminist scholars have for
obvious reasons tended to value feminist texts. Yet the anti-heroine is an imperfect feminist
agent, to say the least. She either fails to attain self-fulfillment, much less empowerment, or
succeeds by buying into and profiting off of patriarchal, racist systems. And in reproducing her,
her authors also reproduce, to varying degrees, the racist and sexist ideologies by which she is
judged. As a result, these texts don’t fit into the existing feminist schema by which we have
recovered and framed women’s writing. The anti-heroine doesn’t implicitly or explicitly disrupt
the hetero-patriarchy; she sits, albeit uncomfortably, within it. If this figure fits poorly into
feminist rubrics, however, I argue that she perfectly reflects the period’s hesitancy towards
feminist ideas. In this project, I thus report upon American modernisms’ relationship to what I
call, following the lead of a 1925 Harper’s Monthly column, “feminism’s awkward age.” By
placing the Woman We Don’t Want to Be—unnerving both in her familiarity and in the
possibilities she represents for American femininity—at the center of American modernisms, this
study offers a new perspective on the period and its peculiar preoccupation not just with selfmaking, in the sense of the self-made man, but with the repulsive and fascinating possibilities of
the un-made or incoherent feminine self.

2

An Embarrassment of Bitches

I borrow the phrase “an embarrassment of bitches” from New Yorker television critic Emily
Nussbaum. She uses it in her review of one of the best recent incarnations of the modernist type
this project describes: Phoebe Waller-Bridge’s titular character Fleabag from her 2016 BBC
series. The show “Fleabag,” Nussbaum writes, “appears at the crest of a years-long wave of badgirl comedy on cable; it’s both a welcome phenomenon and one that, for viewers trying to
choose new shows, can feel like an embarrassment of bitches.” The twenty-first century
incarnation of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be has indeed jumped from the page to the screen,
supplementing the exasperated wives and “women who have it all” with carefully wrought
portraits of feminine failings.1 Fleabag, alongside Valerie Cherish’s cringe-inducing efforts to
ingratiate herself in “The Comeback” (2005, 2014) and Hanna Horvath’s intense selfishness in
“Girls” (2012-2017) offer just a few examples.2
American modernity too enjoyed an embarrassment of bitches. For the purposes of this
project I have chosen to discuss only protagonists—characters towards whom the reader is
predisposed because they inhabit the primary role in the text. These texts don’t merely brook
feminine disrepute; they center it.3 Even within these parameters, there is a veritable wealth of
subjects from which to choose. I focus on this figure as she appears in Gertrude Stein’s Three
1

For more on this phenomenon, see Gay (2014), Weinman (2013) and Susman (2015).
That’s not to say that she’s left the novel entirely: Lauren Groff’s Mathilde of Fates and Furies (2015), Celeste
Ng’s Mrs. Richardson of Little Fires Everywhere (2017) and Gillian Flynn’s Gone Girl (2012) furnish more good
contemporary examples.
3
Ann Ducille notes this phenomenon with regard to the period’s black women writers, arguing that one of the ways
Fauset, Larsen and Hurston “rewrite” their predecessors lies in that “heroines cease to be singularly and uniformly
heroic, good. pure, blameless—victims of patriarchal privilege and racial oppression who persevere against all odds;
they become instead multi-dimensional figures, full of human (and, in some cases, monstrous) faults and foibles”
(Coupling Convention 87). She makes much, as I will too, of Fauset and Larsen’s particular interest in portraying
“the colonized mind … [T]heir texts implicitly explore the ways in which social forces and patriarchal ideology
inspire, if not demand, the participation of black women in their own objectification and domination” (Coupling
Convention 94).
2
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Lives (1909), Edith Wharton’s Custom of the Country (1913), Anita Loos’ Gentlemen Prefer
Blondes (1925), Nella Larsen’s Quicksand (1928), Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Plum Bun (1928) and
Dorothy Parker’s “Big Blonde” (1929). Yet I might also, for instance, have written on Dawn
Powell’s Effie of Turn, Magic Wheel (1936), Rosalie of Parker’s glorious send-up “Sentiment”
(1933), Jane Bowles’ Christina of Two Serious Ladies (1943), Nancy Boyd’s nameless
protagonist in “No Bigger Than a Man’s Head” (1922) or Tess Slesinger’s Cornelia in “On Being
Told…” (1935). Journeying outside the realm of protagonists, we have perhaps the best bad girl
of 1920’s literature, Clare of Larsen’s Passing (1929), not to mention sublimely awful Dodo of
Powell’s The Locusts Have No King (1948). The pickings among work written by male authors
are noticeably slimmer—because writing the anti-heroine requires centering feminine interiority
in the first place—but Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie (1900) is an obvious, if early, referent, as
is Gloria of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Beautiful and the Damned (1922). There is also The Great
Gatsby’s Daisy Buchanan (1925) and Lady Brett Ashley of Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also
Rises (1926)—neither of them protagonists, but both certainly problems in the way the Woman
We Don’t Want to Be is a problem.
Had this dissertation centered on the work of male authors, it might have been called
“The Women We Don’t Want to Marry” (or shouldn’t want to marry, or shouldn’t have married).
I’m joking, of course, but I also mean this joke as a come-on of sorts: in titling this project “The
Woman We Don’t Want to Be,” I am acknowledging a conscious bias in its construction. The
argument I am making here about American modernisms grows out of women’s work and
imagines an implicitly feminine reader, as I will discuss in the next section. What this project
offers, then, is at once a reassessment of the literary moment of American modernisms and a
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provocation. What happens when we take seriously the wealth of wrong women in the period,
American modernity’s own “embarrassment of bitches?”
And they were indeed embarrassing, these women called forth on the page to be the
subjects not just of gleeful mockery and sanction, but of furtive pity, uncomfortable recognition,
even envy. Each age calls for its own bogeys; and The Woman We Don’t Want to Be was, I
contend, American modernity’s tailor-made bête noire, the perfect instantiation of its fears and
foibles. If the choices newly available to women derive from the period’s expansions, then when
the anti-heroine choses or feels wrong, destroying others or herself in the process, she personifies
that which is unsettled and unsettling about the times themselves. These deplorable female
protagonists are both symptom and disease. They foster discomfort not because they oppose the
racist hetero-patriarchal systems that would and do oppress them, but because they buy into—
failing and succeeding within—those very systems. This, then, is the nature of the trap in which
the Woman We Don’t Want to Be finds herself: because her desires and tactics originate within
those systems, she is rendered complicit in her own oppression, even as she is sometimes able to
turn that complicity to her advantage. Dorothy Parker’s Hazel, for instance, is “fun” because
“men liked you when you were fun,” and she is crushed by precisely that “fun.” Anita Loos’
Lorelei, on the other hand, enriches herself by playing into the expectations of those men who
see her as an unwitting conduit for their desires and strivings; in the end they prove the dupes. In
short, the Woman We Don’t Want to Be is a participant, lighting the apparatus from the inside by
attempting to succeed by its parameters. As a result, she reveals the nature of those parameters,
probing the limits of acceptability. The picture she provides of American modernisms is of an era
deeply concerned with how to make oneself—in the sense of the self-made man—socially,
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economically and personally. Of course, the question (and for women in particular) was also this:
can one make the self at all?
But first, who are the Women We Don’t Want to Be? They are female-authored
protagonists who are frustrating, despicable, difficult, or in some other way objectionable—
characters whom we might roughly term anti-heroines. Naming this figure as such is an uneasy
but instructive endeavor. The Oxford English Dictionary is unusually terse on the subject of the
“anti-hero”: “n. One who is the opposite or reverse of a hero; esp. a chief character in a poem,
play, or story or story who is totally unlike a conventional hero.” “Anti-heroine,” as a derivative
of the term, first appeared in 1907 in Frank Wadleigh Chandler’s delightfully titled critical
monograph The Literature of Roguery. Chandler does little to distinguish the few examples of
anti-heroines he offers from his masculine account of anti-heroism; these female characters are
also derivatives, warranting no more than a sentence or two. He was hardly alone in this: I have
yet to find an account of the modernist anti-heroine as distinct from the anti-hero. Yet, at least in
American modernisms, the anti-heroine is an entirely different beast.
For critics of the modernist anti-hero, the defining quality of this figure as historically
situated is his victimhood.4 “In fiction,” Ihab Hassan writes, “the unnerving rubric ‘antihero’
refers to a ragged assembly of victims” (55). The modernist anti-hero’s impotence in the face of
rapid change is, Shadi Neimneh contends, “a response to the insignificance of human beings in
modernity and their drab existence; it is a feature of modernism and its zeitgeist” (75). This “do I
dare to eat a peach” model of masculinity pits itself against the self-determination of the
traditional American hero. The anti-hero, in other words, is the timely rebuttal of the American
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See Walker (1985), Hassan (1995), Brombert (1999) and Neimneh (2013).
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myth of the “self-made man.”5 But what of the American woman, who was neither expected nor
empowered to make herself? And whose existence was not contracting but expanding—the result
of innovations in technology and medicine, most notably birth control, changing societal norms
around romantic love, and women’s increased ability to travel independently. Indeed, some of the
most despicable of modernity’s heroines were self-made women, and that was precisely the
problem: Instead of living in altruistic relationality, they made themselves at the (often literal)
expense of others. American modernisms’ anti-heroes, by constrast, tell of masculine
disenchantment and the fragmentation of the self in the face of rapid change. If we seek
modernism’s zeitgeist there, we find only a world closing in on itself and its denizens, the
“wasteland” of modernity. Modernity’s anti-heroines offer a more balanced version of the story,
telling not just of victimhood, impotence, and failures of self-making, but of the period’s newly
available choices, and the anxiety to which those choices gave rise. In other words, whereas the
anti-hero has long been the avatar of American Modernism, the anti-heroine provides a much
larger and more accurate picture of the moment.
Even so, the word “anti-heroine” is not entirely adequate to the task of describing this
peculiarly modernist phenomenon. The term necessarily appeals to a long-standing tradition of
female heroism and its converse. We might trace the Western tradition of the anti-heroine to the
long nineteenth century, when authors began to center despicable women instead of relegating
them to the sidelines as comic relief, cautionary tales or both (think Mrs. Elton of Jane Austen’s
Emma). William Makepeace Thackery’s Becky Sharp in Vanity Fair (serialized 1847-1848),
Gustave Flaubert’s eponymous Madame Bovary (1856), or, slightly earlier and significantly less
canonical, the fallen society girl Eliza Wharton in Hannah Webster Foster’s The Coquette (1797)
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The phrase was first coined in 1832 by United States senator Henry Clay to describe laborers who controlled their
own success, rather than being controlled by external forces.
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furnish useful examples. However, the phenomenon I am describing here, and ascribing to this
particular moment in American literary history, does not entirely follow from the tradition of
feminine anti-heroism these texts map. Whereas these protagonists offer their readers cautionary
tales and villainy, inspiring disdain, hatred, and sometimes even pity, they do not encourage the
kinds of recognition their modernist counterparts do. The modernist anti-heroine is implicated of
her own accord, but she also implicates the brutal world that makes and unmakes her. As a result,
she sullies not just herself, but everyone around her. And she gives rise not just to pity, disdain
and fear, but to admiration and envy—an affective ambivalence that leads, as I show in my first
chapter, to an ethical ambivalence, worrying the sharp lines of society’s moral strictures. In
attempting to name this dynamic and to foreground the reaction she inspires, I favor another
term: The Woman We Don’t Want to Be.

The “We” Who Wants: A Methodological Preamble

The Woman We Don’t Want to Be is constituted by an ambivalent affective relationship between
reader and protagonist. Naming this figure as such is thus dependent upon a critical
characterization of the contemporary “we” who experiences her—the “we” who wants and who
is repulsed, the “we” who is constituted and who fears and refuses such constitution. A dubious
and various collective, this “we” is difficult to pin down and impossible to locate within a single
imagined reader. In casting around for methodologies adequate to this task, I have found
traditional modes of critique useful, but ultimately insufficient. Sarah Blackwood and Sarah
Mesle come upon a similar issue in writing about their encounter as both critics and
contemporary readers with Lenù, the protagonist of Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels. “What
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if,” they ask, “a text … generates knowledges and experiences that can’t be contained within the
consensus making world of criticism or that comes to knowledge from a felt sense, hard to
describe or explain? … What if you know something about a text because of something dark,
bad, shameful, or unacceptable, that you know about yourself?” It’s not just that encountering the
anti-heroine necessitates appeal to ways of knowing that supplement or supplant criticism’s basic
structures; it’s that the encounter with the anti-heroine gives rise to those new ways of knowing.
“We” don’t go willingly into relation with the Woman We Don’t Want to Be, but we find and
lose ourselves within her all the same.
In this study, I thus align myself with a relatively uncontroversial understanding of
postcritique, one that neither refuses critique nor takes it up as the only mode of reading.
Matthew Mullins describes this stance particularly well in his review of Critique and
Postcritique (2017), writing, “the ‘post-’ in postcritique does not suggest that postcritical reading
has only emerged just now in the aftermath of critique. Neither does it mean that critique is dead,
exhausted, finished. Rather, it signifies that critique is no longer synonymous with literary
studies and that there are still vibrant and rewarding ways of reading a text even after it has been
read critically” (486-487). This stance is hardly new; critics have been performing postcritical
readings for quite a while now, if not always by that name. It is merely, as a result of the recent
reading debates, newly on display. With this study, I seek to widen the space available in
modernist and American studies for the sort of postcritical affective analyses to which critics like
Rita Felski and Sianne Ngai point—asking questions of recognition, disgust and even that
classroom bogeyman, likability6—by meaningfully engaging questions of readerly experience.

6

The terms “recognition” and “disgust” are taken from Rita Felski’s and Sianne Ngai’s Uses of Literature (2008)
and Ugly Feelings (2007), respectively. To my knowledge, no critic has seriously taken on the question of likability.
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I employ various tactics in this effort. I draw from contemporary sketches of modern
femininity offered in articles, editorials and advertisements from magazines like Harper’s
Bazaar, Time and The Crisis. I consider contemporary reviews of and responses to my key texts
in magazines, newspapers and letters; and I call on theoretical models from affect studies and the
recent reading debates to consider how the texts themselves express the affective disposition of
other characters towards their anti-heroines, imply an affective relationship between author and
protagonist, and cultivate an affective disposition towards the protagonist on the part of the
reader. In this effort, I align myself with the key interventions of Molly Travis’ Reading Cultures
(1998). She argues, first, that we ought to differentiate the textual reader and the actual reader
(though they are fundamentally “both constructions” (2)); second, that readers read in an effort to
find themselves; and third, that readers “never escape a social context” (6).
Evidence-based though this approach may be, constructing a “we” is necessarily a
speculative endeavor. There is a moment in Juliana Spahr’s Everybody’s Autonomy: Connective
Reading and Collective Identity (2001) when she writes, “Mainly this book is an attempt to
figure out my own story, to understand what happened when I was in high school and found
Stein’s work … and everything I thought I knew about reading changed’ (14-15). I love this
moment for its bravery, but also for pulling out what is already there, at the heart of every critical
project: a search for ourselves. The critical “we” tends to be a way of dispersing the ownership of
an idea among a vast, imagined collective. It’s about safely saying in the critical sphere that I, the
person writing these words, feel this way. It is both disingenuous and entirely, utterly in earnest.
In constructing a contemporary “we” that understands this woman by negation—“The Woman
We Don’t Want to Be”—I try to acknowledge the pitfalls of this critical vantage point, even as I
explore its wealth of possibilities. These pitfalls are hardly new or newly understood. I risk first
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of all creating a critical and contemporary “we” that is merely a vaguely historicized extension of
myself. Rita Felski writes beautifully of this concern in the Gender of Modernity (1995),
discussing her efforts to avoid anachronism notwithstanding “the necessary construction of the
past from the standpoint of the present” (34).7 And I risk recreating the hegemonic “we” that is
merely, as Donna Haraway puts it, “the vantage point of the cyclopian, self-satiated eye of the
master subject” (1990, 192). As Felski observes, “this historical tightrope of empathy and
critique is a difficult one to negotiate skillfully: it remains for the reader to decide how
successfully this negotiation has been achieved” (Gender of Modernity 34). Yet there are
rewards, too, to this effort to conceive of a readerly “we.” Much of what is striking, the punctum,
of the texts I consider in this project lies their exploration of the play between collective anxiety
and individual possibility. The authors themselves respond to, imagine, and to a certain extent,
create a readership. And so, in interacting with these texts, I do too.
I borrow again from Felski, looking in particular to her notion of “recognition,” alongside
Lauren Berlant’s conception of an “intimate public,” in order to do the theoretical work of
constructing this “we.” The two ideas bear remarkable similarity to one another: both describe
how individuals can organize around a cultural product without necessarily coalescing into a
unified group. Felski begins her reading of the difficult, neurotic Hedda Gabler in her chapter on
“Recognition” with an anecdote about a woman who reportedly said, “Hedda is all of us.” For
Felski, this observation expresses two key features of the audience’s experience: first, it indicates
an affective experience of recognition that changes how the self is understood; second, it makes
reference to a gendered “us” that shares in that recognition (Uses of Literature 35). The two are

7

As it happens, there has been a call recently for so-called “strategic presentism” in the form of a 2018 MLA Panel
and Wai Chee Dimock’s Editor’s Column in PMLA, “Historicism, Presentism, Futurism” (2018). As Dimock
describes it, “strategic presentism” might enable in the same way as Spivak’s “strategic essentialism”: “a cautiously
adopted presentism might allow humanists to bracket the nontrivial differences among historical periods” (257). In
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of course linked: the identificatory recognition creates alliances among members of what Lauren
Berlant calls the “intimate public.” Berlant defines an “intimate public” as “a loosely organized,
market-structured, juxtapolitical sphere of people attached to each other by a sense that there is a
common emotional world available to individuals who have been marked by the
historical burden of being harshly treated in a generic way” (Female Complaint 10, Berlant’s
italics). The “we” I construct here is similar to Berlant’s in that it documents the attachment of
individuals to one another by virtue of the “sense that there is a common emotional world”
available to individuals who have been “harshly treated in a generic way.” For the purposes of
this project, that shared emotional world is constructed not just by recognition, affiliation and
envy, but by antipathy, revulsion and irritation, with these affects manifesting in different
degrees, arrangements and forms according to the reader’s own species of “harsh treatments” or
lack thereof. Put another way, the “we” I construct is an intimate public constituted by a shared
but individualized affective ambivalence.
One finds traces of this “we” in reviews of Nella Larsen’s Quicksand and the collective
frustrations they document, in the advertisements surrounding Anita Loos’ Gentlemen Prefer
Blondes, which I’ll discuss at the end of this introduction, and in Larsen’s letter to Stein about
“Melanctha”: “I never cease to wonder,” Larsen writes, “how you came to write it and just why
you and not some one of us should so accurately have caught the spirit of this race of mine.”8 Of
course, other black authors disagreed vehemently with Larsen’s assessment—Claude McKay, for
instance, read “Melanctha” as little more than minstrelsy, which, in a sense, it was)—and that is
precisely the point (Daniel 69). The “we” I seek to describe constitutes a diffuse and
differentiated collective with conflicting affective responses. This multivalent “we” is,

this sense, presentism is, as Terrance Hawkes has it, “no more than an up-front acknowledgment of our
‘situatedness’” in time (qtd. in Dimock 261).
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furthermore, frequently inscribed into the texts themselves. Near the end of Fauset’s Plum Bun,
for instance, the protagonist Angela “said to herself, ‘There is no sorrow in the world like my
sorrow,’ and knew even as she said it that some one else, perhaps only in the next block, in the
next house, was saying the same thing” (310). Here Fauset’s protagonist is, to say the least, in a
highly particular situation: passing for white, trying to reforge the ties she severed from her black
community and trying to marry a man she thought was white (he turns out to be passing too), she
finds that that man is engaged to her sister. What links Angela to “some one else, perhaps only in
the next block, in the street” is the very particularity of her sorrow. Angela and this “some one
else” share a sense of the uniqueness of their pain and, crucially, of being utterly alone in their
experience of that pain. In reconstructing these collective recognitions of individual sorrows, it is
crucial to recognize the wide range of possible readerly experience, dependent upon race, class,
sexuality, gender, a whole myriad of positionalities and investments, that might feed into such a
collective.9
Finally, part and parcel of this “we” is an acknowledgment of how these characters, like
so many female protagonists written by female authors, were inevitably understood as extensions
of their authors’ public personae and private lives. Here, I start from Faye Hammill’s instructive
reading of Anita Loos. Hammill shows how Loos strategically moves in and out of public
identification with her anti-heroine, sometimes distancing herself from Lorelei, sometimes taking
her on as a sort of alter-ego. Similarly, Edith Wharton’s biographer R. W. B. Lewis refers to
Undine as Wharton’s “anti-self” (350), and Dorothy Parker claims her anti-heroine Hazel was
based on “a friend of mine … just say I knew a woman once,” an identificatory oscillation
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further complicated by the similarities between Hazel’s plot and Parker’s life (Parker & Capron
5). Nella Larsen is particularly interesting in this respect, as she lied publicly about certain facets
of her life to more closely align her biography with that of her protagonist Helga Crane. In this
sense the Woman We Don’t Want to Be functions not just as a foil for the author, but as an antiself, an alter-ego, even an uncanny double. Just as “Hedda is all of us,” the anti-heroine provides
a fun-house mirror reflection of her authors. My primary interest here, however, is not
biographical. Rather, I consider how women writers use their protagonists—and the real or
perceived identificatory slippages between those protagonists and themselves—to negotiate their
literary moment.

A Literary History of Feminism’s Awkward Age

In 1925, Harper’s Monthly published a piece by columnist Elizabeth Breuer entitled “Feminism’s
Awkward Age.” The article offers a highly suggestive portrait of the age by way of its women:
Too many who have jobs wish they were wives, and if they are wives they wish they had
jobs. If they love without convention they pine for marriage. If they are married they feel
they might have accomplished more in the wild waste lands of irresponsible emotions. So
it goes, in varying degrees of regret. What, then, is the matter with us? The matter is that
we are at that stage of self-consciousness that makes everything in life difficult, just as
individuals reach an awkward age. We do not move easily. We are assertive, angular. We
get in everybody’s way. We are either too sad or too happy. (545)
The modern woman Breuer describes is divided against herself, incapable of getting all she
wants, and just as incapable of not wanting all she can’t have. Breuer goes on to argue that
organized feminism had been replaced by individual women’s frustrated desires. In place of
collective action, Breuer posits the individuated strivings of women to become themselves.
“[C]onsciously our job is just the job of trying to be human beings,” she writes. “The machine
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age, by needing us to feed it, has given women the chance to express themselves” (550-551).
“The matter with us,” then, is also the problem with modernity: modernity engenders in women a
desire for complete selfhood it does not enable them to fulfill. The standard-bearer of this
frustrated femininity—and thus of the awkward moment in American feminism Breuer
describes—is herself a Woman We Don’t Want to Be, “assertive, angular, … get[ting] in
everybody’s way.” This difficult woman is at once a symptom of the age and what its denizens
most fear becoming: the woman who either cannot find or forge the self, or who does so in all
the wrong ways.
Alongside Breuer’s “assertive, angular” “we,” The Woman We Don’t Want to Be engages
in a communal searching for an individual telos. This is some of what Berlant means when she
claims in The Female Complaint that the “intimate public” is “juxtapolitical.” By
“juxtapolitical,” Berlant broadly means that the personal and the political are imperfectly aligned
in an intimate public. She sees her “intimate public” as “consumers who, depressed by the
political, do not see it as a resource for its own reformulation or theirs” (29). And just as the
“we” this project describes exists alongside, but does not align with or see resources within, a
political project, the Woman We Don’t Want to Be does not necessarily do the sort of feminist
community-building one might expect or hope for. In her 1914 “Feminist Manifesto,” Mina Loy
wrote, “As conditions are at present constituted—you [women] have the choice/ between
Parasitism, & Prostitu-/tion—or Negation.” The anti-heroine takes these choices as offered.
Although her search amply demonstrates the fissures of both the good life she seeks and the
structures within which she seeks it, she offers little in the way of solidarity or solution.10 Many
of the texts this project explores offer satirical critique of American modernity, but that critique is
hardly meant to foment collective action. In contrast to traditional, optimistic satire in which a
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problem is laid out with the sense that by identifying it it might be solved, one finds instead the
question Breuer poses in “Feminism’s Awkward Age”: “What, then, is the matter with us?” The
answer, it turns out, is everything. Everything in these texts is wrong: the Woman We Don’t Want
to Be and the world that excludes, censures and despises her, even as it makes her what she is.11
As a result, this figure is at once uncomfortably threatening and exceedingly banal. Not seeking
to disrupt unjust systems, she nonetheless makes their failings visible by virtue of her very
existence.
This portrait of the age differs markedly from those offered by other critics who construct
and work from a feminine modernist canon. Broadly speaking, these critics tend to align
modernist women writers with feminist values, or to pull out feminist values in the texts they
describe.12 I do not mean to separate my project out from these feminist values or methodologies,
nor to malign any of this excellent and much-needed work. My work is intellectually and
materially enabled by this critical tradition. I would, however, like to suggest that these
investments, when taken in aggregate, skew our understanding of American women’s
modernisms, and thus of American modernisms more generally, towards that which is more
easily recovered within a feminist framework.13 Critical responses to the texts I discuss in this
project, for instance, tend to read for the side-eye critiques these texts offer, while neglecting the
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intense—often misogynist and racist—antagonism these authors siphon towards their
protagonists. In the past couple decades or so, this trend has been changing. For writers like
Wharton, Stein and Fauset in particular, it is becoming less critically de rigueur to disavow their
various conservatisms in order to be able to talk about their work. And critics like Sarah Ahmed,
Sianne Ngai, Anne Anling Cheng and Lauren Berlant have begun this work in a more theoretical,
less historicist context. Here, I work in the same vein to try to make space in feminist scholarship
for encountering those aspects of women’s writing that are either not feminist or explicitly
antifeminist. American women’s modernisms don’t fit perfectly into a feminist rubric, and why
should they? Modernity coincided with a particularly awkward moment in American feminism.
Indeed, every one of the authors discussed in this study had an ambivalent, if not openly
antagonistic, relationship towards feminism as a movement and women’s empowerment more
generally.14 Gertrude Stein, for instance, navigated the disconnect between her own ambition and
her sense that “the whole physical scheme of the woman is directed towards fitness for
propagation” by adopting what her biographer Lucy Daniel called “a persistent masculine
authorial pose” (“Degeneracy in American Women” 412, Daniel 27).15 In The Autobiography of
Alice B. Toklas, she reports wise-cracking in response to a friend’s request to “remember the
cause of women,” it was “not … that she at all minds the cause of women or any other cause but
it does not happen to be her business” (83). Edith Wharton too was hardly in sympathy with the
application to Wharton and her work. For instance, most feminist critics seem to imply that Wharton, though never
one to ally herself with the feminist movements of her day, was a kind of inherent feminist” (237).
14
Granted, it is unclear how Nella Larsen felt about contemporary feminism. I don’t believe either of her
biographers discuss the issue, and I could find no indication of her opinions on the matter in any of her published
work, or any of the small collection of letters I was able to track down. As Larsen was the most private and least
prolific of the authors discussed, it perhaps makes sense that this should be yet another blank spot in her life. In any
case, Larsen’s readers would have known nothing of her inclinations.
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women’s movement, writing in her own autobiography A Backward Glance, of “that ancient
curriculum of house-keeping which, at least in the Anglo-Saxon countries, was so soon to be
swept aside by the ‘monstrous regiment’ of the emancipated: young women taught by their elders
to despise the kitchen and the linen room, and to substitute the acquiring of University degrees
for the more complex art of civilized living” (60).16 The ambivalences of Dorothy Parker, Jessie
Redmon Fauset and Anita Loos towards feminism have been subject to greater notice.17 Likely
because of their status as middlebrow writers, they are often accused of anti-feminism—and I
use the word “accused” advisedly, as anti-feminism is often rhetorically deployed to imply a lack
of depth.18 To be clear (or really, in case it wasn’t clear), that is not the argument I wish to make
here. I don’t mean to offer a rebuke, merely a description: In “feminism’s awkward age,” these
authors too felt awkward about feminism, and they showed that awkwardness in their despicable
female characters, in their work more generally and in the public faces they presented.
Granted, Dorothy Parker, Anita Loos and Jessie Redmon Fauset—along with Edith
Wharton and occasionally Nella Larsen—were and are often similarly accused of not being
“modernists.” Gertrude Stein seems to be one of the few American women writers whom we
might declare “safe” in this regard, both because of her aesthetic difficulty and as a result of her
own repetitive insistence that she “started the whole thing” (qtd. in Benstock 18).19 Including
these writers in a project on American modernisms then raises the question: what do I mean by
modernisms in the first place?
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Beginning with the advent of the term, there have been countless debates about what
modernism is—when it begins and ends, what its contours are, whether it is singular or plural,
what its inclusions and exclusions are, what those inclusions and exclusions mean, and about
whom. In the late 1990’s, these debates culminated in the “New Modernist Studies,” which
called for a marked expansion of the field along various trajectories.20 Let’s start, then, with
some points of (relatively) unanimous agreement. First, most agree that modernity was a season
of rapid change, and M/modernism(s) was/were a characteristic artistic response or set of artistic
responses to that change.21 Second, most agree that capital-M-Modernism and its aspirations
towards cultural and intellectual purity were not overlaid on top of modernity’s literary
production after the fact; they were there from the start, a product of the New Critical tradition
that emerged during the same period.22 Third, most agree that M/modernism(s) set
itself/themselves up as representing a break from nineteenth-century literary modes, particularly,
in the United States, Sentimentalism. Finally, most agree that these stories of the Great Divide on
the one hand, and aesthetic rupture on the other, are inadequate to describing the period’s
literature.23 Beyond these claims, I will remain neutral with regard to the terminological debates.
In calling the subject of this study as American modernisms, I name my ambition to begin to
describe the morass of American literary responses to modernity.
The Woman We Don’t Want to be is highly useful in this regard, as she slots into these
contemporary and retrospective debates of her own accord. She appears across literary “brows,”
even as to a certain extent she transcends them;24 her characterization draws, with marked
20
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ambivalence, from nineteenth century aesthetic modes; and she is both witness to and instrument
of the period’s rapid changes. Taking off from this figure’s own contradictory logics, this study,
rather than contesting the definition or M/modernism(s), takes the term’s contested nature as a
starting point. American modernisms thus resolve into a series of bifurcated portraits that, while
not particularly satisfactory to those attempting a clean definition, encapsulate the various ways
of thinking about the period’s literary production.
To that point, this dissertation also traverses a racial divide that has, in canonical terms,
cordoned off literary production by black artists and insulated the work of white artists from
considerations of race. Race was “an originating concern of modernism” (Rainey & Hallberg 2).
This quotation is taken from the introduction to the first issue of Modernism/Modernity,
published in 1994, in which the editors ask “how the history of modernism might look if we took
race as an originating concern of modernism, as some of the authors included in this issue argue
we should” (2). I use it somewhat tendentiously, as a way of gesturing to the longstanding
tradition of understanding race as central to modernism(s), even as the centrality of race is still
often ignored and black authors tokenized in book-length studies.25. While I acknowledge the
very different conditions in which black and white authors wrote and sought readers, I also seek
not to recreate two “separate but equal” canons—the Harlem Renaissance on the one hand and
American Modernism on the other—but to document black and white author’s characteristic
artistic responses to their shared moment.26 Adrienne Johnson Gosselin makes the case for this
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approach in “Beyond the Harlem Renaissance: The Case for Black Modernist Writers” (1996).
We ought “include black authors,” she argues, “not as Harlem Renaissance writers on the
periphery of a larger, Euro-American movement, but as black Americans participating in the
modernist phenomenon” (37). The effect of this stance is not just to widen the modernist canon,
though that is all to the good, but also to foreground race as an “originating concern” for black
and white modernists alike. In the United States, both white and black authors deployed race to
negotiate their relationship to the nation, to make claims at authenticity, and, particularly central
to my purposes, to indicate and manage desirability or lack thereof. Indeed, the authors I
examine here all centralize race in their texts, using whiteness and blackness (and biraciality,
blackness masquerading as whiteness, whiteness that is nonetheless a “race apart” from other
kinds of whiteness, blondness as idealized whiteness) to inscribe difference, cultivate
ambivalence, and limn desirability and despicability. An account of the Woman We Don’t Want
to Be would thus be woefully incomplete without an account of race.

Types & Tactics

As you’ll see, I’ve structured this project in a series of diptychs, dividing my examples of the
Woman We Don’t Want to Be into racialized types: blondes for the introduction, “mulattas” for
Chapters One and Two and passers for Chapters Three and Four. I do so both as an analytical
tool—placing representatives of each type into conversation with one another is highly useful—
and because typing was something of a fashion during American modernity.27 Between the
prevalence of types in the new mass-market magazines and the emerging “sciences” of eugenics

substantial material and political differences among the thinkers, writers, and activists I consider, but instead to
analyze the differences among their various, often competing, versions of improved human breeding” (22).
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and ethnology, Americans were using types as a way of understanding not just the other, but
themselves.
Rapid advances in printing technologies around the turn of the twentieth century created
the conditions for the proliferation and popularization of magazines and newspapers.28 These
periodicals, Angela Weaver argues, “were leaders in the debate over how a woman should live
her life in American society” (32); and the so-called “smart” magazines in particular funneled
their estimations and admonishments of modern American femininity through sketches of
recognizable “types.”29 Dorothy Parker was especially prolific in this vein, publishing pieces like
“Women: A Hate Song” (1916) in Vanity Fair, “Our Tuesday Club” (1920) in Ladies’ Home
Journal and, as a commentary on inadequate masculinity, “Men I’m Not Married To” (1922) in
The Saturday Evening Post. “Women: A Hate Song” is particularly pointed, its six stanzas
mapping out six possibilities for modern femininity, none of them particularly likable (though
many are eminently enviable). Of the “domestic” types, she writes, “Oh I hate that kind of
woman”; “They are the worst./ Every moment is packed with Happiness./ They breathe deeply/
And walk with large strides, eternally hurrying home/ To see about dinner.” Of the “WellInformed ones,” she observes, “they absolutely ooze current events”; “Oh how they bore me.”
There is an inherent derision, even a narrative violence, to this typing: Parker flattens women she
has known (and whom her readers too have presumably known) into forms that are at once
recognizable and banal. Her derision is consistent with that with which the Woman We Don’t
Want to Be more generally is met. Indeed, Parker’s ‘Woman: A Hate Song” is in some senses a
litany of them in verse. Parker’s derision, however, is not reserved solely for these women; it
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rebounds too upon the poem’s speaker, a malcontent incapable of performing any of the
normative femininities she outlines, and on the reader, who is roped in at the end. Of the
“unfailingly cheerful ones” she skewers in the poem’s closing stanzas, Parker muses, “I
sometimes yearn to kill them./ Any jury would acquit me. I hate women./ They get on my
nerves.” The joke is on “the unfailingly cheerful ones,” them, on the speaker, but it is also,
finally, on us “women” in general. It’s not just that we, as invoked and represented by Parker’s
imaginary jury, hate women too (they get on our nerves); it’s that the contemporary woman may
well have recognized herself among the typology Parker assembles. If the set of feminine
possibilities Parker constructs are ridiculous, despicable and annoying, it is because we recognize
them in others, and in ourselves.
Of the texts this study examines, Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Plum Bun, Anita Loos’
Gentlemen Prefer Blondes and Dorothy Parker’s “Big Blonde” explicitly align the typing of their
protagonists to the mass market magazine practice of typing. Gertrude Stein and Edith Wharton
were also interested in the mass market apparatus and its preoccupation with types, but they
were, alongside their New Negro counterparts Fauset and Nella Larsen, particularly attuned to
the possibilities for typing contemporary modes of racial classifications offered.30
At the turn of the twentieth century, eugenics and ethnology emerged as ways to
catalogue and describe humanity.31 As Paul Peppis shows, these discourses were “conditioned by
the popular concept of type, which during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gained
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immense popular currency, becoming structurally entwined with period conceptions of race”
(373, Peppis’ italics).32 I’ll discuss these trends at greater length in the chapters devoted to Stein
and Wharton, but it suffices for now to observe that the characterization of the Woman We Don’t
Want to Be is conditioned by contemporary eugenic and ethnographic thinking—not to mention
black and white nativism—which were highly invested in the notion that appearance might offer
insight into character, and that human behavior might therefore be more fully understood by way
of subdivision into racial or ethnic types. Granted, while the anti-heroine’s characterization often
relies upon these contemporary essentialisms, she just as frequently serves as a deliberate rebuke
to them. The passers in particular belie the sense that race, character or marriageability are
legible on the body; and while Stein and Larsen toy with the determinisms and pathologies
assigned to the “mulatta,” both ultimately undermine them, consigning their biracial antiheroines to tragic endings without allowing that it must have been so. The blondes, finally, are
especially interesting in this regard. Blondness has long been a signifier of whiteness, which is to
say, the presumed racial default, and that which is thus understood to be above notice. Yet
blondness also calls attention to itself. It is an almost ostentatious whiteness that particularly
appealed to eugenicists for its link to the putatively superior Nordic (or later, Germanic) “master
race.” For Loos and Parker, Blondness first and foremost limns desirability. Yet, confounding
eugenic notions of such desirability, both Loos and Parker make monsters of their blondes in a
marital and reproductive schema: Loos’ Lorelei is a horrible mother, instrumentalizing and
neglecting her child, whereas Parker’s Hazel is almost grotesquely un-reproductive: she never
has children notwithstanding her wealth of sexual partners, and she herself ages and fattens.
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This brings me, finally, to a third way of thinking about types and the practice of typing:
as a collection of tactics and possibilities. In her book The Female Grotesque (1995), Mary
Russo suggests this path, which she adapts from Amelia Earhart’s defense of “stunting” in planeflying. (Earhart, incidentally, was born four years after Dorothy Parker, and disappeared the same
year Edith Wharton died.) Earhart writes, “Some critics protest against such exhibitions [of
stunts, or stunting]. I myself do not see what harm they do. … They may not point the way to
progress in aviation but they demonstrate its possibilities” (qtd. in Russo 20). “A stunt,” Russo
elaborates, “may be thought of more theoretically as a tactic for groups or individuals in a certain
risky situation in which a strategy is not possible” (21). This kind of typing bears witness to the
tricks and flips women perform along the tightrope walk of femininity. Coalescing these
characters around specific types allows us to acknowledge and explore the tactics they hold in
common. Like Russo, I use the word tactics advisedly, invoked Certeau’s conception of the
“tactic” as an improvisational tool of the disempowered—and as distinct from the “strategy,”
which is reserved for the fully enfranchised. Just as the anti-heroines considered here deploy
similar sets of tactics to negotiate the flux of modernity, their authors too deploy similar sets of
tactics to arrange themselves in the modernist literary scene. Constellating these tactics further
helps us to see the horizon of possibility and the nature of the limitations for these writers and
their anti-heroines.
In dividing these characters into types, then, I offer one final, tactical diptych: those who
have too much control, and those who have too little. The former is too pragmatic, the latter
insufficiently so. The former feels too much, the latter too little. It is a play of extremes in which
punishment is guaranteed; the question is merely to whom it will be meted out. Take, for
instance, the two blondes: Anita Loos’ Lorelei of Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1925) and Hazel
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Morse of Dorothy Parker’s “Big Blonde.” As I will show, Hazel feels too much and controls too
little, whereas Lorelei studiously feels nothing, and is thus able to control not just herself, but the
men who come into her orbit. This tactical division holds too for the rest of the anti-heroines I
discuss in this study: Stein’s Melanctha and Larsen’s Helga feel too much and control too little;
Wharton’s Undine and Fauset’s Angèle (as Angela renames herself when she is passing) feel too
little and control too much.

In Modern America, the Blonde Joke is on You

In his famous essay on Laughter (1900), Henri Bergson argues that “mechanical inelasticity” is a
necessary, if insufficient, prerequisite for the comic. By Bergson’s logic, we laugh at a man who
trips on the sidewalk because he can’t or won’t adapt to the sidewalk’s irregularities. The man’s
stride repeats itself mechanically, whereas, according to Bergson, “a really living life should
never repeat itself” (23). Bergson conceives of laughter as penalty for this mechanical
inelasticity, a means of socially policing and punishing inelastic behavior. What he does not
theorize, however,—and what I’ll take as my starting point here—is the ways these comic
mechanisms are themselves intrinsically punishing, regardless of whether or not they evoke
laughter. Take, for instance, one of Bergson’s key examples, of a Punch and Judy show:
No sooner does the policeman put in an appearance on the stage than, naturally enough,
he receives a blow which fells him. He springs to his feet, a second blow lays him flat. A
repetition of the offense is followed by a repetition of the punishment. Up and down the
constable flops and hops with the uniform rhythm of the bending and release of a spring,
whilst spectators laugh louder and louder (38).
This dynamic, even before the spectators laughter, of getting beaten down over and over again
because of an inability to adapt, lies at the center of this project and forms a common thread
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between the two tactical types I’ve described. The question is merely to whom these punishing,
repeating blows will be meted out.
Anita Loos’ 1925 bestseller Gentlemen Prefer Blondes features one of modernity’s most
despicable heroines. A potent mixture of tactical brilliance and sublime stupidity, Lorelei Lee
literally makes her living off of male attention. Loos’ blonde engineers the comic mechanisms of
the text, yet both author and protagonist direct comic brutality outwards, towards the titular
“gentlemen.” The men Lorelei seduces, uses and then casts aside are punished, reviled, and,
crucially, laughed at for being unable to adapt to the new kind of femininity she represents. In
Dorothy Parker’s award-winning 1929 short story “Big Blonde,” Parker refigures Loos’ blonde
in her protagonist Hazel Morse. Hazel is just as maddening as Lorelei, yet it is Hazel’s failures,
not her successes, that make her so distasteful. Parker’s “Big Blonde” ages and fattens Loos’
Lorelei, manifesting the trap the inevitable waning of youth and beauty presents for Hazel,
Lorelei and women like them.33 “Big Blonde” accordingly directs its comic brutality inward:
Hazel is punished, reviled and laughed at for her repetitions, incapable as she is of moving
outside of what we might call a “kept woman” plot.
In both cases, the problem these women represent is a matter of control—over the men
they encounter, but also, crucially, over themselves and their emotions. In short, whereas both
Lorelei and Hazel frustrate, repulse and unnerve readers with their choices, Lorelei does so by
having too much control, Hazel by having too little. What’s more, Parker and Loos use these
varying levels of control to sketch the age’s economies of affect. By this I mean to touch on what
Sarah Ahmed refers to in her “Affective Economies”—that emotions circulate throughout these
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This argument is taken in part from Rhonda Pettit, who framed Parker’s “Big Blonde” as an answer to Loos’
Gentlemen in her article “Material Girls in the Jazz Age” (1997).
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texts—but also to highlight how that the circulation of emotions has tangible effects on the
economic position of all involved, such that the emotions themselves become a kind of currency.
Throughout Anita Loos’ Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, her protagonist Lorelei cultivates an
almost uncanny level of control over the titular “gentlemen.” Yet her power sneaks up on her
reader, just as it sneaks up on the men in her orbit. Take, for instance, the second episode of
Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, aptly enough, given Bergson’s theorization of repetition, entitled
“Fate Keeps on Happening.” En route from New York to Europe, Lorelei runs across Mr.
Bartlett, the District Attorney who prosecuted her for shooting a man in Little Rock. At first,
Lorelei wants nothing to do with him; she is still angry at how he portrayed her during the trial.
But when another “gentleman,” Major Falcon, suggests that she spend time with Mr. Bartlett—it
turns out in order to wheedle state secrets out of him—she acquiesces. It seems at this point that
Major Falcon is using Lorelei as an unwitting honey pot. But Lorelei, it turns out, is in control, if
not entirely in the know. Mr. Bartlett quickly falls under the influence of her charms, tells her
everything, and tries to convince her to get off the boat with him. She considers accompanying
him, but then, “I got to thinking about what Mr. Bartlett called me at Little Rock and I am quite
upset. I mean a gentleman never pays for those things but a girl always pays” (32). In the end,
Major Falcon becomes the conduit of Lorelei’s revenge on Mr. Bartlett, not the other way
around.
Over the course of Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, Lorelei will make several other gentlemen
pay for her time and feigned interest. Gus “The Button King” Eisman, for instance, pays for
Lorelei’s entire European expedition. Sir Francis Beekman, whom Lorelei not-so-affectionately
dubs “Piggie,” pays for a diamond tiara several times over. And Mr. Spoffard, her eventual
husband, finances her acting career.
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In extracting these payments, Lorelei plays her childishness and stupidity as vulnerability
and powerlessness, masking not just the sophistication of her maneuvers, but also their very real
economic stakes. In other words, Lorelei manages to gain control over these gentlemen not in
spite, but by dint, of her intellectual failings. This is one of the central jokes of the text. Lorelei’s
diary reads like a child’s musings on adult conversations—she parrots the gentlemen’s phrases
and adopts their beliefs without really seeming to understand them—yet her tactical brilliance is
undeniable. This play of brilliance and stupidity enables Loos’ double-pronged attack, skewering
gentlemen and blonde alike. And while Lorelei is rewarded for this canny performance with
clothing, jewelry, money and travel, the gentlemen, like the constable in the Punch and Judy
show, are knocked down over and over again. Misunderstanding her childishness and stupidity as
a sign of powerlessness, they “fall” for her, one after the other. It is precisely that childishness,
stupidity and very real vulnerability that counter-intuitively give her control over the men who
seek to control her. To be clear, I don’t mean to argue for Lorelei as some sort of feminist hero.
She’s not changing the rules of the game, but capitalizing on them. The “gentlemen” are then
punished because of their inability to adjust to this distribution of power: thinking themselves in
the driver’s seat, they willingly give up emotional control.
The D.A. Mr. Bartlett is thus right when he thinks to himself during the trial that Lorelei
“only used [her] brains against gentlemen and really had quite a cold heart” (27). The entirety of
Lorelei’s limited intelligence is trained upon manipulating her male admirers’ emotions. Yet her
chief asset is her ability to control her own, either because of a native coldness—as Mr. Bartlett
implies—or because she purposefully distances herself from those gentlemen that make her feel
something. When she finds herself too attracted to a French Visconte, for instance, she stops
seeing him with what is now the text’s most iconic line: “Kissing your hand may make you feel
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very good but a diamond bracelet lasts forever” (56). She is also constantly admonishing
Dorothy for not retaining control over her feelings, falling in love with gentleman after
gentleman and thus relinquishing her control more generally. For Lorelei, feelings ruin the best
mercenary intentions.
Dorothy Parker’s “Big Blonde” Hazel, by contrast, feels too much. Her feelings are out
of her control—which, as we’ll see, places everything else out of her control as well. Parker’s
story has the same episodic quality as Gentlemen, but begins near the end, with the titular “big
blonde” Hazel Morse relegated to her “flabby” middle thirties and hazy recollections of a lost
youth. The twenty-something Hazel, we are told, was pretty, popular and, above all, fun. After
receiving a few offers of marriage from a few out-of-towners, “stout, serious men,” she settles on
Herbert Morse, an entertaining drunk who “earned enough” and has no intention of leaving New
York (640). Thus far, we have a run-of-the-mill marriage plot, adapted according to the emerging
courtship practices of the 1920’s. (We might even term this and Lorelei’s “flapper marriage
plots,” following historian Christina Simmons’ classifications of modern marriage.34) Of course,
a typical marriage plot, flapper or otherwise, stops at the marriage itself. The woman has been
safely reintegrated into the heterosexual family sphere. This is her happy ending, her time to
relax into home-making and child-rearing. “Big Blonde’s” marriage plot, however, barely makes
up one quarter of one part of Parker’s four-part story. The rest bears witness to Hazel’s decline
into alcoholism, her separation from Herbie, her affairs with men of progressively decreasing
desirability, and finally, her failed suicide attempt.
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For Simmons, a “flapper marriage” is putatively modern: It maintains both partners’ independence from their
families of origin and adopts, albeit superficially, the early twentieth century’s increasingly permissive sexual moral
code. In practice, however, it values women for their youth and inexperience, “reassert[ing] the male dominance no
longer acceptable in its Victorian form” (Making Marriage Modern 149).
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For Hazel, it is not only her repetitive choices that are destructive, but the very “fun” to
which they are linked. In her twenties, Hazel learns that “Men liked you because you were fun ...
So, and successfully, she was fun. She was a good sport. Men like a good sport” (639). The
problem here is two-fold: first, fun is not an end in itself for Hazel, but a way of getting men to
like her. She therefore gives it up as soon as she marries: “It was a delight, a new game, a
holiday, to give up being a good sport. … But the thing was that [her husband] Herbie was not
amused” (640). Which is to say—and this is the second part of the problem—that fun, it
transpires, is a repetitive cycle all its own from which Hazel cannot escape without real material
sacrifice. She cannot abandon her “good sport” persona once she gets a man to like and marry
her. Fun, for Hazel, is fungible. When she does, she is punished first by Herbie’s abuse, then by
his abandonment. She spends the remainder of the marriage, and then the story, in an alcoholic
haze, trying with mixed success to blunt her native sentimentality and repeating, less and less
convincingly, gestures of fun so that she will not be punished again. For this mechanical
repetition, though, she is further punished by the reader’s frustration, ebbing sympathy and,
occasionally, their laughter.
By the time Herbie leaves her for a job in Denver, Hazel, “never noticeably drunk and
seldom nearly sober,” hardly seems to register his abandonment (644). As she walks him down
the hall to the door, the song “Ain’t We Got Fun” “run[s] loudly through her mind” (643). Only
the song’s first few lines are reproduced in the story itself, but it was very popular, and would
have been known well by contemporary readers.35 In “Ain’t We Got Fun,” bill collectors amass
around two young newlyweds, who sing the chorus: “Ev'ry morning, ev'ry evening/ Ain't we got
fun?/ Not much money, Oh, but honey/ Ain't we got fun?/ The rent's unpaid dear/ We haven't a
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bus/ But smiles were made dear/ For people like us.” Hazel “had never liked the thing,” and it’s
easy to see why. The song painstakingly documents the couple’s decline into poverty; fun is,
towards the end, literally all they have.
For Hazel, at least, fun has some exchange value. It provides her a path through—if not out
of—the economic precarity of the aging, unpartnered woman, in that its performance can be
transmuted into financial gain when coupled with the necessary conditions of exchange—which
is to say, men willing to exchange it for an apartment and things. Yet fun must also, at least to a
certain extent, be unaware of itself: its power is predicated on the ingenuousness with which it is
offered. Therefore, as the commodity value of fun grows increasingly (indeed, painfully)
apparent to Hazel—that is, when Herbie leaves her because of her “crabbing”—she finds herself
less and less capable of performing it convincingly (640). The emotional and physical toll of
keeping up a “good sport” persona should not be undervalued, especially because “fun” doubles
here as a sexual euphemism. So when Hazel, abandoned by Herbie, begins taking other lovers as
a way of providing for herself, the terms of the exchange are as clear to Hazel as they are to the
reader: she is offering emotional and sexual labor in exchange for increasingly fleeting financial
stability, with a succession of increasingly less desirable lovers.36 Nonetheless, she keeps on
because she has no other choice: fun—and this is true of Lorelei as well—is her only way to
provide for herself. As with the couple in the song, it is, in the end, all they have.
Parker and Loos both consistently and variously emphasize that their blondes are not
isolated figures, but emblematic of larger cultural phenomena. “Big Blonde,” for instance, is
35

“Ain’t We Got Fun” was first performed by Arthur West in the revue Satires of 1920, and the song gained a wider
audience when it was recorded by the popular duo Van and Schneck in 1921. Fittingly, F. Scott Fitzgerald also refers
to it in The Great Gatsby (1925).
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Berlant sums up these terms of exchange more generally as “the bargain ‘a woman’ makes with femininity, which
is to measure out a life in the capital of intimacy, opening herself to a risky series of sexual and emotional
transactions that intensify her vulnerability on behalf of securing value, a world and ‘a life’ that are financially,
spatially and environmentally stable and predictable enough” (217).
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awash in Hazel’s doubles, other female characters with the same punishing, cyclical plots. Parker
also documents Hazel’s search for doubles in books, magazines and newspapers. When her
marriage to Herbie is suffering, “It seemed to her that almost everything she read—novels from
the drug-store lending library, magazine stories, women's pages in the papers—dealt with wives
who lost their husbands’ love” (641). And later, when she thinks of killing herself, Hazel
“pounced upon all the accounts of suicides in the newspapers. There was an epidemic of selfkillings… she felt a cozy solidarity with the big company of the voluntary dead” (646). We
might also seek a double for Hazel in Parker herself. For better or for worse, the story is often
read as thinly-veiled autobiography. Similarly, Loos explicitly tells readers in her “biography of
the book” that she based Lorelei on several women: a blonde actress she met once on a train, a
blonde woman H.L. Mencken dated, and all those other blondes she had watched repeatedly
reaping the rewards of male attention. “I wanted Lorelei to be a symbol of the lowest possible
mentality of our nation,” she writes in the “Biography of the Book” (Gentlemen xxxix). As Faye
Hammill shows, Loos also implicitly tethers her own public image to Lorelei, even going so far
as to borrow one of Lorelei’s signature grammatical mistakes, A Girl Like I, as the title of her
own autobiography. What’s more, the drawings of women modeling the latest fashions in
Harper’s Bazaar, the magazine where the serial appeared, resemble the illustrator’s drawings of
Lorelei, underlining her status both as a cautionary tale and, to a certain extent, an aspirational
figure. To put it briefly, these authors multiply their protagonists. And in the process, they
suggest both the pleasures and the discomfort of representing the gross, the laughable, the
trapped as it collides with representing the self, the type, “the symbol of the lowest possible
mentality of our nation.”
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For in the end, in Modern America, the blonde joke is on us. If these comic mechanisms
are symptomatic of new types of modern femininity, those types condemn the contemporary
reader by way of a simultaneously uncomfortable and aspirational recognition—a recognition of
complicity in the systems that entrap, enable and punish these women, even as the reader may
herself be entrapped, enabled, and punished by those very systems. In “Comedy Has Issues,”
Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai’s introduction to the recent Critical Inquiry special issue on
comedy, they write, “Comedy helps us test or figure out what it means to say ‘us.’ Always
crossing lines, it helps us figure out what lines we desire or can bear” (235). In this case, I am
interested is what we can, just barely, bear—and how finding those lines helps us as critics to
imagine a contemporary, multifarious “we” that is laughing (or, perhaps, not laughing).
In both Gentlemen Prefer Blondes and “Big Blonde,” then, we find comic mechanisms that
punish emotional expression and reward control. In Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, Lorelei is figured
comically to be sure, but it is the gentlemen who are punished for allowing her to succeed,
incapable as they are of adapting to the threat she poses. In “Big Blonde,” Hazel can’t escape the
punishing trap of the new kind of femininity she herself represents, trying as she is to exploit a
system that was never made for her, to play a game that was rigged from the start. In both cases,
the problem these women represent is figured as a matter of emotional control specifically:
Loos’s Lorelei has too much, controlling not only her emotions but those of the “gentlemen”
around her; Parker’s Hazel has too little, controlling no one, least of all herself. These economies
of affect, Loos and Parker further emphasize, are not contained, but rather symptomatic of new
kinds of modern femininity.
In tracking these two species of modern femininity, this study’s first section takes on
characters like Hazel, who can’t take control over anything, least of all their own emotions, and
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the second section considers characters like Lorelei, who have too much control not just over
themselves, but over everyone else around them. In the process, I tell a story of contested
modern selfhood. For both Hazel and Lorelei, self-making is a zero-sum game. Lorelei makes
herself socially and economically at the expense of other’s emotional self-control. Hazel gives up
emotional self-control and thereby yields control of her body and identity to others.

Object Lessons in Making and Unmaking the Self

Gertrude Stein claimed, bombastically but not entirely without reason, that her story
“Melanctha” (1909) constituted “the first definite step away from nineteenth century and into the
twentieth century in literature.” In Chapter One, “An Ethical Ambivalence: Gertrude Stein’s
‘Complex, Desiring’ Melanctha,” I argue alongside Stein that “Melanctha” inaugurated a
tradition of affective and ethical ambivalence towards female protagonists. This chapter begins
by outlining the racialist and Pragmatist ethical schemata with which Stein story toys. Whereas
readings of “Melanctha” have tended to focus on either the former or the latter, therefore reading
Stein as either ethically neutral or deeply antagonistic towards her anti-heroine, I show how
placing both in conversation allows for a fuller description the ethical and affective parameters
within which Stein plays. Stein does not reject either way of thinking and judging outright.
Rather, she refuses to take any moral schema as given, thereby plunging Melanctha, and the
reader alongside her, into an ethical ambivalence. The result of this ethical ambivalence, evident
in the text itself as well as in the contemporary response to it, is an affective ambivalence. In the
pointed absence of narratorial guidance as to how to judge Melanctha, we also find ourselves
affectively unmoored; we do not know how to feel about her. Stein thus gives us a female
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protagonist—and, I suggest, the first one—who can neither be blamed nor exonerated for the
predicaments in which she finds herself, and who is, as a result, both despicable and enviable.
This ambivalent play forms the unsettling backbone of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be.
My second chapter, “‘All Helga Ever Does is Run Away’: Nella Larsen’s Quicksand,”
takes on another self-consciously modernist refiguration of the “tragic mulatta.” Larsen’s biracial
protagonist Helga Crane is hysterical, reactive, impulsive and compulsive. A maddening woman,
she seems constitutionally incapable of making good choices, and therefore of finding any sort of
happiness. “What was the matter with her?” the narrator frequently asks. “Why couldn’t she be
happy, content, somewhere?” (Quicksand 111). In answer to this question, I argue that Helga
exhibits “wrong feeling.” An affective overflowing of the bounds of the self, wrong feeling
results in a series of repetitive, frustrating, ineffectual—to put it frankly, bad—choices. In
contrast to literary sentimentalism’s signal value “right feeling,” with the sentimental heroine
feeling her way to moral choices and action, Helga feels her way to the wrong reactions. This
chapter examines how “wrong feeling” reconfigures the self, showing how that self is not just
constituted, but infiltrated by the outside world. In the process, I discuss how Larsen uses
Helga’s controlling emotions to navigate her own literary moment. Feeling wrong is, I show, a
peculiarly twentieth-century phenomenon, a manifestation of the modernist allergy to sentiment
and sentimentalism that nonetheless takes up its key tropes. Quicksand calls into question not
just whether women can “make themselves” from within a modern schema of femininity, but the
very nature of the self that is the site of such making.
If Helga’s identity is catastrophically unstable, the next chapter then demonstrates how
one might harness and weaponize such instability. Chapter Three, “Undine’s ‘Flexible soul’:
Speculations in Identity in Edith Wharton’s Custom of the Country,” demonstrates the threat of
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being endlessly changeable. Undine capitalizes upon the desire and assumptions of others by
iteratively assimilating their wants into her own “flexible soul.” In this chapter I show that
Undine speculates not just in her relationships, which she uses them to enrich herself, dropping
them when they either lose value or prove poor investments; she also speculates in identity. In
the process, I argue, she spreads and dramatizes the emptiness at the core of modern desire.
Undine’s second and third husbands provide the best examples of this phenomenon: unable to
insulate themselves from Undine’s destructive flexibility, they adapt to it, and thereby allow their
sense of themselves, along with the societal strictures they represent, to be destroyed. Undine
thus taps into the same racial panic evoked by the passer, reproducing her interloping, “invading
race” at the expense of her husband’s older races. By this logic, feminine self-making in
American modernisms turns out to be a project not of forging the self, but of strategically
emptying it out.
Chapter Four, “Identity, Desire and the Double in Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Plum Bun: A
Novel Without a Moral” closes the project by bringing together the affective and ethical
ambivalence of the first chapter and the flexible identities of the second and the third in order to
pinpoint the threats incoherent selfhood might pose to a modern world that, notwithstanding
modernity’s ethical flux, retains certain moral coda. In other words, what happens when we
reinsert the unstable self into a moral universe? I answer this question by focusing on an
illustratively imperfect example of my titular phenomenon. Fauset’s Angela is hardly the best
example of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be. Instead of getting trapped in the circular “endings”
in which her counterparts, willingly or unwillingly, find themselves stuck, Angela undergoes a
sentimental education that ends by suggesting resolution, even fulfillment. But Angèle, the
social-climbing passer Angela becomes, is a near-perfect exemplar of the Woman We Don’t
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Want to Be. Conniving and sexual in all the wrong ways, a bad black subject and an incomplete
white one, she manages to extricate herself from the moral universe of her idyllic, respectable
upbringing. She transports herself, and her reader by proxy, into the ethical contortions of bad
femininity and then leads us out of it—all while refusing to close up those societal fissures her
misbehavior exposed. Instead of reintegrating Angela into the racial heteronormativity necessary
to the American national and eugenic project, I argue, Fauset folds the ethical ambivalence
Angela’s passing has exposed into the existing moral schema. The novel thus finds its resolution
not by fleeing the instability and moral anxiety to which Angela’s doubling gives rise, but by
working within it.
Finally, my afterword examines this figure’s afterlife at the dawn of American
feminism’s second wave, suggesting how an account of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be might
not just revise our understanding of American modernisms, but also trouble our current
periodization of American literary history. Looking to this figure demonstrates continuities in
women’s writing from modernity well into the mid-century.
Readers of this study might well choose to construct their own groupings. I offer two
possibilities here: first, an assemblage of racialized types—the blondes (Lorelei and Hazel), the
“tragic mulattas” (Melanctha and Helga) and the passers (Undine and Angela); second, a division
according to who has too much control (Lorelei, Undine and Angela), and who has too little
(Hazel, Melanctha and Helga). Yet these groupings are by no means foregone conclusions. It
might have been otherwise. I might, for instance, have organized these figures by their
relationships to sexuality, with Gale Wilhelm’s We Too Are Drifting (1935) added to the mix, or
by the author's race, working in Gwendolyn Brooks’ Annie Allen (1949), or by pitting
middlebrow against highbrow texts and appending Dawn Powell's Turn, Magic Wheel (1936).
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The comings and goings of the authors I study here yield their own groupings. Larsen and
Fauset, for instance, are frequently compared: both women wrote about the black bourgeoise,
and both found themselves caught between the older and younger generations of the Harlem
Renaissance. They were even friends. Wharton and Stein rarely get compared, but both were
expatriates in Paris. In fact, the two lived just a few blocks from one another from 1906 on,
though it seems they never met. There are also less expected links between the authors this study
considers. While she did not meet Wharton, Stein did meet and correspond with Nella Larsen.
Larsen even wrote her a letter about “Melanctha,” in which she enclosed, fortuitously enough,
Quicksand. In another delightful confluence, Stein’s first installment of The Autobiography of
Alice B. Toklas appeared right next to Dorothy Parker’s “Sentiment” in Harper’s Bazaar—the
same magazine, incidentally, where Loos published Gentlemen Prefer Blondes. Then there are
the single degrees of separation: Dorothy Peterson, one of Larsen’s best friends, was also close to
Dorothy Parker. And Carl Van Vechten, who maintained relationships with Stein and Larsen, also
ran in the same circles as Fauset, though she disliked and mistrusted him, as she wrote to
Langston Hughes.37 And in what is to my mind the most delightful of such pairings, Stein and
Loos, who were friendly (though Loos evidently annoyed Stein with her penchant for flowery
thank-you notes) did a book-signing together when Stein was promoting The Making of
Americans and Loos was promoting Gentlemen.38 In short, there are various ways one could tell
this story.
Ultimately, though, the Woman We Don’t Want to Be tells of how the structures of
modern selfhood disseminate the threats and possibilities inherent not just to modern femininity,
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but to American modernity writ large. The modernist anti-heroine asks not just how one can
make the self socially, economically and personally, but whether, and under what conditions, the
self can be made at all. These are peculiarly American preoccupations, newly available to
women as a result of modernity’s flux. In painting a picture of the period, the Women We Don’t
Want to Be crystallizes the ambivalent affective response characteristic not just of the age’s
anxieties, but of its possibilities.
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Wyndham Lewis also pairs Stein and Loos in his essay “Time’s Children. Miss Gertrude Stein and Miss Anita
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AN ETHICAL AMBIVALENCE:
GERTRUDE STEIN’S “COMPLEX, DESIRING” MELANCTHA
“Donc je suis un malheureux et ce n’est ni ma faute ni celle de la vie.”
In “Melanctha,” the second story of Gertrude Stein’s Three Lives (1909), we find what is likely
the first example of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be. Melanctha Herbert is at once beautiful,
intelligent and charming and reactive, compulsive and deeply frustrating. She makes the same
mistakes over and over again, repelling everyone she loves as a result, it would seem, of her
moral laxity. By normative standards, she is femininity—and black femininity in particular—
gone awry, an example of how not to be. Yet Stein refuses to wholly condemn her protagonist.
This refusal is evident even before the story begins. Stein precedes Three Lives with an epigraph,
reproduced above, from the symbolist poet Jules Laforgue: “So I am an unhappy person and it’s
neither my fault nor that of life.”39 This opening salvo hedges against easy assignments of blame;
yet it is also an acknowledgment that readers will want to find fault somewhere, either with the
individual or the world she inhabits. In anticipating and then refusing this line of questioning,
this quotation neatly encapsulates the frustration and fascination of reading “Melanctha”: The
narrator cultivates the impulse to assign blame by repeatedly asking why and how her
protagonist finds herself in certain positions, but never provides a satisfactory answer as to who
or what is at fault. Instead, in “Melanctha,” I argue, Stein inaugurates a new textual relationship
to blame and admiration.
While “Melanctha” has been the subject of a great deal of critical output, two ways of
thinking about the text will be particularly important for my purposes: through American
Pragmatism and what I’ll roughly term American racialism—two turn-of-the-century schemata
39

Others have translated “un malheureux” as “unhappy,” but I have made this translation choice to underline how,
by using the noun instead of the adjective, Laforgue lays claim to an identity as an unhappy person, not to a (maybe
passing) state of unhappiness.
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by which people were divided, understood and judged. I’ll outline them roughly here and return
to them later in greater detail. The first, represented by scholars like Omri Moses, Lisi
Schoenbach and Lisa Ruddick, brings the Pragmatist tradition to bear on “Melanctha,” focusing
in particular on Jamesian (or, in Moses’s case, Bergsonian) understandings of habit. As I’ll
demonstrate in this chapter’s first section, this lens usefully highlights those parts of Stein’s text
that accord to what Ruddick calls its “ethical blankness” —its refusal to moralize about its
“conformists and troublemakers” in general, and Melanctha in particular (Ruddick 40). The
second, advanced by scholars like Laura Doyle, Daylanne English, Carla Peterson and Sonia
Saldívar-Hull, points to Stein’s deployment of racial thinking in “Melanctha.” I use the term
“racial” here to encompass a great deal of at times contradictory contemporaneous thinking,
including Eugenic thinking and policy, Primitivist aesthetics, racial and racist typologies and
black and white nativisms. Viewing “Melanctha” through a racial lens troubles its putative
“ethical blankness” by highlighting its readiness to moralize about certain traits, associated at the
turn of the century with American blackness.
These two ways of reading the text rarely occupy the same critical space, pulling the
reader, as they do, in opposite ethical—and affective—directions. I, however, argue for a natural,
if at times oppositional, link between them. In “Melanctha,” Stein plays within the ethical limits
of these schemata, giving rise to a moral vertigo of sorts—what I call, adapting Ruddick’s key
term, an “ethical ambivalence.” We can neither blame Melanctha nor exonerate her, and Stein
plays with and within our moral uncertainty.40 This ethical ambivalence comes hand in hand with
an affective ambivalence. As readers, we find that we can neither fully despise nor wholly
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Some may recognize the term “ethical ambivalence” from Judith Butler’s 2000 article of the same name. To be
sure, there are similarities between Butler’s and Stein’s ethical ambivalence. Both document not just an ambivalence
within, but also an ambivalence towards ethical judgment; and in both, the central tension emerges from how the
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delight in Melanctha, and so we do both, oscillating between the extremes of antipathy, fear and
censure on the one hand, and envy, admiration and identification on the other.
In this chapter, I work not progressively but iteratively, exploring the curious tension
between sympathy and blame that emerges in Stein’s “Melanctha” by considering how those
tensions play out, first in the causal mechanisms of the text as constructed against a Jamesian
psychological schema, then in the racialized judgments of the text as constructed against black
nativism and white supremacy. I end by showing how the ethical and affective ambivalence I
describe manifests in contemporary responses to Three Lives and to its author. This chapter thus
offers ways of knowing and seeing akin to Stein’s own: interpretations pile on top of one another,
accumulating into a richer and thicker portrait. Throughout, I will return to the same moments in
the text, showing not just how they reveal themselves anew when held up to different lights, but
how the interpretations I offer build on one another. In the process, I provide a variegated and
thick description of both the backdrop against which our ethical and affective ambivalence
unfolds, and the nature of that ambivalence itself—what it looks and feels like, and how it is
constituted.

Stein at Play within a Jamesian Ethics

Intimations of blame are there from the start of “Melanctha”—which is to say, from the story’s
narratological (if not its chronological) beginning. The story begins with Melanctha helping her
friend Rose Johnson to care for the latter’s newborn child. “Melanctha,” the narrator explains,
“did everything that any woman could,” but “Rose Johnson was careless and negligent and

Other tests, bruises and ultimately infiltrates the borders of the Self. Butler, however, is describing her own
ambivalence about ethics, which, to put it briefly, has a very different quality than Stein’s.
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selfish, and when Melanctha had to leave for a few days, the baby died” (47). Both here at the
start and when the story cycles back to this episode near the end, the narrator asks a variant of the
following question:
Why did the subtle, intelligent, attractive, half white girl Melanctha Herbert love and
do for and demean herself in service to this coarse, decent, sullen, ordinary, black
childish Rose, and why was this unmoral, promiscuous, shiftless Rose married, and that’s
not so common either, to a good man of the negroes, while Melanctha with her white
blood and attraction and her desire for a right position had not yet really been married.41
Sometimes the thought of how all her world was made, filled the complex, desiring
Melanctha with despair. She wondered, often, how she could go on living when she was
so blue. (48)
In “Melanctha,” there is a great deal of blame to be allotted—not just for the protagonists’ having
“not yet been really married,” but for her melancholy, for the failures (indeed, the very terms) of
her relationships with Jane, Jeff, Rose and Jem, not to mention for her eventual death in a “home
for poor consumptives” (47, 141).
Admittedly, the impulse to assign blame is a naive one, pulling us into the muddy waters of
reader response and critical intuition. Yet it is also a question Stein poses from the very start and
one that, even if she didn’t, would nonetheless prowl the text’s borders. Is Melanctha, in her
young and sentimental death, a traditional fallen woman being punished for her wanderings?
Alternately, if, as Stein writes, Melanctha “could never … change the ways that always made her
keep herself in trouble” (56), can we feasibly blame her for anything that happens to her at all? Is
she then merely the product of the cruel world that made her—or, all too possible in Stein’s
racialized schema, of her genotypical and phenotypical make-up? Or, to take a step back: if it
really is “ni [s]a faute ni celle de la vie,” then what do causal relationships between people,
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Stein’s use of a period instead of a question mark here is in keeping with her style of punctuation throughout
“Melanctha”; the narrator uses question marks only in dialogue and when firmly ensconced inside a single
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actions and events in this world look like in the first place? What structures of causality
condition readings of Melanctha as an individual, and questions of her guilt—which is to say not
just her culpability, but also her responsibility—in particular?
The second paragraph of the above quotation teasingly suggest a causal relationship, even
as it answers neither the narrator’s query nor ours. “Sometimes the thought of how all her world
was made, filled the complex, desiring Melanctha with despair” (48). Causality inheres in the
sentence’s very grammatical structure; in a very basic sense, the first half causes the second.
That is, “The thought… filled … Melanctha with despair.” We might then suppose that the
thought’s content—“how all her world was made”—fills Melanctha with despair and in turn
makes her wonder “how she could go on living.” Stein, however, erects bulwarks against these
conclusions. First, the putative cause is the thought of the thing, not the thing itself, which calls
into question that thought’s relationship to reality. The passive construction, “how all her world
was made,” then calls further attention to this putative cause’s potential emptiness, inviting other
allocations of blame. How is her world made, and by what or whom? Melanctha herself,
“complex, desiring” and “despair[ing]” as she is, might be assumed to have a hand in it. At the
same time, “all her world” would have to extend beyond her immediate control, if not
necessarily beyond her purview.
This is true not just on a practical level, but at the level of form: for each of Three Lives’
protagonists, the world’s construction is intimately linked to and limited by their idioms—the
distinct sets of words and phrases with which they think and speak. And like those of “the good
Anna” and “the gentle Lena,” the idiom in “Melanctha,” and thus the ways its characters can
think, speak and feel about the world, is heavily restricted. “The thought of how all her world

character’s consciousness. It is also appropriate given that the story presents the problem, but provides no sure way
of solving it.
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was made” is constructed and contracted by Melanctha’s idiom—which circulates among and
between the story’s characters and thus lies beyond her sole control, even as it finds expression
through her. Finally, the comma between “made” and “filled” (“Sometimes the thought of how
all her world was made, filled the complex, desiring Melanctha with despair”) literally splits the
sentence down the middle, separating cause and effect. Both literally and figuratively, then, “the
thought” and Melanctha’s “despair” are divorced from each other even as they overlap and
propel each other forward.
In “Portraits and Repetition” Stein describes a similar phenomenon when one is talking and
listening: “It is necessary to be at once talking and listening, doing both things, not as if they
were one thing, not as if they were two things, but doing them, well if you like, like the motor
going inside and the car moving, they are part of the same thing” (170). Similarly, actions and
reactions manifest in “Melanctha” in a recurring loop, with no discernible point of origin. This,
then, is the problem with which we are faced from the beginning: in order to wrangle with the
question of “why… Melanctha … lov[es] and do[es] for and demean[s] herself” throughout the
story, we must first understand how causality operates—how to ask “why” in the first place.
Critics have long puzzled over Three Lives’ enigmatic structuring of causality. Marianne
DeKoven first brooks the issue in 1983, observing, “To the extent that the time of the narrative is
a ‘continuous present,’ the chronological events in each heroine’s life are not linked causally.
Instead, they are seen as a process of continual change…. not dependent on the will of a
character or the logic of other events in the narrative” (A Different Language 33). In other words,
to say that Melanctha caused any one thing to happen would be a gross oversimplification, as
would the claim that any one event had an observable effect on her character. More recently,
scholars have accounted for Stein’s structuring of causality by calling attention to her
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indebtedness to the work of her professor (and, Stein claimed, mentor) William James and the
philosophical and psychological tradition of American Pragmatism more generally.42 Omri
Moses, Lisi Schoenbach and Lisa Ruddick focus in particular attention on Stein’s appeal in
“Melanctha” to Pragmatist conceptions of habit. Schoenbach describes the thrust of this work
with admirable concision: “In Stein, habit is at once a discursive structure and a subject of
inquiry” (15).
Throughout Three Lives, and “Melanctha” in particular, Stein demonstrates a pronounced
interest in the power of habit. Her prose is characterized by the habitual deployment of words,
phrases and ideas; her characters are habitual beings, repeating the same words, phrases, ideas—
and crucially, the same actions—over and over again; and the narratives emphasize how habits
give rise to and structure social identity. Even the book’s contemporary reviewers picked up on
James’ influence, demonstrating the extent to which Jamesian psychology was, if not commonly
held knowledge, at least a clear point of reference. The reviewer at the Dallas Times-Herald, for
instance, wrote, “The psychological motivation of Melanctha's thought processes and actions
clearly show the influence of Miss Stein's training under William James.”43 All of which is to
say: Stein's structuring of causality in the “continuous present” is clearly indebted to Pragmatist
understandings of habit.
According to James, a habitual act comes about not as a function of the will, but of the
habit itself. In other words, each individual habitual act emanates from the fact of its own
previous repetitions (Principles 115-117). Like the motor and the car of which Stein writes in
“Portraits and Repetition,” the individual act and the habit are “part of the same thing,”
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Stein likely overstated the extent of her relationship with James. She casts him in The Autobiography of Alice B.
Toklas as a mentor and friend, but Stein’s biographers agree that this characterization strains plausibility.
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Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas Papers, Beinecke Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Box 77, Folder 1408.
A reviewer at The Nation also made note of the influence: “In the rue de Fleurus Miss Stein settled down to the
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inseparable and moving inexorably forward on the steam of a cyclical causality. Omri Moses
accordingly argues that, while Melanctha cannot herself “change her ways,” they and she do, in
fact, change—as a result of the forward momentum of a Pragmatist understanding of habit. We
thus ought not to take Melanctha’s relentless repetitions as a sign of stagnancy. Habit, Moses
maintains, functions for Stein as “a character-shaping force” that “never repeats in the same way
twice” (118, 117). His reading draws implicitly on Stein’s notion of “insistence”—what she says
happens to repetition when a thing is “really living.” For Stein, a living thing cannot repeat
anything the exact same way; her term “insistence” calls attention not only to the different ways
a living subject does or says the same thing, but also to how what is repeated accumulates
meaning both by being repeated (insisted upon) and by being repeated differently (with varying
insistence) (Lectures 166-167). Moses further implies that Stein’s characters only develop
relationally, often by virtue of their constant explaining (and reexplaining) of themselves to
others (121-124). Here, I make this claim explicit and take it one step further: causality in
“Melanctha” manifests in and through relationships. While Melanctha never demonstrates
individual control over herself or the world around her, her story nonetheless documents a
relational agency and, thus, a relational sense of causality—one in which control accumulates in
the interactions of two or more individuals. As a result, we end up with a relational construction
of blame.
This relational causality is, unsurprisingly, most evident in the relationship the text dwells
on the longest: that between Melanctha and Dr. Jefferson Campbell. Mary Berenson wrote
approvingly to Gertrude Stein, “the theme of your ‘Melanctha’ is one of the most interesting
pieces of psychology that I know, the inevitable tempo each person has for doing & feeling, &

creation of a form of consciousness as described by James and Bergson, in forms and diction to conform to the ideal
of austere simplification.”
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the misery of caring about a person with a different tempo from one’s own.” Melanctha and
Jefferson’s negotiations of control and recrimination are particularly on display when their
tempos move from alignment to misalignment:
Every day now, Jeff seemed to be coming nearer, to be really loving. Every day now,
Melanctha poured it all out to him, with more freedom. Every day now, they seemed to
be having more and more, both together, this strong, right feeling. …
One day there had been much joy between them, more than they ever yet had had
with their new feeling. All the day they had lost themselves in warm wandering. Now
they were lying there and resting, with a green, bright, light-flecked world around them.
What was it that now really happened to them? What was it that Melanctha did, that
made everything get all ugly for them? What was it that Melanctha felt then, that made
Jeff remember all the feeling he had in him when Jane Harden told him how Melanctha
had learned to be so very understanding? (91)
The first paragraph shores up Moses’ claim that habitual repetition in “Melanctha” can accrete to
create new experience, and my claim that that change manifests in collective, relational
repetition. The second paragraph then representationally merges Jefferson and Melanctha into
the pronoun “they”: The two lose “themselves in warm wandering,” experiencing “their new
feeling.” In the third paragraph, the narration shifts back to an individual thinker, Jefferson, who
begins to wonder, “What was it that Melanctha did, that made everything get all ugly for them.”
Of course, whatever it was, they both did it; Melanctha can hardly be held exclusively
responsible for Jeff’s “remember[ing] all the feelings he had.” Stein’s rendering of Jeff’s
consciousness here is tinged with an unmistakable irony, and it’s hard not to remember this
moment when, only a few pages later, Jeff scolds Melanctha: “I never put my trouble back on
anybody, thinking they made me” (102). Nonetheless, the suddenness of the change, in addition
to Jeff’s efforts to put his finger of “what was it that now really happened to them,” implies that
something did happen, and that somehow, between them, they caused it to happen. This, then is
the structure of causality mapped by “Melanctha”: one in which cause and effect are intertwined
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and mutual, and in which change accrues and manifests through habitual, collective repetition.
Neither Jefferson or Melanctha alone caused—nor can be blamed for—Jeff’s feelings;
nonetheless, this incident occurred between them and has a lasting and measurable effect.
Indeed, this line of recrimination ultimately gives rise to (even if it doesn’t necessarily cause) the
failure of their relationship.
“This,” to borrow a turn from William James, “brings us by a very natural transition to the
ethical implications of the law of habit. They are numerous and momentous” (Principles 120, his
italics). As I have shown, “Melanctha” refuses to allocate blame—thereby sidestepping the very
issue the text itself raises—by constructing a collective, relational causality, and thereby
dispersing blame. Everyone and no one is at fault, because everyone and no one is in control. Of
course, when James calls attention to the “ethical implications of the laws of habit,” he is
referring to ethical superiority of certain psychological habits, ways of living, or, as Berenson
puts it, “tempos” over others. James extols the ethical benefits of regularity in particular: “There
is no more miserable human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision … Full
half the time of such a man goes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so
ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his consciousness at all. If there be such daily
duties yet not ingrained in any one of my readers, let him begin this very hour to set the matter
right” (122). It’s hard not to think of Jefferson Campbell here, and his (habitual) insistence on
being “regular.” “Dr. Campbell,” Stein writes, “believed you ought to … be regular in all your
life, and not to be always wanting new things and excitements, and to always know where you
were, and what you wanted …” (67). Jefferson, in short, regularly evangelizes regularity,
aligning himself with a Jamesian ethics of habit. Lisa Ruddick accordingly argues that Jefferson
typifies a “Jamesian plot of mental success” (13); logical, straight-forward, self-improving and
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above all “regular,” he is Stein’s “purest Jamesian creation” (Ruddick 25). Melanctha, by
contrast, possesses childish, even dangerous habits. She wanders and seeks adventure, repeating
habitual actions that counterintuitively keep her position in flux. “One way to account for her
[Melanctha's] presence—were we to remain within the limits of the Jamesian paradigm—would
be to see her as an example of the high costs, in Darwinian terms, of mind-wandering” (Ruddick
28). Ruddick ultimately, however, argues that “Melanctha” constitutes “a protest against the
entire notion of mental success represented by Jeff,” and, what’s more, a refusal to explore the
ethical considerations of habit at all (30). After “struggl[ing] tediously with her own moralism”
in her earlier works, Stein “collapse[s] … ethical definition” in “Melanctha”(39). For Ruddick,
the story exhibits an “ethical blankness” (40).
As I have already indicated, I will ultimately contest—or really, partially adopt and seek to
nuance—Ruddick’s claim through a consideration of the ways Stein deploys contemporary racial
thinking in her story. That said, there is ample evidence for Ruddick’s characterization of the
story, so long as we remain within a Jamesian paradigm and the concomitant relational causality
I have outlined. The story’s “ethical blankness” comes to a head at the end, when Melanctha,
abandoned by everyone she has ever loved, sickens and dies. What, after all, is left for Melanctha
to do, say or be at this juncture? She has parted from her family of origin, her romantic partners
and friendships. Her story is at an impasse, and not only because losing her prospects for
marriage and reproduction leave her without the rhetorical stability and reproductive future those
choices provide. If Melanctha can only change within the context of relationships, then in the
absence of those relationships she necessarily reaches a standstill. “Surely she was right now
when she said she would just kill herself, for that was the only way how she could do” (136).
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The story accordingly ends in a different kind of narrative space, a sort of ethical middle
distance:
Melanctha never again saw Rose Johnson, and it was hard to Melanctha never any
more to see her. Rose Johnson had worked in to be the deepest of all Melanctha’s
emotions.
“No, I don’t never see Melanctha Herbert no more now,” Rose would say to anybody
who asked her about Melanctha. “… I expect some day Melanctha kill herself …. No, I
always am real sorry for Melanctha, she was never no just common kind of nigger, but
she don’t never know not with all the time I always was telling it to her, no she never no
way could learn, what was the right way she should do ….”
But Melanctha Herbert never really killed herself … she only got a bad fever and
went to the hospital where they took good care of her and cured her.
When Melanctha was well again, she took a place and began to work and to live
regular. Then Melanctha got very sick again, she began to cough and sweat and be so
weak that she could not stand to do her work.
Melanctha went back to the hospital, and there the Doctor told her she had
consumption, and before long she would surely die. They sent her where she would be
taken care of, a home for poor consumptives, and there Melanctha stayed until she died.
(140-141)
Once Melanctha “never again saw Rose Johnson,” Rose Johnson’s judgment of Melanctha grows
increasingly provisional and distant. Indeed, at the end of the story Melanctha drops out of
everyone’s ken—Rose’s, the narrator’s and the readers’; we slowly lose sight of her just as she
loses herself, or rather, just as she finds herself “lost, and all the world … whirling away in a
mad weary dance around her” (139). Melanctha’s death is treated neutrally, the telling plain and
devoid of narrative judgment—a perfect example of the “ethical blankness” for which Ruddick
argues. Though Stein uses Rose’s voice to bring normative parameters to bear on Melanctha’s
death, Melanctha is not ultimately judged by those parameters. And even when she “beg[ins] to
work and to live regular,”—even though, that is, she finally falls in line with a Jamesian ethics
of habit—she still sickens and dies.
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Melanctha’s death is ultimately figured as neither her punishment nor her fault. It is merely
what happens. In the end, the text yet again suggests a story of blame and punishment, only to
refuse to deliver it. This is Stein’s play within Jamesian ethics: a refusal, as Ruddick argues, to
moralize about any individual’s habits, and a collective allotment of blame.

“Much Nearer the True Hysterique”: Turn of the Century Racial Psychology

In the previous section, I explored how Stein constructs her own idiosyncratic structures of
causality, and a concomitant ethical blankness, against the backdrop of a Jamesian understanding
of habit and its ethical ramifications. In the next, I will start again, complicating the claim for
Stein’s ethical blankness by engaging the racialized and racist antipathy “Melanctha” directs
towards many of its characters. In this brief interlude, I will show that, while these two
perspectives may seem to be disconnected—certainly, they have been treated that way by the
text’s critics—they are in fact tethered to one another, both in the contemporary thinking and for
Stein specifically. Simply put, racial type was thought to inform psychological type. As a result,
to the extent that black interiority was considered by white authors at all, it was often understood
to be fundamentally disordered. This way of thinking reemerges in the critical conversation
surrounding Melanctha’s psychology, often without acknowledgment. When, for instance, Judith
P. Saunders makes the case in 1985 that Melanctha is mentally ill, she constructs her argument
with reference to Melanctha’s parentage. Melanctha’s father’s “blackness” and her mother’s
“paleness,” Saunders claims, “take on symbolic significance, helping to define crucial
contradictions within Melanctha’s personality” (55, 56). Though she doesn’t make reference to it,
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Saunders is tapping into a tradition that feeds characterizations of the biracial subject into a
ready-made script of psychic abnormality.
This script aligns the “double personality,” then thought to be the hallmark of the hysterical
subject, with the self-divided nature the Eugenic movement ascribed to biracial people. The
American eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard wrote of “mulattoes” in the early twentieth century,
“These unhappy beings, every cell of whose bodies is a battleground of jarring heredities,
express their souls in acts of hectic violence and aimless instability” (qtd. in English 104). Here
we see the conflation of abnormal psychology and eugenic thinking. Mixed racial make-up is, for
Stoddard, a guarantor of melancholy and instability.44 In literature, this thinking is particularly
manifest in the fatal doubleness of American sentimentalism’s “tragic mulatta” figure.45 Unable
to fit entirely into either the black or the white world, these characters were often used to
personify the pain of the color line—or, before abolition, slavery—in a character for whom,
because of her “white blood,” white readers might find some sympathy. The “tragic mulatta”
rarely marries or has children (“mulatto” is the Spanish word for “young mule,” referencing the
underproductive offspring of two different species). More often than not, she ends up killing
herself. Melanctha too is portrayed as divided against herself, suicidal, unprocreative, verging on
mental illness and, crucially, somewhat sympathetic; yet, as I just noted, she pointedly does not
commit suicide.
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Melanctha’s bisexuality, understood as it was at the time as another kind of pathology, would also have been
linked to her race. Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, black female sexuality was linked
to lesbian desire, and Melanctha’s “wanderings”—not to mention her friendships with Rose Johnson and Jane
Harden—are accordingly tinged not just with presumed black promiscuity, but with homoerotic possibility. In
Difference and Pathology (1985), Sander Gilman shows how, during the nineteenth century, scientific and medical
apparatuses of knowledge production collided sexual and racial alterities. Of the relationship between black female
sexuality and homosexuality in particular, Gilman writes, “By 1877 it was a commonplace that the Hottentot’s
anomalous sexual form was similar to other errors in the development of the labia . . . leading to those ‘excesses’
which are called ‘lesbian love’” (89). See also Jaime Hovey’s “Sapphic Primitivism in Gertrude Stein’s Q.E.D.”
(1995).
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Operating as it does at the intersection of the emerging American eugenics movement and
the roughly simultaneous rise of academic and popular interest in psychology in the United
States—not to mention a nineteenth-century American literary tradition—this logic would have
been familiar, likely even appealing, to Stein. Certainly, Stein believed that some types of people
were more likely to display hysterical tendencies than others, and that those types could be
identified by their physical and physiological characteristics—as is evident in her undergraduate
work. As a student at Radcliffe, Stein published two articles in The Psychological Review. In the
first, “Normal Motor Automatism” (1896), she and her classmate Leon Solomons sought to
replicate in themselves (two putatively “normal” subjects) the “second personality” of the
“hysterical subject” (492). “The limits of normal automatism,” they ultimately claimed, could be
made to include hysterical symptoms. In other words, in an age and academic tradition that
categorically separated the “hysterical” woman from her “normal” compeers, Stein and
Solomons sought to demonstrate the slipperiness of that distinction—and thus the possibility
(perhaps even the threat) that putatively “normal” people might contain within them the seeds or
symptoms of mental illness. Stein’s individually authored second article, “Cultivated Motor
Automatism: A Study of Character in its Relation to Attention” (1898), following up on the first
by testing to see if certain types of people were more likely to display hysterical symptoms than
others. She argued that those subjects that displayed automatic tendencies could be profitably
grouped into two “types.” Whereas Stein characterized “Type I” subjects by detailing their
personality traits and interests, her description of Type II subjects relied upon physical and
physiological identifiers. These “individuals [are] often blonde and pale, are distinctly
phlegmatic,” she writes, with “sluggish circulation” (298, 306). “Type II” subjects, she
concludes, are “much nearer the true hysterique,” and thus much likelier, on the basis of
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observable characteristics, to display symptoms of hysteria (305). In “Cultivated Motor
Automatism,” then, Stein offers readers a slightly different, if related, understanding of hysterical
symptoms than she offers “Normal Motor Automatism”: Yes, the “normal” psyche contains
within it the possibility for hysteria, but this propensity is significantly greater in certain types of
subjects, identifiable by their physical and physiological characteristics.
Gertrude Stein was hardly alone in suggesting that certain types of people might be
predisposed to certain pathologies. The eugenic policies being proposed and implemented
throughout the United States indicated a widespread belief that traits—from intelligence and
work ethic to propensities for disease—were heritable, and therefore that certain ethnicities,
races and physical types were more likely to display undesirable, even pathological traits than
others.
Granted, it is impossible to say on the basis of these experiments whether Stein believed
black people were more likely to display abnormal psychological tendencies than white people,
or whether she understood Melanctha as either a pathological subject, or a subject who displayed
pathological tendencies.46 The point I wish to make here is not that we can answer any of these
questions definitively; it is simply that racial and psychological classifications intertwined during
the time Stein was coming of age and writing Three Lives, and that, as a student, she was
actively involved in that conversation. I would also like to suggest that, whether or not we read
Melanctha as a definitively pathological subject, Stein’s experimental agenda hints at a potential
source for some of the readerly discomfort of encountering Melanctha. It’s not just that
Melanctha’s potential pathology makes her a difficult woman to censure and to defend, to
admire, even to root for; though it is also these things. It’s that whether Melanctha is a
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pathological subject or not, we her readers—most of us normal subjects (or so we would like to
believe)—contain within us, following the logic of Stein’s experiments, the ability to behave as
Melanctha behaves. “Melanctha” thus begins to read not just as a cautionary tale, but as an
everywoman’s journey. Her perpetually “blue” life and untimely death demonstrate how we
might all be susceptible. By this light, the story’s subtitle “Each One As She May” is all too
appropriate, even pointed. In the notebooks in which Stein drafted Three Lives, this was in fact
the story’s title, not its subtitle.47 “Each One As She May” flattens all the racial and pathological
particularities the story loads onto its protagonist. Shorn of Melanctha’s name, her story
threatens to becomes our story.

“The Better Sort”

The racial terrain of “Melanctha” is variegated and strange, neither a clear product of the racism
of its time nor entirely detached from it. Before I begin in earnest, I’d like to acknowledge two
things that are likely obvious to anyone who has read the text, but nonetheless warrant
articulation. First, Stein’s is a racist text. The narrator’s description of Rose, for instance, hardly
demonstrates an ethical blankness: “Rose Johnson was careless and was lazy, but she had been
brought up by white folks and she needed decent comfort. Her white training had only made for
habits, not for nature. Rose had the simple, promiscuous unmorality of the black people” (47-48).
Rose’s “nature”—or, to borrow another word from Stein herself, her “bottom nature”—inheres
in this “simple, promiscuous unmorality of black people, in contrast to the more ethically neutral
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“habits” inculcated by “her white training.”48 By these lights, “ethical blankness” is limited to an
abstract realm of “white training,” whereas a “black nature” gives rise to ethically-charged
remonstrations. These remonstrations are, furthermore, hardly arbitrary; rather, they fit into a
preexisting schema of racial difference, fulfilling many of the contemporaneous racist
stereotypes surrounding African Americans. It is not only the limited idiom of “Melanctha” that
allows Stein to dispense with Rose so quickly; the adjectives “simple” and “promiscuous” point
concisely to contemporary racist assumptions.
Second, Stein’s racism and racialism are, like much else in her oeuvre, complicated,
difficult things. While her characterizations undoubtedly truck in racist stereotypes, as is evident
above, most critics agree that “Melanctha” does not consistently reproduce the racist
assumptions of its time. To the contrary, Milton A. Cohen points out that Stein’s racist categories
are so inconsistently deployed as to destabilize the undergirding racial hierarchy. Instead, Stein is
most interested, as Paul Peppis and Laura Doyle later argue, in “testing the limits of [racial]
typology” even as “the seductive stabilization of identity that race offers enthralled” her (Peppis
383, Doyle 255). Here, I’ll try to keep both things in view, probing the complexity of Stein’s
relationship to American blackness, while attesting to the fact, as Sonia Saldívar-Hull does in her
well-known essay “Wrestling Your Ally,” that Stein was a “white supremacist” and whiteness
functions as the story’s “privileged center” (189, 191).
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Stein coins the term “bottom nature” in The Making of Americans, published in 1925 but composed around the
same time as Three Lives. “A man in his living has many things inside him,” she writes; “he has in him the kind of
important feeling of himself to himself that makes his kind of man; this comes sometimes from a mixture in him of
all the kinds of natures in him, this comes sometimes from the bottom nature in him…” (The Making of Americans
149). In fact, it appears that she interrupted her frustrating experiment with Making in order to write Three Lives. In
one of her Lectures in America, “The Gradual Making of the Making of Americans,” she writes of “one day after I
had written a thousand pages, this was in 1908 I just did not go on anymore” (147-148). Three Lives was published a
year later, in 1909.
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The question of race in “Melanctha” has been well-canvassed, with critics examining
everything from Stein’s engagement with obstetrics and eugenics (English 2004) to her
experimentation with African American musical traditions (Peterson 1996). Missing, however, is
an account of how the mandates of black respectability operate in “Melanctha.” One of the
“better sort of negroes,” as Stein puts it, Melanctha literally embodies the opportunity for a
certain kind of marriage and breeding—one that slots into the successful completion of
contemporaneous black nativist project of racial uplift. Yet Stein constructs—and this is
unusual—her black nativist marriage plot from within the assumptions of white supremacy:
namely, that not just marriageability and evolutionary fitness, but also basic goodness, are
determined by one’s proximity to whiteness. The reader’s affective and ethical relationship with
Melanctha gets funneled through this idiosyncratic construction.
This black-nativist-cum-white-supremicist marriage plot is there for Melanctha from the
start, albeit in phantom form. In fact, it is there in the very set of questions with which Stein
begins “Melanctha,” and with which I began this chapter. I’ve reproduced the passage again
here, this time with a little more context:
She and Rose Johnson were both of the better sort of negroes, there, in Bridgepoint.
“No, I ain’t no common nigger,” said Rose Johnson, “for I was raised by white folks,
and Melanctha she is so bright and learned so much in school, she ain’t no common
nigger either, though she ain’t got no husband to be married to like I am to Sam
Johnson.”
Why did the subtle, intelligent, attractive, half white girl Melanctha Herbert love and
do for and demean herself in service to this coarse, decent, sullen, ordinary, black
childish Rose, and why was this unmoral, promiscuous, shiftless Rose married, and that's
not so common either, to a good man of the negroes, while Melanctha with her white
blood and attraction and her desire for a right position had not yet been really married.
(48)
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Whereas Rose Johnson is “married, and that’s not so common either, to a good man of the
negroes,” Melanctha “had not yet been really married.” The problems Stein outlines in this
passage are relational in nature. Melanctha’s devotion to Rose is a problem because of what Stein
construes as Rose’s racial inferiority; Melanctha’s “not yet be[ing] really married” is a problem
because this putatively racially inferior woman is married, and in such a way that seemingly
fulfills all the goals that Melanctha, “with her white blood and attraction and her desire for a
right position” might be assumed to have. Coming, as these paragraphs do, within the first couple
pages of the story, the “yet” implies that Melanctha might at some point during the story get
“really married”—that the story of “Melanctha: Each One As She May” might revolve around a
marriage plot.
Stein then uses the example of Rose’s marriage to delineate the ethical feminine position
within such a courtship: “Rose kept company, and was engaged, first to this colored man and
then to that, and always she made sure she was engaged, for Rose had strong the sense of proper
conduct. ‘No I ain’t no common nigger just to go around with any man, nor you Melanctha
shouldn’t neither,’ she said one day when she was telling the complex and less sure Melanctha
what was the right way for her to do” (49). To be sure, Rose’s notions of “proper conduct” are
being mocked here—as are more provincial attitudes around courtship, engagement and
marriage. What’s more, Stein’s description of Rose, like many of her racialized descriptions, is at
odds with itself: Rose in this telling is both promiscuous and respectable. Nonetheless, Rose’s
example offers “the complex and less sure Melanctha” a path to black respectability, or, more
accurately, to what Stein represents as black respectability: presumed sexuality within the
parameters of the institution of engagement, then marriage, “to a good man of the negroes” (49).

60

Rose’s insistence that neither she nor Melanctha are “common nigger[s],” not to mention
the narrator’s preemptive shoring up of that insistence—“She and Rose Johnson were both of the
better sort of negroes, there, in Bridgepoint”—further confines this model of marriage to a
particular kind of black femininity: one based in white supremacy. Melanctha and Rose belong to
“the better sort of negroes” primarily because of their links to whiteness. Rose was “raised by
white folks,” a fact she deploys alongside Melanctha’s schooling to explain why neither of them
is a “common nigger.” And because Melanctha’s links to whiteness also derive from her
ambiguously “pale” parentage, the narrator’s portrayal of Melanctha’s marriageability points first
and foremost to her body: “Melanctha with her white blood and attraction and desire for a right
position had not yet been really married.” “Blood,” “attraction” and “desire” all undergo an
interesting doubling here. “White blood” is both metaphorical and literal, bearing witness to the
abstraction of Melanctha’s lineage by calling attention to the concrete ways it marks and inhabits
her body. “Attraction” and “desire” then mark the terms of marital-sexual exchange; Melanctha
inhabits the right “sort” of blackness (and also the dangerous, queer, childish, wrong “sort”) by
being at once, “with her white blood and attraction,” desirable and desirous.49
The mandates of black nativism, not to mention anxieties surrounding miscegenation on
both sides of the color line, further confine the choices available to Rose and Melanctha to black
male partners, and certain kinds of black male partners at that. Rose scolds Melanctha for her
liaisons with white men, and when Melanctha abandons Jane Harden, looking for “something
realler [sic]…something that would fill her fully,” “it was never the rougher men now that she
talked to, and she did not care much now to know white men of the, for her, very better classes”
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Insofar as racial alterity maps onto sexual alterity for Stein, as Corrine Blackmer (1993) suggests, this view of the
conditions under which individuals gain access to institutional privilege scans perfectly. That is, just as Melanctha’s
marriageability is linked to her whiteness, it also necessitates refusal of her queerness. The promise of stability and
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(61-62).50 The search for an appropriate husband—which is to say, a man roughly one’s equal in
intelligence, pedigree, wealth and, in this case, race—is an all too recognizable feature of the
marriage plot, even as we may be uncomfortable with its deployment here. And it is clear from
the beginning that if Melanctha is to marry well, she must marry, as Rose has, “a good man of
the negroes.” In other words, her partner must also be among the “better sort.” The black nativist
marriage plot Stein offers is in this sense an avowed eugenic project, encouraging marriage and
reproduction within the emerging black middle and professional classes as a way of propagating
the “best” of the race.
For Melanctha, these possibilities and restrictions are most forcefully represented in her
relationship with Jefferson. “Jefferson Campbell,” the narrator explains, “was all the things that
Melanctha had ever wanted. Jefferson was a strong, well built, good looking, cheery, intelligent
and good mulatto” (Three Lives 72). For many of the same reason that Jeff represents an ideal
Jamesian subject, he is also representative of what W.E.B Du Bois called the “talented tenth.”51
Du Bois begins the essay, “The Negro race, like all races, is going to be saved by its exceptional
men. The problem of education, then, among Negroes must first of all deal with the Talented
Tenth; it is the problem of developing the Best of this race that they may guide the Mass away
from contamination and death of the Worst, in their own and other races” (8). Jefferson
Campbell, with his education and profession, is a strong standard-bearer for this category. And
he was met as such by contemporary readers of the novel. The Kansas City Star refers to Jeff as
“the very best type evolved in the race, a young physician.” And the reviewer for the New York

recognition in marriage is then tied to whiteness and heterosexuality, tethering her blackness and queerness to one
another by negative image.
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I have yet to find any indication of Stein’s views on intermarriage between black and white people, but she
certainly disapproved of mixed marriages between Jewish and non-Jewish people. She argued against such mixed
marriages in a college essay, maintaining the position, according to her biographer Brenda Wineapple, for most of
her life (57).
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Post seemed all too willing to pick up on Stein’s racism in applauding “Jefferson’s criticism of
negroes for doing things ‘to get excited’ appealing to us as very forcible,” and bemoaning Rose’s
“deteriorating influence.”52 Jeff, in short, is appealing within the black nativist marriage plot
Stein constructs precisely because of his accordance with an implicit white supremacy and his
appeal to a Jamesian ethical schema.
To the point, it is no coincidence that Jeff’s pleasure in and insistence upon being “regular”
makes him not only an exemplar of black respectability, but also an ideal Jamesian subject; Stein
uses Pragmatist ethics to construct her vision of black respectability. Jeff is, as I noted above, not
only committed to being “regular”; he also evangelizes regularity to the rest of the black
community in Bridgepoint. “‘I don’t believe much in this running around business and I don’t
want to see the colored people do it,’” he tells Melanctha. “‘I am a colored man and I ain’t sorry,
and I want to see the colored people like what is good and what I want them to have, and that’s
to live regular and work hard and understand things, and that’s enough to keep a decent man
excited’” (67). Jefferson’s membership in the “talented tenth” is not only, then, a matter of habit;
it is also an attitude of prescription. Yet if Stein builds black respectability on top of a Jamesian
ethics of habit, then the former must be as shaky and attenuated as its foundation, given that
Stein does not, in the end, judge Melanctha by James’ ethical prescriptions. In this case, Jeff’s
prescriptivism masks his own participation in those things he claims he doesn’t “believe much
in,” something Melanctha herself points out to him after this speech. Jeff doesn’t, for instance,
avoid women like Jane Harden in favor of “the nice girls that stay at home with their people, the
kind you say you are really wanting” and he seems to “want to have a good time just like all us
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Du Bois (who incidentally also worked with William James at Harvard) popularized the term in an essay of the
same name published in 1903, two years before Stein began work on Three Lives.
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Both reviews can be found in the Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas Papers, Beinecke Rare Books and
Manuscript Library, Box 77, Folder 1408.
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others” (67). “No, Dr. Campbell,” Melanctha tells him, “it certainly does seem to me you don’t
know very well yourself, what you mean, when you are talking” (68). As a standard-bearer for
black nativism, then, Jefferson typifies both “the very best type evolved in the race,” as well as
the movement’s limitations and hypocrisies.
It is nonetheless by these shaky ethical parameters that Dr. Campbell is caught up short
when, after presumably having sex with Melanctha, he finds himself feeling that she has done
something “that made everything get all ugly for them” (91). Again, I’ll quote a different part of
a passage I explored in the first section.
What was it that Melanctha felt then, that made Jeff remember all the feeling he had in
him when Jane Harden told him how Melanctha had learned to be so very understanding?
… It was all green, and warm, and very lovely to him, and now Melanctha somehow had
made it all so ugly for him. What was it Melanctha was now doing to him? What was it
he used to be thinking was the right way for him and all the colored people to be always
trying to make it right, the way they should be always living? … Jeff felt a strong disgust
inside him; not for Melanctha herself, to him, not for himself really, in him; he only had
disgust because he never could know really in him, what it was he wanted, … the things
he before had believed in for himself and for all the colored people, the living regular,
and the never wanting to be always having new things, just to keep on, always in
excitements. All the old thinking now came up very strong inside him. He sort of turned
away then, and threw Melanctha from him. (91)
Jeff’s fear that Melanctha has made him forget “the right way for him and all the colored people
to be always … living” rests in the fear that, in abandoning those habits, he has lost his sense of
himself and his knowledge of “what it was he wanted.” It is furthermore important that
Melanctha’s sexuality precedes Jeff’s crisis of personality. Melanctha’s body—along with the
presumption of promiscuity (from the time “when Jane Harden told him how Melanctha had
learned to be so very understanding”)—is what is at issue here. That is to say, Melanctha’s
racialized body as it resists the confines of respectability is the problem for Dr. Jefferson
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Campbell—in part because it is her body is what makes her eugenically marriageable in the first
place.
In the end, Melanctha unravels against this vision of black respectability, even as that
vision as it is represented by and within Jefferson is similarly called to account. Of course,
Melanctha ends up bearing the much heavier cost. Whereas Jefferson is lightly mocked for his
hypocrisy, Melanctha’s inability or refusal to meet the prescribed benchmarks of acceptable
black femininity and, crucially, black female sexuality, confine her to a kind of childishness: one
in which womanhood is guaranteed by the institution of marriage, and failure in the face of that
“civilizing” force marks the unmarried woman as degenerate and backwards—in other words, as
a primitive subject. Melanctha does not progress by heteronormative standards of femininity, and
those changes she does undergo do not follow a teleological narrative of progress. Instead of
progressing from childhood to courtship, engagement, marriage and (eventually, presumably)
eugenic child-bearing and -rearing, Melanctha repeats herself, saying and doing the same things
over and over again, with progressively less desirable results. In Time and The Western Man
(1927), Wyndham Lewis accordingly writes of Melanctha, along with Anita Loos’ “uneducated
american [sic] flapper-harlot” Lorelei, as “Time’s Children” (76). Unable to grow up, these antiheroines repeat and accrete, Melanctha’s “ceaseless repetitions [conveying] the monstrous bulk
and vegetable accumulation of human life in the mass, in its mechanical rotation” (Lewis 74).
Stein is herself accused of a similar childishness, taking on “the accent of a little girl” (Lewis
75). Neither, according to Lewis, fully grows up.
Lewis was hardly the only one to suggest that Stein reflected herself in Melanctha. The
similarities between “Melanctha and her semi-autobiographical novel Q.E.D. are highly
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suggestive.53 As a result, critics have long understood Melanctha, and Stein’s use of race
specifically, as a mask, calling attention to Stein’s own forms of alterity. Corinne Blackmer, for
instance, argues that race functions as a cypher for Stein’s homosexuality, while Carla Peterson
suggests blackness allows Stein to negotiate her relationship to her Jewishness.54 Michael North
takes a more formalist tack, arguing for Stein’s “racial masquerade” as a stylistic rebellion
against attempts, beginning in the late nineteenth century, to standardize American English.
Peterson, I think, puts it most succinctly when she writes, “blackness functions as a means of
both self-expression and self-denial” for Stein (145). I rehearse these arguments neither to claim
that “Melanctha” isn’t really about race at all, nor to read Melanctha as a palimpsestic vessel for
Stein the woman. Rather, I’d like to suggest that Stein either funneled or was understood to have
funneled those parts of herself that were most marginalized into her protagonist, using racist
language both to distance her from that marginalization and to underline the discomfort, even
hatred, with which those identities were met. This sense of superiority and disgust, coupled with
an envy and identification, is among the most salient attributes of the Woman We Don’t Want
To Be, and one we risk losing when we take the teeth out of Stein’s racism order to examine its
intricacies.
The response of contemporary reviewers reflects the ambivalent relationship critics suggest
Stein felt towards her anti-heroine. Positive reviews focused not just on Stein’s formal
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Granted, the structural similarities between “Melanctha” and Q.E.D. (Richard Bridgman notoriously calls
“Melanctha” an “indifferent” rewriting) lends itself to reading Dr. Jefferson Campbell, not Melanctha, as a stand-in
for the former medical student Stein. See Richard Bridgman’s “‘Melanctha’” (1961), Marianne Dekoven’s A
Different Language: Stein’s Experimental Writing (1983), Lisa Ruddick’s Reading Gertrude Stein: Body, Text,
Gnosis (1990) and Michael North’s The Dialect of Modernism: Race, Language, and Twentieth-Century Literature
(1994). John Carlos Rowe draws this link as well, but he claims that Stein “represents herself in Three Lives by way
of a fictional ‘splitting,’ already evident in Q.E.D., in which her characteristics, tendencies, and idealizations of her
identity are variously presented in all of the characters, but especially in the protagonists” (230).
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This is not, to be clear, Peterson’s primary argument. In “The Remaking of Americans: Gertrude Stein’s
‘Melanctha’ and African-American Musical Traditions,” she makes the fascinating case that Stein borrowed both
characters and stylistic effects from “coon songs,” rag and the blues.
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innovations, but on the ways those innovations aligned readers with the stories’ protagonists,
and with Melanctha in particular. Georgina Goddard King wrote in her aptly titled “A Review of
Two Worlds,” “In reading Melanctha Herbert you were a negro yourself. The whole world was
Negro. The power was as undeniable as it was curious. You saw for a moment into somebody
else’s skin, sometimes by a sudden lighting flash of intuition, sometimes by a slow steeping in
the alien psychology. The New York City Post similarly noted, “Whoever can adjust himself to
the repetitions, false starts, and general circularity of the manner will find himself very near real
people. Too near, possibly.”55 For these reviewers, whether Stein accurately represented black
life in Baltimore was beside the point. What mattered was that they felt she had, and thus they
felt drawn to Melanctha, even as the very fact of that identification repulsed them. One finds
oneself “too near," too close for comfort.
Negative reviews, on the other hand, took up and compounded upon Stein’s racist
antagonism towards her characters. The Herald described Three Lives as a meditation on “minds
of low caliber and meager cultivation, the three lives depicted being those of three servant
women, one of whom is a mulatto.” The Rochester Post similarly complained that “Gertrude
Stein’s book may be ‘realistic,’ but it seems to us that the pages devoted to a description of the
habits of dogs and maidservants are both tedious and distasteful.” And The Times was most
damning of all: “The three lives,” their reviewer wrote, “are all rather sad and dingy—one of
them, in fact, is the life of a negress.” The term “heroines,” they go on to note, “seems singularly
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unfitted to these drab lives.” These reviews challenge the idea that this “sordid, unpretty
existence of a trio of lowly women” warranted fictionalization at all (the Pittsburgh Post).56
And while Stein obviously believed they did, she was also canny enough to anticipate this
response, again in racist terms. In a 1905 letter to her friend Mabel Weeks, Stein writes, “I am
afraid that I can never write the great American novel. I don’t know how to sell on a margin or
do anything with shorts and longs, so I have to content myself with niggers and servant girls and
the foreign population generally. . . . Dey is werry simple and werry wulgar and I don’t think
they will interest the great American public. I am very sad.”57 These couple sentences—with
their joking derision, casual racism and ventriloquizing of the “niggers and servants” she has
chosen as her subjects—highlight the antagonistic resonances of Stein’s racialized
characterizations.
Indeed, the structure I’ve outlined in this section is undoubtedly a racist one, identifying as
it does marriageable black people by their proximity to whiteness and primitivizing Melanctha
herself through reference to her promiscuity. Though I do not discuss it here, the text also
demonizes others, like Jem Richards and Melanctha’s father, for their unruly blackness. Yet
there is, finally, a sort of narratorial admiration for Melanctha’s unruliness—for her “wandering”
and seeking of “knowledge,” her “complex, desiring,” “passionate” nature, her intelligence,
curiosity and depth. Indeed, much of this admiration is based on her wanderings, and her
attendant refusal of the phantom marriage plot outlined for her. Melanctha is warm and daring;
she gains “knowledge” and strength through her sexual encounters. At one point Melanctha
admonishes Jefferson for not having “real courage, to run around and not care nothing about
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what happens, and always to be game in any kind of trouble” (98). As a result of her own “real
courage,” Melanctha finds herself without all the relationships that sustained her; had she
married Jefferson Campbell, she would not have died “in a home for poor consumptives.” Yet
we admire her nonetheless. Here again, Stein proposes and plays within an ethical schema,
suggesting her anti-heroine’s recrimination only to ultimately refuse it. Because of the charged
nature of the text’s racial language, though, we find ourselves wondering not just whether we
should blame Melanctha, but whether we should be repulsed by her. In the end, though, we
blame her and we can’t; we are repulsed by and attracted to her; we envy and fear her wandering.
We find ourselves “too near, possibly” to Melanctha. In other words, we arrive not at an ethical
neutrality, but at an ethical and affective ambivalence.

The Two Publications of Three Lives

Three Lives was sprung on the United States reading public twice. The first time, in 1909, it was
published by Grafton, a vanity press, and sold fewer than one hundred copies in six months.58
While it made its way into the hands of a fair number of reviewers, few members of the general
public actually read it. The second time, it was put out by Bennet Cerf in 1933 as a cheap
Modern Library Edition. The edition included a preface by Carl Van Vechten, and appeared in
conjunction with the 1933 publication of Stein’s best-seller and book club favorite The
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas.59 By the second publication of Three Lives, Stein had become
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something of a celebrity; she was known, and well-known in some circles, as a writer, collector
and salonière. As the Chicago Daily Tribune put it, “for years intelligent readers have known of,
if not actually followed, the work of Gertrude Stein.”60 The release of Autobiography, coupled
with a marketing blitz, a lecture circuit and radio appearances, then propelled her to the
proverbial next level, with contemporary reviewers of The Autobiography referring to 1933 as
Stein’s annus mirabilis.61 In September of that year she was featured on the cover of Time
Magazine. The cover article pitched The Autobiography as a sort of primer, and sought to render
Stein legible and appealing to the “man-in-the-street.” “Plain readers are not apt to go to
Gertrude Stein, with or without introduction. Mohamets in their own right, they insist that
Mountain Stein should come to them. And now at last the mountain has come. At one longdeferred bound she has moved from the legendary borders of literature into the very marketplace,
to face in person a large audience of men-in-the-street.” (A New Yorker announcement for The
Autobiography echoes this sentiment, calling the book—albeit somewhat derisively—“The
Gertrude Stein myth neatly debunked by Gertrude Stein.”62) The Time article mentions Three
Lives specifically twice, first as the text that “had given her a reputation among U.S. writers,”
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and second as one of the experimental texts readers should consider reading; it was being
reprinted, the author noted, that very month.
One wonders if Stein was thinking of the difference between Three Lives’ receptions in
1909 and 1933 when she said in a 1935 lecture, “The world can accept me now because there is
coming out of your generation someone they won't like, and therefore they accept me because I
am sufficiently past in having been contemporary so they don't have to dislike me. So thirty
years from now I shall be accepted” (6).63 In Autobiography, Stein explains that in 1909 she “had
written the story of Melanctha the negress, the second story of Three Lives which was the first
definite step away from the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century in literature” (61).
This bombastic pronouncement practically begs to be contested; yet in 1933, readers and
reviewers were more than willing to take Stein at her word. Herbert Gorman at The Post, for
instance, wrote:
“The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas,” then, is a history and a vindication for it reveals
what a more intelligent-minded body of critics should have revealed years ago—that
Gertrude Stein is an important and lasting influence on modern English writers, that she
is an atmosphere and an impulse and a beginning. The literature of the twentieth century
may be said to begin with her, with ‘Three Lives’ especially, although all that she has
written is less important than she is, for she came before Joyce or Proust … or
Apollinaire or Dorothy Richardson.64 (My italics)
Similarly, a Houston newspaper observed of Three Lives, “written yesterday, it would be a
remarkably fine book, in the van of the ‘modern’ movement. Written in 1909, it is an
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astonish[ing] anachronism.”65 And another Georgia newspaper, responding to Stein’s assertion
that “Melanctha” was “the first definite step” and Van Vechten’s calling the story “a milestone”:
“It is difficult, reading this story now, to realize that these statements are not exaggerations. But
when one remembers that this book was … published about 1909 it is easy to realize how
revolutionary in style and subject matter Melanctha was.”66
I’ll end this chapter by suggesting, alongside Stein, that with “Melanctha” she
inaugurates a new, peculiarly twentieth-century, tradition: one of affective and ethical
ambivalence. We might say the same things of Larsen’s Helga, Wharton’s Undine and Fauset’s
Angela—not to mention Loos’ and Parker’s blondes—as we do of Melanctha: We don’t know
whether to admonish or admire them, to fear or to envy them, and so we oscillate between
extremes even as we are inexorably, uncomfortably pulled into relation with these figures.
Several of the themes I outlined in “Melanctha” will re-emerge throughout this project. Like
Melanctha, none of the characters I discuss grow up, instead consigning themselves—happily or
unhappily, purposefully or not—to a series of cyclical repetitions without clear telos. Like
Melanctha, they will cause us to call into question the very nature of blame and agency, of who
has what kinds of control and under what conditions one can make or forge control over others,
and over oneself. Like Melanctha, they will disperse blame. Like Melanctha, their endings will
offer no resolution; they will sometimes offer generic gestures towards punishment and a return
to a logical world order, even as they refuse to fulfill those promises. All of which is to say: Stein
is right when she says “Melanctha” constitutes he first definite step away from the nineteenth
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century and into the twentieth century in literature.” In “Melanctha,” Stein offers us the first
example of the modernist anti-heroine, or, as I call her, The Woman We Don’t Want to Be.
As we turn, then, to the broader landscape of this project, I am perversely reminded of T.
S. Eliot’s cavalier dismissal of Stein in his January 1927 review for The Nation & Athenaeum:
“[Stein's] work is not improving, it is not amusing, it is not interesting, it is not good for
one’s mind. But its rhythms have a peculiar hypnotic power not met with before. It has a
kinship with the saxophone. If this is the future, then the future is, as it very likely is, of
the barbarians. But this is the future in which we ought not to be interested.”
Whether it is “improving” or not—and indeed, I suspect it isn’t—Stein’s work set the stage for a
barbaric future of bad femininity in which, I think, we ought to be very interested.
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“ALL HELGA EVER DOES IS RUN AWAY”: NELLA LARSEN’S QUICKSAND
“Frankly the question came to this: what was the matter with her? Was there, without her
knowing it, some peculiar lack in her? Absurd. But she began to have a feeling of
discouragement and hopelessness. Why couldn’t she be happy, content, somewhere?
Other people managed, somehow, to be. To put it plainly, didn’t she know how?”
(Quicksand 111)
I have never assigned a text that frustrated my students more than Nella Larsen’s 1928 novel
Quicksand. It wasn’t that they struggled to understand it; rather, they seemed to recognize
Larsen’s protagonist Helga Crane all too well. They wanted to feel for her, a biracial woman
adrift in a racist and sexist world, but none of them could stay sympathetic for longer than a
chapter or two at a time. Each class would end with a discussion of their hopes for Helga’s
future, while the next would begin with their complaints of how those hopes had been set up and
dashed, how all her mistakes seemed like iterations of the same mistake. Like Helga herself, my
students tried to diagnose the central problem; like Helga, they found themselves stymied and
confused. And so they got angry and frustrated with her, with Larsen and (let’s be honest) with
me too. They began predicting Helga’s failures and blaming her for her pain.
To be fair, my students were hardly unjustified in their feelings. Helga Crane is nothing if
not a maddening protagonist—a woman we (adamantly) don’t want to be. And lest we
understand these reactions as anachronistic ones, Larsen’s contemporaries read Quicksand in
much the same way. For the novel’s contemporary reviewers, as for my class, the frustration
stems from Helga’s inexplicable choices. The reviewer at The Nation, for instance, complained
that “[t]he motivation of this character is not always convincingly explained; the intention of the
book is not even always clear” (qtd. in Tate 238). The novelist Wallace Thurman’s take in the
short-lived magazine Harlem: A Forum of Negro Life was even more damning:
[T]he author seems to be wandering around lost, as lost as her leading character who ends
up by doing such an unexpected and unexplainable thing that I was forced to reread the
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book, wondering if in my eagerness to reach the end, I had perhaps skipped a hundred
pages or so. But no, such had not been the case. Helga does get blown into the gutter and
Helga does let herself be carried away by a religious frenzy to the point where she
marries a Southern minister and spends the rest of her life having babies. This would
have been all right for anyone except the Helga to whom Miss Larsen has introduced us,
and even then it would have been all right had the author even as much as hinted that
someday her character might do either the expected or the unexpected. But for the most
part all Helga ever does is run away from certain situations and straddle the fence; so
consistently, in fact, that when she does fall on the dark side, the reader has lost all
interest and sympathy, nor can he believe that such a thing has really happened.
(Thurman 220)
Helga’s lostness (and Larsen’s too, because here, all too typically, Larsen gets lumped in with
her protagonist) is for Thurman directly linked to her “unexpected and unexplainable” actions.
How can we square Helga’s refusals and wanderings, he implicitly asks, with an ending that
seems so unacceptable to her sensibilities? Is there a logic, “expected” or “unexpected,”
subtending those actions, and if so, what is it? Significantly, Thurman never uses any variation of
the word “choice” here or anywhere else in his review; instead, he characterizes Helga’s actions
as if they are happening to her: “Helga does get blown into the gutter and she does let herself be
carried away,” he writes. Thurman takes these open questions as signs of bad artistry—missing, I
think, the terrible beauty these tensions generate.67 Nonetheless, his characterization of Helga’s
actions is incisive, as are the questions he poses.
Thurman is right that “all Helga ever does is run away … and straddle the fence.” Helga is
constantly, reactively and compulsively on the move: from Naxos to Chicago, Chicago to
Harlem, Harlem to Copenhagen and back again, Harlem to Alabama. Even at the end, when she
is physically restrained from leaving by multiple difficult childbirths, she still fantasizes and
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strategizes about “how … to escape from the oppression, the degradation, that her life had
become” (161). Why? Why does she spend the entire novel “wandering around lost”—at least
until, in a moment of religious fervor as bewildering as it is brief, she marries a pastor, bears his
children, subsides into what can only be termed nervous exhaustion, and thereby finds herself
stuck in a “quagmire” from which she finally cannot flee (159)? Students, reviewers and critics
alike have asked this question; it is even posed several times in the text itself. “Why couldn’t
[Helga] be happy, content, somewhere?” (Quicksand 111).
The critical conversation surrounding the novel is lively and deep, and scholarly answers to
this question have run the gamut. For my purposes, however, they can be roughly divided into
two camps: those who seek reasons for Helga’s ineffectual searching within her psyche, and
those who seek them within her world. I will discuss the substance of these readings later on; for
now, I will simply observe that they rely upon an implicit separation of interior and exterior in
order to think about Helga’s choices. Simply put, we tend to understand choice as occurring in
two distinct steps. There is, first, the process by which a set of possible choices comes into
existence. These possibilities originate not in the individual to whom they will be presented, but
in the world they inhabit and its predisposition towards them. By this logic, Helga’s “yellow
satin” beauty, relative financial independence and freedom from family ties at the beginning of
the novel all suggest a woman with a large horizon of choices—even as her status as a “despised
mulatto” contracts that horizon (Quicksand 36, 51). As the reviewer for the New York Times
opined, unfairly but not entirely without reason, “The essential tragedy has little to do with
Helga’s being a negro. … Helga has her chances, the reasonable, average number of chances

way of doing in real life, but artificially like ill-managed puppets. Claude I believe has shot his bolt. Jessie Fauset
should be taken to Philadelphia and cremated” (Thurman 119).
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which come to most human beings.”68 As we’ll see, the essential tragedy has a great deal to do
with her race; nonetheless, Helga does, indeed, “ha[ve] her chances.” The second step moves
from exterior to interior, with the individual selecting among the available choices. In order to
assign blame to either Helga or her world, we must buy into this separation.
For Helga, however, choice is a far messier proposition. The two processes—by which
choices are made available and by which they are made—infect one another. As a result, Helga
never really chooses; rather, she reacts violently towards and against a world from which she
cannot separate herself, and which she constitutes just as it constitutes her. In this chapter, then, I
offer a third path, one that eschews the distinctions between interior and exterior, self and other,
cause and effect upon which these readings implicitly rely, and one that begins with what sticks:
Helga’s bewildering choices and the frustration they evoke.
That is to say, I begin with a consideration of agency—of who has (how much and what
kinds of) control. Helga vexes traditional understandings of agency by calling into question the
very idea of a coherent, inviolable self that can take control in the first place. She is subject to
feelings so overwhelming that they traverse interior and exterior, breaking notions of selfhood
and the traditional understandings of agency that come along with them. As a result, she is
marked as hysterical, reactive, impulsive and compulsive. Her feelings manifest as affective
overflowing, with no discernible locus in either self or world, and result in a series of repetitive,
frustrating, ineffectual—to put it baldly, bad—choices. Larsen’s Quicksand, to put it another
way, details the mechanisms and repercussions of feeling wrong—of emoting the wrong way,
about the wrong things, for the wrong reason—and of acting on the basis of those feelings. I
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accordingly name the controlling emotions Helga exhibits “wrong feeling.” “Wrong feeling”
describes an emotional relationship to the world that breaks the divide between interior and
exterior, thereby entrapping her in a cyclical temporality of bad choices. In contrast to literary
sentimentalism’s signal value “right feeling,” with the sentimental heroine feeling her way to
moral choices and action, Helga feels her way to the wrong reactions. Helga does not (cannot)
exist outside of her emotional intra-actions with the world that makes and unmakes her.69 As a
result, her choices are not her own. Rather, they form the site of her affective cleaving with her
environment.
Sianne Ngai begins to describe this phenomenon in her excellent reading of Helga’s
“irritation” in Ugly Feelings (2005), arguing within the context of Fanon’s racial epidermal
schema for irritation as the novel’s primary mood (as distinct from affect, in that it has no
occasion). For Ngai, Helga is constantly irritated—literally and emotionally—which is to say
that she responds too much in the face of unimportant annoyances, too little in face of serious
racial injustice. Helga is emoting, in short, to the wrong degree and about the wrong things. My
reading of Quicksand has much in common with Ngai’s formulation, yet I think Ngai gets Helga
wrong in a key way: She describes Helga’s irritation as her own little “microclimate,” which
distances her from those around her. On the one hand, Ngai is right to note the ways Helga repels
the advances of the reader and the other characters, and this observation gives rise to her most
compelling readings. I, however, contend that Helga is not merely repulsing and withdrawing
from others. To the contrary, Helga’s constant irritation (and ours with her) manifests her
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inability to emotionally distance herself from the world around her. Helga’s wrong feeling
serially isolates her from those communities she so desperately wants be a part of, not because
she separates herself out, but because she can’t.
This chapter elucidates the workings of wrong feeling within Larsen’s Quicksand. Briefly
put, the first section defines “wrong feeling,” and the second shows how an appeal to this
concept can help us to break the critical impasse surrounding Quicksand. In the process, I tell
three related stories. The first concerns the way a sentimental mode, tradition and complaint
feeds into and constitutes modernist literary production, and how Larsen in particular uses her
protagonist’s controlling emotions to navigate her literary moment. Feeling wrong is, I show, a
peculiarly twentieth-century phenomenon, a manifestation of the modernist allergy to sentiment
and sentimentalism that nonetheless takes up its key tropes. The second story tells of how wrong
feeling breaks the divide between interior and exterior, counterintuitively implicating Helga in
her own undoing. And the third is a story of punishment—of the mechanisms and repercussions
of emoting the wrong way, about the wrong things and for the wrong reasons.

“Ridiculous Sentiment”

Because all of Helga’s choices tend to resemble one another, her first consequential choice, to
leave Naxos, is as good a place as any to start. The first two chapters create the impression that
Helga’s flight from Naxos might well be an all-too-reasonable response to an oppressive
environment. Even the name has negative connotations. Naxos is the Aegean island where
Theseus abandons a sleeping Ariadne to her loneliness and isolation. An anagram of the word
“Saxon,” Naxos also evokes and critiques historically black institutions’ capitulations to white
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understandings of black respectability. “A showplace in the black belt,” Larsen dubs it,
“exemplification of the white man’s magnanimity” (Quicksand 39). The reader is furthermore
assured that Helga’s prickliness is a result of her inability to fit the “Naxos mold,” and that she
might therefore be restored to some hypothetical past pleasantness by her removal from this
institutional “machine” (39): “The general atmosphere of Naxos, its air of self-rightness and
intolerant dislike of difference, [was not] the best of mediums for a pretty, solitary girl with no
family connections. Helga’s essential likable and charming personality was smudged out” (40).
In the proper conditions, we are led to believe, Helga could be “likable,” “charming,” even
happy. As Cheryl Wall puts it, “Larsen’s memorable protagonist embarks on a journey towards
self-discovery that seems destined to succeed” (96). Helga might be the heroine we are hoping
for, if we will only accompany her on her search for herself.
And she does, indeed, find herself, several times over: first in Chicago where she “felt …
that she had come home,” then in Harlem where “she considered that she had, as she put it,
‘found herself’” (Quicksand 63, 75). It was, she thinks to herself that first time in Harlem, “a
release from the feeling of smallness which had hedged her in, first during her sorry, unchildlike
childhood among hostile white folk in Chicago, and later during her uncomfortable sojourn
among snobbish black folk in Naxos. … But it didn’t last, this happiness of Helga Crane’s”
(Quicksand 78). The feeling never lasts. And so Helga keeps finding and losing herself again and
again. Her decision to leave Naxos is representative of this cycle not just because she leaves, but
because it is not really a decision as such. That is to say, Helga doesn’t decide to leave; the text
instead emphasizes “a peculiar characteristic trait, cold, slowly accumulated unreason in which
all values were distorted or else ceased to exist” (Quicksand 39, my italics). She arrives at the
feeling that she must leave (Quicksand 38).
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Later, reflecting on her determination to go right away, even Helga can’t help but see her
choice as illogical:
Regretfully she was forced to acknowledge that it would be vastly better to wait until
June. … Surely she could endure for that much longer conditions which she had borne for
nearly two years. By an effort of will, her will, it could be done. But this reflection,
sensible, expedient thought it was, did not reconcile her. To remain seemed too hard.
Could she do it? Was it possible in the present rebellious state of her feelings? The
uneasy sense of being engaged by some formidable antagonist, nameless and ununderstood, startled her. It wasn’t, she was suddenly aware, merely the school and its
ways and its decorous stupid people that oppressed her. There was something else, some
other more ruthless force, a quality within herself, which was frustrating her, had always
frustrated her, kept her from getting the things she had wanted. Still wanted. (Quicksand
44)
This passage dramatizes Helga’s search for control. Larsen sets up and then chips away at the
possibility of a logical decision-making process, evoking the phantom of a post-enlightenment
agency. “Will, her will” at first seems like a source of power, even a foregone conclusion;
“surely” she can stay. Then the tide turns. “Will” becomes an empty construct, easily
counteracted by “the present rebellious state of her feelings,” which makes staying seem
impossible. The locus of control then shifts from her will to this “formidable antagonist,
nameless and un-understood” that is both “the school” and “some other more ruthless force, a
quality within herself.” In this sense, control resides both within and outside of Helga. The
tension here is key. It is not merely Naxos that “smudge[s Helga] out,” but the problem does not
lie exclusively in her psyche either. Rather, the “formidable antagonist, nameless and ununderstood” is both interior and exterior. It breaks the divide between interior and exterior, and
manifests in “the rebellious state of her feelings.” This, then, is Helga’s wrong feeling: a
phenomenon of her own making, to which she is nonetheless subject. Instead of impelling her
towards her desires, wrong feeling “ke[eps] her from getting the things she … want[s].”
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Her coworker Margaret’s response to Helga’s decision is telling: “Margaret laughed.
‘That’s just ridiculous sentiment, Helga, and you know it” (Quicksand 47, my italics). While it’s
tempting to write this off as a throw-away comment, I’d like to take Margaret’s accusation
seriously. In naming Helga’s structure of decision-making “ridiculous sentiment,” Margaret both
cites sentiment as a locus of control and treats it as a problem worthy of ironic derision—a move
later repeated by Herr Dahl (Quicksand 121) and, twice, Helga herself (Quicksand 94, 125).
When I argue that Helga feels wrong, I mean all that is evident in Helga’s leaving Naxos: the
phantom expectation of the will as it comes up against the reality of her controlling emotions, the
inside-outness of that emotive relationship to the world, and Margaret’s (not to mention Helga’s
own) ironic derision concerning those feelings. That is, in order to account fully for Helga’s
wrong feeling, we must place it within the larger apparatus of “sentiment” as an American
literary tradition.
Of course, even accounting for that apparatus is no simple endeavor: As Mary De Jong so
aptly puts it, “A nearly universal discourse in the nineteenth century, sentimentalism takes a
multitude of forms, accommodating multiple internal contradictions and inconsistent
manifestations that can reduce a scholar to tears” (2). We might talk about sentimentalism as “a
set of cultural practices designed to evoke a certain form of emotional response” (Samuels 4) or,
in Joanne Dobson’s useful articulation, as “envision[ing] … the self in relation” (170). Most
recent critics agree that sentimentalism was not a genre, but a “rhetorical mode,” which
nonetheless shared certain aesthetic markers, tropes and themes, and privileged the creation of a
certain emotional response—“feeling right,” to use Harriet Beecher Stowe’s famous
formulation—in both character and reader.70 “Sentimental,” however, was never a neutral
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descriptor. Even in its infancy, the term always invoked questions of literary value. Like
“impressionism,” “sentimentalism” was coined to mock the mode of artistic production it
described; unlike “impressionism,” it has never been fully salvaged from its original negative
connotations. Wallace Stevens got at the problem with particular limpidity when he wrote,
“sentimentality is the failure of feeling.” Jennifer Fleissner elaborates:
We should note that, its recent critical recovery aside, the term sentimentality in common
parlance tends to function much like ideology. That is to say, its identification as such
depends at least in some measure on its perceived failure to carry out its ends. By
contrast, if the sentimental text did simply carry out its ends—if one were deeply moved
by it, period—one would not use the word sentimental to characterize it; the use of the
work automatically implies some distance from the sentimental effect. (166)
In brief, the critique of sentimentalism is of a mawkishness that fails to carry out its ends. In
deriding Helga’s “ridiculous sentiment,” Larsen falls in with this critique—a move that also
aligns her with the anti-sentimental prejudice of her literary moment.
In some ways, Larsen’s is merely the same old story, whereby an implicitly masculine
modernism finds its footing by rejecting an implicitly feminine sentimental tradition. After
publishing two short stories in Young’s Realistic Stories Magazine under the masculine
pseudonym Allen Semi, Larsen set her sights on becoming, and becoming known as, a modern
novelist.71 The first step in this self-representational pivot, it seems, was her response to a
negative review in the New Negro magazine Opportunity of Walter White’s novel Flight. Larsen,
using her married name Imes, wrote a letter to the editor in which she presented herself as an
ideal reader of White’s protagonist Mimi because of her extensive familiarity with modern
heroines. “Just why, I wonder, did your reviewer choose the passive French-Canadian Girl, the
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consciousness—what Raymond Williams calls a ‘structure of feeling’—that traverses many cultural forms” (9).
71
“The Wrong Man” and “Freedom” came out in January and April of 1926, respectively. The pseudonym she used,
Allen Semi, is Larsen’s married name Nella Imes in reverse.
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trapped Mattie, and the Salammbô of ancient Carthage, with whom to disparage the sensitive,
rebellious Mimi? Certainly, these are, for their own environment at times, excellent characters.
But so is Mimi for hers” (Imes).72 Larsen suggests instead comparison to “Galsworthy’s
unsurpassable Irene Forsyte or Jacobsen’s Maria Grubbe.” She then cannily writes of her own
“mind, warped as I have confessed by the Europeans and the American moderns.” And in a
paragraph that was ultimately excised (it is unclear by whom) from the published letter, she
enumerates at greater length her modernist bona fides: “Now to your reviewer’s complaints
about the author’s style. Even the opening sentence, so particularly cited, still seems to me all
right. But then, I have been recently reading Huysmans, Conrad, Proust, and Thomas Mann”
(qtd. in Davis, 205). Larsen’s self-positioning is remarkable: She uses her analysis of a New
Negro Renaissance novel’s female protagonist, and concomitant rejection of older analogues for
that protagonist, in order to ally herself with the emergent masculine—and predominantly White
and European—literary modernisms.
Further complicating this account is Larsen’s own public relationship to her anti-heroine.
Of course, the author, whether she encourages the comparison or not, is always wound up with
the Woman We Don't Want to Be. Larsen, however, was at pains to do so. At every opportunity
in the run-up to Quicksand’s publication, Larsen underlined her similarities to Helga, even to the
point of misleading the public about details of her own life. In her author biography for Knopf,
which would be reprinted in part on the dust jacket of Quicksand and used to publicize the author
and her work, Larsen tells a story of her life that aligns her story almost precisely with Helga’s:
“Nella Larsen is a mulatto, the daughter of a Danish Lady and a Negro from the Virgin Islands,
formerly the Danish West Indies. When she was two years old her father died and shortly
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afterward her mother married a man of her own race and nationality” (qtd. in Davis 22). Except
for the death of Larsen’s father—in Quicksand, Helga’s father leaves the family—this biography
maps precisely onto Helga’s plot. Of course, as Thadious Davis showed in her biography of
Larsen, it’s entirely possible that Larsen’s father didn’t die at all, but instead began passing for
white, and that Nella Larsen, who couldn’t pass, was functionally disowned in order to facilitate
the family’s transition into white Chicago. Davis’ evidence isn’t conclusive, and as Larsen’s
other biographer George Hutchison argues, Davis gets several other things wrong—like whether
Larsen visited Denmark as she says (Davis suggests she didn’t; Hutchison shows she did).
Hutchison also paints the picture of a mother who, in marked contrast to Larsen’s depiction of
Helga’s (and Davis’ depiction of Larsen’s), was highly supportive of her daughter’s education.
In any case, as both Davis and Hutchison repeat throughout their biographies of the novelist,
Larsen’s life is plagued with inconsistencies, suppressions and omissions. Two things, however,
are clear. First, Larsen had a great deal in common with her protagonist; and, second, to the
extent that her biography diverged from the story of her semi-autobiographical novel, she sought
to smooth over those dividing lines.
The effect is to suture Larsen the novelist to Helga her protagonist in the public eye. The
biographical blurb Larsen wrote for Knopf provides depth and verisimilitude to Helga’s story,
and Helga’s story in turn fills out Larsen’s public image. In a May 1928 profile of Larsen in the
Amsterdam News, for example, Larsen is made to resemble Helga, not just in her parentage and
education (likely copied from the author’s statement she provided Knopf), but also in her dress—
“a modern woman, … [she] wears her dresses short”—and her surroundings—filled with
“varicolored pillows, paintings, books and more books,” like Helga’s room in Naxos.73
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Similarly, and as I remarked upon earlier, in Wallace Thurman’s review, Helga’s lostness
becomes Larsen’s lostness. Helga’s racial ambivalence too becomes Larsen’s: The writer E.
Merrill Root wrote for the Christian Century, “The book, in so far as it is Miss Larsen herself, is
excellent. She has, in so far as she has simply bared a modern Negro soul, race-divided and
disillusioned by our current misosophy, done us a service” (qtd. in Davis 278). When we speak,
then, of the position Larsen’s text inhabits in its literary landscape, there are two scales of
readerly interaction: first, the literary moment into which Quicksand was sprung by Knopf, a
press that published nearly all the first editions of what would become the classics of the Harlem
Renaissance. In this context, Helga, notwithstanding all her complexities, would have been
encountered as broadly representative of the “mulatto” and the New Negro. And second, there is
the more intimate scale, in which Helga would have been taken as representative of her author.
Larsen performs a similar sort of posturing in Quicksand as she does in her letter in defense
of Flight and in her public alliance of herself with her protagonist. Helga is a quintessentially
modern heroine in her dress, attitudes and mobility. Yet Larsen underlines the modernity of her
project not just through her protagonist’s markers of modernity, but also through the text’s
implicit and explicit critique of the sentimentality at once represented and perverted by that very
protagonist. These are two sides of the same coin: Larsen has her sentimentalist cake and mocks
it too.74 In other words, by adopting modernism’s complaint about sentimentalism—that it is
“ridiculous” and fails to attain its ends—she makes space for sentiment within modernism.
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Indeed, to put a finer point on it, she makes “ridiculous sentiment” the central, driving force in
the life of her quintessentially modern heroine.75
Take, for instance, Larsen’s modernist refiguration of the “tragic mulatta,” a key figure of
the nineteenth-century sentimental tradition. Helga, like Stein’s Melanctha, is portrayed as
divided against herself and verging on mental illness. She is fearful throughout the text of what it
might mean for her to have children; and she ends up committing something akin to suicide by
confining herself at the end of the novel to a series painful and difficult child-births. By this
point, though, readers have lost a great deal of sympathy for Helga. So while, like the
sentimental tragic mulatta, Helga personifies the pain of the color line, in the end she evokes not
sympathy but frustration, even disgust.
This frustration is symptomatic of Larsen’s key perversion of American sentimentalism’s
legacy: the case for “feeling right.” In the concluding remarks to Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852),
Harriet Beecher Stowe, writing against the American institution of slavery, urges her readers to
“feel right. An atmosphere of sympathetic influence encircles every human being; and the man
or woman who feels strongly, healthily and justly, on the great interests of humanity, is a
constant benefactor to the human race” (500, Stowe’s italics). This passage highlights the bidirectionality of the injunction to “feel right.” It is not merely the sentimental protagonist who is
expected to feel “strongly, healthily and justly,” and thus to make his or her way into ethical
relation to the world. It is also the reader who is meant to respond to that protagonist’s journey
with the right feelings—namely, sympathy and compassion. What’s more, for Stowe, as for
many of her contemporaries, “feeling right” was a mechanism not just of encouraging moral
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The argument I’m making here is in some ways an extension of Suzanne Clark’s argument in her aptly named
Sentimental Modernism (1991). “A sense of victory against anti-sentimentalism runs the danger of missing the
point. I want to argue that we should restore the sentimental within modernism, and the sense of great struggle over
subjectivity that the resulting contradictions precipitated” (4).
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action on the part of individuals, but of encouraging individual participation in the process of
virtuous nation-building. As applied to racial difference, “feeling right” purported to convert
abjection into uplift, offering a utopian vision of the power of emotion.
In Helga, Larsen depicts an unruly, inchoate and contagious affect—wrong feeling—that is
a deliberate rebuke to the relative tidiness and implicit promises of sentimentalism’s call for right
feeling. As Ngai shows with particular acuity, Helga’s wrong feelings are reactions to injustice,
but they’re hardly actionable as critique. So while Helga is certainly, to use Stowe’s words,
“encircle[d]” in “an atmosphere of sympathetic influence,” she does not feel her way to right,
moral action. Rather, she allows herself to be swept up by her own overpowering emotions, and
to the wrong ends. And in our frustration as readers, we too feel wrong. Instead of displaying
sympathy and compassion for our unfortunate anti-heroine, we find ourselves stymied—upset
and angry, perhaps, but, like Helga, with no place to go. Quicksand, then, is not a utopian
project, urging readers to act in “the great interests of humanity” as “benefactor[s] to the human
race,” but a deeply pessimistic portrait of a problem that cannot be pinpointed, much less solved.
In place of actionable critique, we find instead that “formidable antagonist, nameless and ununderstood” that both is and isn’t Helga (Quicksand 44). Margaret’s derision for Helga’s
“ridiculous sentiment” must be understood within this context, not merely as a reproof of
Helga’s controlling emotions, but as an indication of the novel’s impressive contortions with
regard to its own sentimental logics.

The Problem of Closeness
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At the start of this chapter, I noted that the scholarly conversation surrounding Quicksand has
reached something of an impasse. In response to Helga’s bewildering choices, the general critical
response has been to allot blame. Critics tend to fall into two camps: those who locate the source
of Helga’s unhappiness within Helga’s psyche, and those who find it in the world she inhabits.
Quicksand simultaneously encourages and refuses these readings—spurring readers to blame
someone or something even as it renders the task impossible. In breaking the divide between
interior and exterior, “wrong feeling” allows us to meditate upon the question of blame in
Quicksand without falling into the traps Larsen sets for her readers. This section will begin by
considering the novel’s provocations through the lens of previous critical responses, and end by
showing how wrong feeling constructs Helga as a permeable subject, bridging her psyche and
her world.
Members of the former critical camp seek to diagnose Helga’s central “lack” by
pathologizing her. There are of course more and less nuanced versions of this critical stance:
While earlier readings diverted attention from the damaging facets of Helga’s environment, later
work, like that of Claudia Tate (1995), Barbara Johnson (1997) and Judith Butler (1993), moved
towards a fuller understanding of the interaction between Helga’s interiority and her
environment.76 Like these critics (and, for that matter, my students), I too am tempted to
pathologize Helga. The novel’s narrator seems to ask for this treatment, begging readers to
diagnose a “lack somewhere,” presumably in Helga’s psyche (Quicksand 42). Helga herself even
goes to a doctor to diagnose her “overwhelming anguish,” and he tells her to take time off work,
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Johnson in particular usefully highlights “the inside-outside opposition … the novel constantly forces us to
reexamine” (254). She nonetheless locates Helga’s problem squarely in Helga’s abnormal psychology, citing her
narcissism, which, as per Heinz Kohut's model, is a void to be filled, sometimes by other people, sometimes by “not
a person but a race, a ‘world’” (260).
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a rest cure of sorts (Quicksand 78). Yet I am wary of this impulse to diagnose Helga for two
reasons.
First, assigning Helga a certain pathology doesn’t do justice to the maddening way
Quicksand, even as it constantly calls for diagnoses, just as frequently demonstrates Helga’s
essential undiagnosability. When Helga’s coworker Margaret comes to check on Helga to see if
she is sick, the narrator explains, “No, Helga wasn’t sick. Not physically. She was merely
disgusted. Fed up with Naxos. If that could be called sickness” (Quicksand 48). In this sense
again Thurman is right. Nobody—not Helga herself, not Dr. Anderson, not Herr Dahl, not the
narrator, not even, perhaps, Nella Larsen—totally understands why Helga does what she does.
Helga pulls away from her friends in Harlem, for instance, “without awareness on her part”
(Quicksand 79). When Dr. Anderson comes to visit her, “she had no intention of running away,
but something, some imp of contumacy, drove her from his presence, though she longed to stay”
(Quicksand 82). “Her definite decision to go [back to Harlem] was arrived at with almost
bewildering suddenness” (Quicksand 122). And after weeks of putting off her return trip to
Copenhagen, “Abruptly one Sunday … she knew that she couldn’t go…. It was no use trying to
persuade herself” (Quicksand 134). The impulse to pathologize Helga, insofar as it is an impulse
to look for an understandable, if not necessarily reasonable, basis for her choices, is a critical
path Quicksand both suggests and blocks. In keeping with Larsen’s refusal, then, wrong feeling
offers not explanation but acknowledgment; it constitutes an effort not to fill the “lack
somewhere” with diagnosis, but to describe the lack.
Second, pathologizing Helga necessarily feeds into the troubling contemporary tradition in
which biracial subjects are always already pathologized—their psychological health a
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consequence of and necessary sacrifice to the color line—outlined in the previous chapter.77 This
logic pathologizes biracial people in an effort to locate the impossibility of their existence within
their genetic makeup, and thereby to exonerate a world that creates no space for them. To be
clear, I do not levy this charge solely against the white communities that exclude their biracial
children—though these are the more violent and damaging exclusions. As the novel shows—for
instance, when Helga’s one-time boss Mrs. Hayes-Rore encourages her to tell no one in Harlem
of her white parentage—there is a reason Helga doesn’t feel at home in predominately black
spaces either. Mrs. Hayes-Rore, the narrator explains, “felt that the story [of Helga’s parentage],
dealing as it did with race intermingling and possible adultery, was beyond definite discussion.
For among black people, as among white people, it is tacitly understood that these things are not
mentioned—and therefore they do not exist” (Quicksand 72). Similarly, in an editorial published
in Opportunity: A Journal of Negro Life three years before Quicksand was released, the author
applauds the phenomenon of the “vanishing mulatto”: “Physical contact between the races is
diminishing, and, in a generation or so, those disturbing ghosts of uncalculating youth shall have
melted away” (291). Returning then to the point at hand: To the extent that Helga’s status as a
“mulatta” accounts for her bewildering choices, it does so not as potential pathology, but as a
means of exclusion and erasure.
That is not to say that we ought to locate the problem entirely within the damaging aspects
of Helga's environment either. Granted, several critics have recently offered remarkably
compelling readings doing precisely that, pointing to how Helga chafes against, for instance,
black nativism (Macharia 2011), “the racialized fantasies of the communities she enters”
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As with Stein’s “Melanctha,” early readings of the novel did reduce Helga’s psychology to her racial status as a
“despised mulatto.” To Nathan Huggins, Helga is “overwhelmed by the ethnic war in her mulatto psyche” (239).
Robert Bone casually refers to Helga as “neurotic” and reads her “restlessness and dissatisfaction [as]… at bottom
projections of Negro self-hatred” (103, 104).
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(Scheper 2008, 684), capitalism (Dawahare 2006) and “Harlem’s capitalizing renaissance and the
race consciousness it purposes to mold” (Esteve 2003, 155). My work here is indebted to these
readings, and in particular to the ways they situate and explicate Larsen’s ironic critique and
indictment of the systems in which Helga is ensnared. Yet members of this camp tend, first of all,
to ignore the ways Helga actively feeds into those systems—a phenomenon I will discuss
presently—and secondly, to gloss over the frustrations Helga evokes, reading her as either a
traditionally agentic heroine, or else refusing to characterize her entirely. Macharia, for instance,
accurately characterizes “Thurman’s critique of Helga’s vacillations [as] reveal[ing] an
ideological investment in … hetero-futurity,” but doesn’t take on Thurman’s all-too-reasonable
frustration with Helga (2011, 266). Jeanne Scheper goes so far as to argue that Helga “turns
power against itself by forging out of acts of displacement a powerful re-scripting of movement
as a site for becoming a subject,” painting her as fundamentally in control—a feminist heroine
for her age (2008, 684-685). The assumption at the heart of these readings is that in a world
where there are no good choices on offer, Helga does the best she can.
This is, to my mind, half true: Yes, there are no good choices for Helga, no action she can
take to extricate herself from a world that fundamentally has no place for her. Yet she nonetheless
makes the wrong choices over and over again—peripatetically refusing several possibilities for
attenuated happiness, before finally throwing herself into the only situation where she will
clearly find none. In a world where there are no good choices for Helga, she nonetheless makes
all the wrong ones.
Wrong feeling breaks the presumed divide between Helga and her world by creating a
protagonist so vulnerable she is permeable—her emotions the site of her affective cleaving with
and from a punishing world she cannot escape. This third path, then, does not merely avoid or
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vex the distinctions between interior and exterior upon which earlier readings implicitly rely; it
breaks them. Granted, Helga tries to separate herself out: She cultivates “a faint hint of
offishness,” intended as a “protective measure for her acute sensitiveness” (Quicksand 66). And
she does revel in the occasional reprieves from her controlling emotions, as when, just after
arriving in Copenhagen, she “recall[s] a line that had impressed her in her lonely schooldays:
‘the far-off interest of tears.’ To her, Helga Crane, it had come at last, and she meant to cling to it.
So she turned her back on painful America, resolutely shutting out the griefs, the humiliations,
the frustrations, which she had endured there” (Quicksand 104-105).78 For Helga, this
detachment, though “she meant to cling to it,” is a brief interlude; too soon, her feelings resume
their habitual closeness. When she receives an invitation to her friend Anne’s wedding in the next
chapter, her reaction is violent and visceral: “Perhaps she was wrong to bother about it now that
she was so far away. Helga couldn’t, however, help it. Never could she recall … the black man’s
existence in America without the quickening of her heart’s beating and a sense of disturbing
nausea. … [I]t was almost a tangible thing in her throat” (Quicksand 111-112). Even at a literal,
physical distance, Helga is too close.
Quicksand dramatizes the problem of this closeness, of feelings that are not just
inescapable, not just overpowering, but also, crucially, constitutive. If “sentimentalism in its pure
essence envisions—indeed desires—the self in relation,” Helga’s permeability warns against a
relationality so intense it swallows the self entirely (Dobson 170). Helga’s wrong feeling, then,
does not merely entrap her in a cycle of desire and punishment; it makes her complicit in that

78

The line, “the far-off interest of tears,” is from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s In Memoriam (1850), in which the
speaker simultaneously bemoans and celebrates the impossibility of traveling to a later point in time, when he will
feel his grief less. It also bears pointed similarity to realist William Dean Howells’ critique of sentimentalism as
“tears, idle tears.”
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cycle. To put it another way, Helga actively feeds into the apparatuses of her punishment, which
then constitute her in turn.
As a result, she often seems to wound herself. Consider, for instance, her reaction to Dr.
Anderson when she sees him again at an event in Harlem:
He responded seriously, … “You haven’t changed. You’re still seeking for something, I
think.” At his speech there dropped from her that vague feeling of yearning, that longing
for sympathy and understanding which his presence evoked. She felt a sharp shining
sensation and a recurrence of that anger and defiant desire to hurt which had so seared her
on that past morning in Naxos. She searched for a biting remark but, finding none
venomous enough, she merely laughed a little rude and scornful laugh and, throwing up
her small head, bade him an impatient good night and ran quickly up the steps.
(Quicksand 82)
In Ugly Feelings, Ngai shows how Helga repulses and rejects everyone around her, creating a
“microclimate” of irritation around herself. Here, it becomes clear that Helga’s irritation is a
symptom, not the cause. Helga’s yearning for connection, for “sympathy and understanding,”
ultimately gives rise to her irritated ejaculation. This is the mechanism by which Helga’s
controlling emotions—her wrong feeling—get a hold of her. Because she either cannot or will
not separate herself out from her environment, she is constantly reacting to its small and large
indignities, instead of acting of her own accord.
Helga’s “uncontrollable wish to wound,” as she rightly notes just after this scene, is a
“boomerang” (Quicksand 83, my italics). It is a boomerang, too, when her “acute sensitiveness”
manifests not as irritation, but as empathy (Quicksand 66). For instance, when her uncle’s new
wife cruelly turns her away, “so plainly wish[ing] to dissociate herself from the outrage of
[Helga’s] very existence,” Helga finds that “she understood and sympathized with Mrs. Nilssen’s
point of view, as always she had been able to understand her mother’s her stepfather’s, and his
children’s points of view. She saw herself for an obscene sore in their lives, at all costs to be
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hidden” (Quicksand 61, 62). Within this empathy lies the repulsion and rejection Helga so often
displays towards others in her irritation; here, though, she redirects those affects towards herself,
and towards the blackness and illegitimacy that together constitute “the outrage of her very
existence” in particular.
Indeed, precisely because Helga’s blackness forms the primary site of her exclusion and
maltreatment, it also exemplifies the ways in which she is constituted by, and uncomfortably
complicit in, the indignities she suffers. In Copenhagen, for instance, Helga lives what she comes
to call a “peacock’s life,” both exploiting and acquiescing to the exploitation of her blackness
(Quicksand 111). The transition begins the moment she steps off the boat: Her aunt and uncle
Fru and Herr Dahl immediately take her shopping, purchasing items that underline her racial
difference either by accentuating the darkness of her skin or by playing into the primitivism with
which that darkness is associated. Notwithstanding her ambivalence about the stressing of her
racial difference, and the use to which her racialized body has been put in “advancing the social
fortunes of the Dahls,” Helga ends up actively enjoying this treatment: “[A]fter a little while she
gave herself up wholly to the fascinating business of being seen, gaped at, desired. … Helga
Crane’s new existence was intensely pleasant to her; it gratified her augmented sense of selfimportance. And it suited her.” (Quicksand 98, 103-104). As the critic Jeffrey Gray puts it, Helga
“participates in the creation of herself as fetish” (263). Nor is Helga’s merely a pragmatic
capitulation; she finds pleasure in giving up the right to portray herself.
Along these lines, we might fruitfully compare Helga to a character like Lily Bart of
Edith Wharton’s 1905 novel The House of Mirth. Lily also “participates in the creation of herself
as fetish”; yet whereas Helga evokes frustration and repulsion in her readers, Lily is nearly
always met with pity and understanding. Helga reads as the engineer of her own destruction,
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whereas Lily is introduced to us from the very beginning as “so evidently a victim of the
civilization which had produced her” (House of Mirth 5). What, we might then ask, differentiates
these two protagonists? Nella Larsen would likely have read Wharton’s novel; and regardless, I
am hardly the first to note the similarities between the two novels—or between the two authors,
for that matter.79 Both Helga and Lily are beautiful and motherless; both sabotage opportunities
for advantageous marriages; and both remain virgins (in Helga’s case, until marriage) in spite of
insinuations of their dangerous sexualities. Augusta Rohrbach even suggested that “Lily Bart’s
story reads as if she were a tragic mulatta, right down to her sudden demise” (103). Helga shares
Lily’s refined sensibilities; and Lily is accused of the same “flightiness” and “unreason” as Helga
(House of Mirth 152, 231). As Edith Wharton herself explains in her autobiography A Backward
Glance, if “a frivolous society can acquire dramatic significance only through what its frivolity
destroys,” then the “tragic implication” of her account of “fashionable New York” lies in its
sacrifice of Lily Bart (206-207). Helga too is no doubt destroyed by the end of Quicksand, yet
the novels’ “tragic implication” reads differently. The difference inheres not just in the systems of
punishment, but in the embeddedness of the protagonist within those systems.
Lily’s unadulterated pride at her success as one of the tableaux vivants at the Wellington
Brys’ “general entertainment” provides an illuminating counterpoint to Helga’s pleasure at her
success in Copenhagen. I quote at length to highlight the narrator’s circulating perspective on
Lily’s display:
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Meredith Goldsmith, for instance, writes in 1994, “Quicksand functions as a critical rereading of the Whartonian
plot, specifically that of The House of Mirth.” See also Linda Dittmar’s “When Privilege is No Protection: The
Woman Artist in Quicksand and The House of Mirth (1991) and Emily J. Orlando’s “Irreverent Intimacy: Nella
Larsen’s Revisions of Edith Wharton” (2015). In the latter, Orlando doesn’t compare these two novels specifically—
she pairs Quicksand with Wharton’s Twilight Sleep—but she does make the case for a broader affiliation between
Wharton and Larsen. Along those same lines, a New York Sun review of Passing notes, “[Larsen] has gone to Mrs.
Wharton and the elegant sophisticates for her lessons in writing” (Clippings File of the James Weldon Johnson
Memorial Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Box 110).
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[T]he unanimous “Oh!” of the spectators was a tribute, not to the brush-work of
Reynolds's “Mrs. Lloyd” but to the flesh and blood loveliness of Lily Bart. … The noble
buoyancy of her attitude, its suggestion of soaring grace, revealed the touch of poetry in
her beauty that Selden always felt in her presence, yet lost the sense of when he was not
with her. Its expression was now so vivid that for the first time he seemed to see before
him the real Lily Bart, divested of the trivialities of her little world, and catching for a
moment a note of that eternal harmony of which her beauty was a part.
“Deuced bold thing to show herself in that get-up; but, gad, there isn't a break in the
lines anywhere, and I suppose she wanted us to know it!”
These words, uttered by that experienced connoisseur, Mr. Ned Van Alstyne,
…affected their hearer in an unexpected way. It was not the first time that Selden had
heard Lily's beauty lightly remarked on, and hitherto the tone of the comments had
imperceptibly coloured his view of her. But now it woke only a motion of indignant
contempt. This was the world she lived in, these were the standards by which she was
fated to be measured! Does one go to Caliban for a judgment on Miranda? (109-110)
Both Helga and Lily are implicated in their own fetishization; they are each, as Walter Benjamin
wrote of the prostitute, “seller and sold in one” (Benjamin 41).80 Yet I’d like to draw attention to
how Wharton’s description of Lily’s tableau vivant centralizes and instrumentalizes Lawrence
Selden’s vision at the expense of Lily’s interiority. Selden imaginatively separates Lily from the
coarseness of her milieu. For Selden, there is a “real Lily Bart” who, “divested of the trivialities
of her little world,” can exist, if only for a moment, outside of its judgment. Granted, Selden’s
reading of Lily’s performance in this scene is hardly the only one Wharton offers her reader, nor
is it necessarily even the most perceptive. Ned Van Alstyne, for instance, is right when he says,
“there isn’t a break in the lines anywhere, and I suppose she wanted us to know it!” Selden’s is,
nonetheless, the dominant perspective from which the reader perceives the scene. What’s more,
in briefly extracting Lily from the world that made her, Selden separates her not only from Van
Alstyne’s desire, but also from her own hopes on the marriage market—which is to say, those
very desires that implicate her in her own fetishization in the first place. Moments like this one—
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in which Lily is detached briefly from her milieu, and examined, clean, whole and apart from
Caliban’s standards—are replicated throughout the novel, reinforcing Lily’s essential duality.81
Helga, by contrast, is never given such treatment. Even though she, like Lily Bart, often seems to
“despis[e] the things she’s trying for,” she is, unlike Lily, incapable of stepping outside the
parameters of her world (Wharton 152). So whereas House of Mirth imagines a “true” Lily Bart
distinct from her milieu, Quicksand allows for no such possibility. Helga thus attains nothing
near the dignity of Lily’s defeat.
The difference between Wharton’s and Larsen’s approaches to their protagonists’ “true”
selves furthermore turns on the distinction Anne Cheng draws between nineteenth- and
twentieth-century practices of fetishization.
Modernist rejection of the nineteenth-century fetishization of ornamentation turns out to
rely on a fetishization of bareness. From one perspective, this new bareness is but another
version of essence; essence has merely been displaced from interiority to exteriority. …
But it would be misguided to think that the notion of essence has been preserved or
reborn without challenge, for it is precisely in that move, that relocation from inside out,
that the very structure supporting the distinctions between essence/interiority and
cover/exteriority begins to turn in on itself. (Cheng 35-36)
Whereas Lily maintains an interiority, an essence, separate from her interactions with the world,
twentieth-century fetishization turns Helga inside-out. Helga does not (cannot) exist outside of
her intra-actions with the world that made her and that she herself made. Thus, in constructing
Helga as an inside-out protagonist, Quicksand insists upon her guilt rather than her victimhood,
all the while underlining, yet again, Larsen’s own participation in a distinctly modern project.
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This quotation, from Benjamin’s “Paris, the Capital of the Twentieth Century,” has also been translated as “seller
and commodity in one.”
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Contemporary reviewers picked up on this too: the reviewer for The Outlook wrote, “From the first chapter,
trifling indiscretions, careless compromises, minor infidelities, begin to close round Lily Bart and bind her hand and
foot until she becomes the victim of a series of circumstances … which taken together forge an iron chain of fate.
And to this achievement … Mrs. Wharton adds the equally great achievement of exposing the chief actor in her
story to contamination at every turn, … and yet preserving a core of integrity at the heart of her nature and sending
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Finally, we must also acknowledge the substantial difference race makes. Lily considers
posing as Tiepolo’s Cleopatra, but ultimately decides on Reynolds’ Mrs. Lloyd. As Elizabeth
Ammons notes, “unlike Cleopatra, whose sexual allure would have been equally strong, Mrs.
Lloyd (like her creator, Reynolds) is unquestionably, purely white. Indeed, she epitomizes
Anglo-Saxonness” (“Edith Wharton and the Issue of Race” 79). Lily thus derives sexual capital
from a performance of her whiteness, a whiteness that is at other points throughout the novel
associated not just with desirability, but with purity and goodness. Helga, wittingly and
unwittingly, similarly finds herself performing her blackness as sensuality—a performance that
becomes particularly clear in the portrait Olsen paints of her: “It wasn’t, she contended, herself at
all, but some disgusting sensual creature with her features” (119). For Larsen, blackness is rarely
coded positively, but is associated with a feeling of taint. Whereas the negative moral
implications of Lily’s sexualization of her whiteness are extenuated by the ways The House of
Mirth uses whiteness to limn goodness more generally, the negative moral implications of
Helga’s sexualization of her blackness are exacerbated by Quicksand’s antipathetic portrayals of
blackness.
Blackness in Quicksand, even as it is at times allied with community and comfort, all too
frequently limns that which is despicable, untenable and undesirable—often, counterintuitively,
because of its associations with that which is too sensual, too sexually desirable and desirous.
Helga’s use of her blackness in Copenhagen thus stands not in contrast to, but in tandem with,
those “days when the mere sight of the serene tan and brown faces about her stung her like a
personal insult” (Quicksand 84). This feeling comes to a head just after she receives the money

her out of life with such compassion of comprehension that not a hand can be raised to hurl a stone” (my italics,
Anna Catherine Bahlmann Papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Box 4, Folder 49).
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from her uncle that will enable her to go to Copenhagen in the first place. Leaving her office to
run a quick errand, she finds that
the inscrutability of the dozen or more brown faces, all cast from the same indefinite
mold, and so like her own, seemed pressing forward against her. Abruptly it flashed upon
her that the harrowing irritation of the past weeks was a smoldering hatred. Then she was
overcome by another, so actual, so sharp, so horribly painful, that forever afterwards she
preferred to forget it. It was as if she were shut up, boxed up, with hundreds of her race,
closed up with that something in the racial character which had always been, to her,
inexplicable, alien. Why, she demanded in fierce rebellion, should she be yoked to these
despised black folk? Back in the privacy of her own cubicle, self-loathing came upon her.
“They’re my own people, my own people,” she kept repeating over and over to herself. It
was no good. The feeling would not be routed. “I can’t go on like this,” she said to
herself. “I simply can’t.” (Quicksand 85-86)
The play of identification and distance in this passage encapsulates Helga’s racial identification
as it is constituted by her wrong feeling. We begin with the brown faces, “so like her own” and
yet “pressing forward against her” (my italics). Is Helga too “cast from the same indefinite
mold”? She tells herself she is—“They’re my own people”—yet she simultaneously feels their
“racial character … inexplicable, alien.” She will accordingly leave Harlem, deciding that “she
didn’t, in spite of her racial markings, belong to these dark segregated people” (Quicksand 86);
and she will then return to Harlem because she is “homesick, not for America, but for Negroes.
… The irresistible ties of race … dragged at her own heart (Quicksand 122). She wishes to
distance herself, to refuse “be yoked to these despised black folk,” but that yoking is an
inescapable as her own body, not just her parentage but her very skin. She is “shut up, boxed up,
with hundreds of her race,” hating herself just as she hates those “brown faces” that do and don’t
resemble her. Cause and effect are one here. Interior and exterior, self and other, collapse into
each other. Here, then, we find ourselves with a relational causality that, at its sentimental
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extreme, implicates the victim of a racist, sexist world in precisely those systems of oppression.
It is an untenable and unsustainable position.
Further complicating this play of identification and distancing is Larsen’s own private
identification with her protagonist. Larsen casually echoes Helga’s ambivalence about
identification with American blackness. For instance, in a 1927 letter to Dorothy Peterson,
gossipy and full of complaints (“it has, as I informed you last week[,] been as hot as hell here”),
Larsen refers explicitly to the passage above from her then-unfinished novel: “Right now when I
look out into the Harlem streets I feel just like Helga Crane in m[y] novel. Furious at being
connected with all these niggers.”82 Later in 1931, when Larsen is vacationing in Spain, she
writes to Gertrude Stein complaining of the country’s “resigned unhappy placidness.” “It may be
just that I’ve got a nostalgia, a yen to see the teeming streets of Harlem and hear some real
laughter.”83 This quotation might just as well have been pulled from one of Quicksand’s later
chapters in Copenhagen; the nostalgia, performative though it may be, is of the same quality.
And here as in Quicksand, readers experience the same whiplash between identification and
distancing, comfort and deep antipathy towards American blackness.
For Helga, the position is untenable. She “can’t go on like this.” And it will remain
untenable. In the end Thurman is right that “all Helga ever does is run away … and straddle the
fence.” The ultimate effect of Helga’s wrong feeling is what so frustrated my students: not just
her peripatetic wandering and inexplicable flights from possibilities for happiness, but the fact
that she makes all the same mistakes over and over again. Because Helga is always reacting
away from a world that nonetheless engulfs and constitutes her, her impossible predicament is
characterized by incessant motion. Helga’s wrong feeling does not just rupture the barriers of the
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self; it also springs a temporal trap, feeding Helga into a cycle from which she cannot extricate
herself.

Going On

By the end of Quicksand, even Larsen seems frustrated with her protagonist. There is a
weariness to the prose describing Helga’s “seductive repentance” and subsequent marriage to
Reverend Mr. Pleasant Green: “As always, at first the novelty of the thing, the change, fascinated
[Helga]. There was a recurrence of the feeling that now, at last, she had found a place for herself,
that she was really living” (Quicksand 146). Granted, Helga too is exasperated with herself by
the end—though not, as the narrator is, for maintaining her pattern, but for breaking it: She “felt
only an astonished anger at the quagmire in which she had engulfed herself. She had ruined her
life” (Quicksand 159). The ending in this sense is an odd mix, one that troubled reviewers of the
novel when it came out, and still confounds critics today. It is both out of character and totally
characteristic.
On the one hand, Helga’s move to Arkansas begins as all her other choices do—not as a
decision, but as a reaction and a rejection—the product of her controlling emotions. Dr.
Anderson apologizes for kissing her, and she reacts with violent emotion, slapping him “with all
her might, in the face.” The choice that surprises not just Dr. Anderson, but Helga herself.
During the next few days and weeks, “Over and over, she repeated: ‘There’s nothing left but to
go now’” (Quicksand 137). And so, soon, she does go, and with characteristic suddenness. “‘I
can’t stay in this room any longer,” she says to herself. “I must get out or I’ll choke.’ …
Distracted, agitated, incapable of containing herself, she tore open her drawers and closets,
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trying desperately to take some interest in the selection of her apparel” (Quicksand 138, my
italics). By the next line, she is out in the night rain. Here again, Helga overflows into her
surroundings, her uncontrolled feelings breaking the barrier between interior and exterior. As she
enters the church—not, to be clear, because she chooses to, but because, “lashed” by “a whirl of
wind,” she literally falls in the gutter, at which point, weak and soaking, she “succeed[s] finally
in making her way to the store whose blurred light she had marked for her destination”
(Quicksand 138)—she is greeted by a song that underlines her inside-outness in biblical terms,
moving from “All of self and none of Thee” to “Some of self and some of Thee,” and finally to
“Less of self and more of Thee” (Quicksand 140, Larsen’s italics). Yes, Reverend Mr. Pleasant
Green, a “flattish yellow man” with none of the pedigree or material prospects Helga so clearly
esteems, is a highly uncharacteristic choice of partner for Helga. Yet his affiliation with the
church, and the self-evacuation with which the church is, for Helga, briefly connected, is the
logical extension of Helga’s permeability.
It is also characteristic that Helga at first thinks she can be happy, then slides slowly
towards that “discontent,” which, we are told from the beginning, lies “crouched” within her
(78). It is characteristic that she should plan for her escape. It is unprecedented but nevertheless
characteristic that, in the absence of any other means of escape, she should attempt to withdraw
into her own body, finding another brief reprieve from her “acute sensitiveness” in an illness
brought on by a particularly difficult childbirth. It is uncharacteristic, however, that she should
have allowed herself to get so mired in any one place in the first place, such that a quick,
impulsive escape is impossible. They say victims of quicksand don’t feel themselves being
drawn down until it is too late, and this may well be true of Helga. Yet one wonders, in light of
all Helga’s wanderings, if she might not have just kept on as she had been. It’s clear, though,
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from the moment she enters the crowd of black faces, that something will have to give. “‘I can’t
go on like this,’ she says to herself. ‘I simply can’t’” (Quicksand 86).
And so we arrive at a cyclical course of repetitions that inclines backwards if it goes
anywhere at all. One might call it a queer temporality. Certainly, Elizabeth Freeman usefully
argues that “recalcitrant subjects”—subjects like Helga and, Freeman’s chief example,
Melanctha, who either cannot or will not “comply to a set of precepts about what counts as
agency” (333)— suffer what she calls a “queer chronicity,” highlighting the ways “chronic
conditions seem to belie narrative altogether” (336); and Keguro Macharia maintains that Helga
queers the normative progression of black nativism, which “sutures racial and sexual
normativity,” by refusing marriage to a member of the talented tenth and thereby (and again, like
Melanctha) refusing to do her part in what could have been a narrative of racial uplift (255). Yet
there is something, to my mind, wanting in these formulations. Granted, suggestions of
queerness run throughout Larsen’s oeuvre, her second novel Passing in particular. Also granted,
a text like Lee Edelman’s No Future—“queerness offers no way of being, no impulse towards
social contestation and change, no promise of a future more just” (182)—has a great deal to say
to readers of Quicksand. Nonetheless, this framing gives heterosexuality remarkably little space
in which to operate and pulls attention away from the traps it holds. For, at the most basic level,
Helga gets stuck in this quagmire not because of any queerness on her part, but as a direct result
of her heterosexual desire and her reproductive and normative femininity. While her flight from
place to place is characterized in part as a rejection of heterosexual desire (and the concomitant
rejection of a normative progression from courtship to marriage and child-rearing), her path
towards cyclical entrapment runs straight through heterofuturity, even if it is of the wrong sort.
The problem in both cases is her social and biological femininity: first her feminized sentiment,
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which propels her from one place to the next, then her reproductive body, which cycles from one
exhausting childbirth to the next.
In the end, Helga finds herself caught in the distinctly feminine trap of survival. She toys
with the idea that she might want to die, but her young body won’t die. “She was convinced that
before her there were years of living” (Quicksand 158). She wants to escape, but her
reproductive body—exhausted by the birth of her fourth child, preparing for the birth of her
fifth—can’t sustain the exertion of leaving. It is an unsustainable position that must, nonetheless,
be sustained. To paraphrase Samuel Beckett, she can’t go on; she must go on. Can’t go on, must
go on. It’s the sound of the tracks underneath the train, of ceaseless movement on a hemmed-in
path. In the final analysis, then, wrong feeling ends in a hall of mirrors. Helga’s are not acts of
self-liberation, freedom or even transgression. They are instead the mechanisms by which she
negotiates her own entrapment. She can’t go on and she can’t stop going, “the good life” in
perpetual deferment. We might here think of Stein’s Melanctha and her incessant repetitions and
just as incessant “blueness,” “wandering,” but never getting “really married.” Or we might think
of Parker’s Hazel and the “misty melancholies” that in the end give rise to her series of lovers
and failed suicide attempt. These are, of course, normative judgments, and that is much of the
point: These women fail by the normative, teleological benchmarks of acceptable femininity,
wherein a specific courtship process regulated by the woman’s family of origin gives rise to
suitable marriage, eugenic child-rearing and eventually, peaceful death. It would be a mistake to
jettison these normative standards in our evaluation of these texts, or, on the other side of the
coin, to try to reclaim these characters as feminist subversives in an attempt to recuperate them
for contemporary readerly sympathy. Melanctha, Helga and Hazel are maddening protagonists,
firmly ensconced within normative frameworks. It’s important not to lose sight of that basic fact.
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The account I have offered here gestures to one of the key problems with the Woman We
Don’t Want to Be more generally. She is despicable, guilty, troubling and wrong because she is
the personification, extension, excretion, even the creator, of a world that is all these things—a
world that precludes her happiness even as it fulminates within (and without, about) her an
inescapable drive towards it. She is the feminine counterpart of Gertrude Stein’s “lost
generation” of young men, the banner-holder of Dorothy Parker’s “ladies’ auxiliary of the legion
of the damned.” This figure thus exists within a strange tension: the instantiation of a broken
modernity, she is also, as I have argued, its tailor-made bête noire. Of course, she couldn’t be
one without the other; that is much of the point and much of the problem. Rita Felski writes of
“recognition,” that it is “simultaneously reassuring and unnerving” (25). It is reassuring to know
you are not alone, unnerving to know you are part of a bad pattern—that there was a bad pattern
in the first place of which to be a part. Helga’s essential undiagnosability plays into this
discomfort: To know that something is wrong is both a relief and a burden, especially when the
problem, as yet, has no name. In calling it “wrong feeling,” I try to give the problem a name but
not a locus, to show how, even when we find a way to describe the threat the Woman We Don’t
Want to Be poses, it seems to flit away for us, to hover at the borders, to stay constantly and
tantalizingly out of reach. The problem is Helga; the problem is the world.
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UNDINE’S “FLEXIBLE SOUL”: SPECULATIONS IN IDENTITY
IN EDITH WHARTON’S CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY
“This, in the social order, is the diversion, the permitted diversion, that your original
race has devised: a kind of superior bohemia, where one may be respectable without
being bored.” (Custom of the Country 218)
“She’s a monstrously perfect result of the system: the completest proof of its triumph” (166).
This is how Charles Bowen, a minor character in Edith Wharton’s 1913 novel The Custom of the
Country, accounts for its beautiful and destructive anti-heroine Undine Spragg. Bowen is the
novel’s participant-observer, stepping in at strategic intervals to offer wry commentary on
contemporary morae—or, to use his own words (and he is the only one to say them), “the custom
of the country.” Here, the “system” to which he refers is American marriage and its emotional
and economic terms of exchange. Bowen explains that American women must be content with
“the leavings tossed them by the preoccupied male—the money and the motors and the clothes—
and pretend to themselves and each other that that’s what really constitutes life …[when these
things] are simply the big bribe she’s paid for keeping out of some man’s way” (165). Some
contemporary readers of the novel took Bowen’s speech and ran with it, understanding Undine’s
success as broadly indicative of her worlds’ failings. The New York Sun put it best when they
called Undine an “ideal monster” (qtd. in Killoran 66). In this chapter, I’ll ask what precisely is
so monstrous about Undine—and what Wharton critiques in and through this monstrous woman.
Much of the criticism of The Custom of the Country seeks to answer these questions by
explaining what the novels is about. Ticien Marie Sassoubre argues provocatively that Custom is
“about changing property relations and the ways in which those property relations are
constitutive of personal identity” (687). For Elizabeth Ammons, it’s about American marriage
(“The Business of Marriage”). For Ariel Balter, it’s about desire, and the ways sexual desire
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transmutes into capitalist and consumerist desire, and vice versa. All these readings will heavily
inform the work of this chapter, compelling and enabling its analysis. I, however, ultimately
contend that The Custom of the Country isn’t about anything. Instead, Undine spreads and
dramatizes the emptiness at the core of modern desire. The novel’s subject turns out to be not
something but nothing, a discomfiting aimlessness aligned with modernity’s unstable
subjectivity. Like Undine, the novel wanders from one aspiration to the next without a broader
telos, fundamentally empty at its core. There is no solution or better world on offer, no path to
self-fulfillment—indeed, no path to coherent selfhood at all.
The suggestion of this novel—and of this project as a whole—is that wanting and being
are not constant things, but ways the modern self is made and unmade in relation. Undine brings
this logic to its monstrous conclusion, showing what happens when a woman repeatedly and
strategically makes and unmakes herself according to the market’s fluctuating desires. In the
previous chapter, I explored the self-destructive potential of an incoherent self. This chapter
shows the other side of that coin: the threatening feminine control that might be forged by the
incoherent self. Undine makes herself not just without finding self-fulfillment, but without filling
herself at all. Rather, she strategically deploys her emptiness to iteratively reflect and assimilate
the desires of others. That emptiness, furthermore, infects those around her, breaking essentialist
understandings of identity to make way for a monstrously flexible modern selfhood. In contrast
to her first and fourth husband Elmer Moffat, a typical self-made man, who makes himself by
virtue of a self-contained intelligence and acumen, Undine makes herself on the strength of her
identity’s very incoherence. Put another way, feminine self-making in American modernisms
turns out, counter-intuitively, to be a project of strategically unmaking the self.
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As a result of her iterative flexibility, Undine fits perfectly into the “awkward moment”
of American feminism this project outlines. Instead of finding herself by bucking the
heteropatriarchy and refusing normative standards of femininity, Undine loses herself in order to
succeed by precisely those parameters. To be sure, Undine, as one of Wharton’s correspondents
wrote, “ha[s] not a single redeeming feminine trait (except her beauty). ... an incarnation of
feminine selfishness” (my italics).84 Yet her iterative flexibility is in fact peculiarly feminine, in
that it harnesses the assumption of feminine receptivity—that wives in particular are
fundamentally assimilable to their husbands’ ways of living, wanting and being. Undine turns
this assumption on its head by being endlessly assimilable, adopting and adapting to everything
around her while retaining nothing.85 These are the same standards of feminine desirability and
marriageability to which the Woman We Don’t Want to Be more generally is held—the same
expectations of feminine comportment that alternately reward and destroy her, keeping her either
way in persistent loops of wanting. Undine is the ideal inhabitant of this loop because she brings
it full circle. She wants respectability and amusement, “the money and the motors and the
clothes”; her male admirers want her body and companionship; her female counterparts want
what she has; and none of these parties will ever have enough. What’s more, if, as Ariel Balter
acutely observes, “Undine’s wants are the collective wants of turn-of-the century America,” then
Undine betrays not just her husbands and friends, but her readers—the “we” of this study—by
getting everything we wanted: power, position and wealth (21). Even as we fear the rapacious
modernity she represents, we envy her for what she has. This monstrous femininity, as conduit
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for and receptacle of our collective desires, is not just threateningly, horribly quotidian—a view
of every-day modernity, with its parties, clippings and squabbles—but also threateningly,
horribly desirable—a damning reflection of what we ourselves want, and thus, in a sense, what
we want to be. In the end, then, what is most horrifying about Undine is her representativeness.
It’s not just that she is a monster, but that she is our monster.
This chapter will begin by exploring Undine’s multifarious identity performance,
showing how she iteratively constructs and deconstructs her identity on the basis of her
assimilative, ever-changing desires. Undine, I show, speculates not just in marriages, but in her
own “flexible soul.” Each new iteration of her personality forms the basis for her own, most
recent venture, to be tested on the market in order to see how much social and fiscal capital she
can bring in on the basis of her performance. As I’ll discuss in the second section, Undine’s
“flexible soul” destabilizes and commodifies not just her own identity, but those of others as
well. Undine’s second and third husbands provide the best examples of this phenomenon: unable
to insulate themselves from Undine’s destructive flexibility, they adapt to it, and in the process
allow themselves, along with the societal strictures they represent, to be destroyed. Undine
empties them out. Her ability to iteratively recreate her identity and to “infect” those around
her—not to mention the text’s insistence that she is of a different “race” than her husbands—
furthermore calls to mind turn-of-the-century racial panic, and anxiety about the passer in
particular. In this second section I’ll thus also look to how Undine taps into these anxieties, her
identity performance offering the same rebuke to essentialist notions of identity as the passer’s,
and her marriages registering as miscegenations. If Undine simultaneously victimizes and
implicates her interlocutors, dispersing and multiplying blame by rendering them complicit in the
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means of their destruction, the final section bears witness to the scale of this indictment,
exploring the empty modernity that emerges as a result of Undine’s destructive flexibility.

Speculations in Identity

In The Writing of Fiction (1925), Edith Wharton applauds Balzac and Stendhal for the
“Advances in Modern Fiction” they represent:
What was new in both Balzac and Stendhal was the fact of their viewing each character
first of all as a product of particular material and social conditions, as being thus or thus
because of the calling he pursued or the house he lived in (Balzac), or the society he
wanted to get into (Stendhal), or the acre of ground he coveted, or the powerful or
fashionable personage he aped or envied (both Balzac and Stendhal.) These novelists …
are the first to seem continuously aware that the bounds of a personality are not
reproducible by a sharp black line, but that each of us flows imperceptibly into adjacent
people and things. … Since Balzac and Stendhal, fiction has reached out in many new
directions … but it has never ceased to cultivate the ground they cleared for it.86 (9-11)
If, as we saw in the previous chapter, “the bounds of personality” encompass the environment
around the individual, such that the world “flows imperceptibly”—and, I’d add, uncontrollably—
into the self, Wharton here articulates an understanding of the self in which this process also
operates in reverse, “each of us flow[ing] imperceptibly into adjacent people and things.” In
Custom of the Country, Wharton’s protagonist Undine exemplifies this bi-directional constitution
of the self. Undine makes her identity from the things and people around her—“the society [s]he
want[s] to get into … the powerful or fashionable person [s]he ape[s] or envie[s]”—even as she
“flows imperceptibly” and threateningly into those people and things, making (or really,
unmaking) them in their turn. Far from being “reproducible by a sharp black line,” Undine’s
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personality overflows the bounds of the self. What’s more, she is endlessly changing and
changeable. What Undine “covets” and “apes”—those people and things that constitute her just
as she flows into them—is constantly changing; her itinerant desire pushes her from personality
to personality. Undine thus offers a testament to the ceaseless pull of desire, which, empty at its
core, must continually refill itself.
Undine’s second husband Ralph sees half of this equation, understanding Undine as
deeply impressionable. “She was still at the age when the flexible soul offers itself to the first
grasp,” he thinks to himself when he first feels what he later terms the “call” to marry her
(Custom 64). Undine’s “flexible soul,” we learn as the novel goes on, allows her to mold herself
not just to Old New York, but to every environment she enters. Undine has an “instinct of
adapting herself to whatever company she was in, of copying ‘the other’ in speech and gesture as
closely as she reflected them in dress” (Custom 127). As a result, her personality is constantly
shifting in response to her environment, assimilating “adjacent people and things,” even as, at
any given moment, “Undine was not consciously acting a part: this new phase was as natural to
her as the other” (Custom 211). While Undine takes from everyone around her, she is particularly
constituted by her husbands, to the point that the reviewer from the Independent referred to the
novel’s protagonist as “such destructive characters as Undine Spragg-Moffat-Marvell-De
Chelles-Moffat.” (Custom ed. Emsley 428).87 The plural “characters” is pointed, implying that
Undine changes so much in each marriage as to constitute a whole new person.
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Ralph’s first few interactions with Undine offer the reader a starter course in her tactical
dissimulations and—particularly intriguing—just as tactical frankness. Undine begins by
attempting, at the dinner to which Ralph’s sister invites her, to adopt the mannerisms of the Old
New York society to which Ralph belongs. Yet While Undine is, generally speaking, careful to
mask her provincialism during her first forays into that society, she drops the pretense
completely when she finds herself in an opera box with Ralph. “Some intuition,” Wharton
writes, “told her that frankness was the tone to take with him” (54). The switch in her selfpresentation is not just instantaneous, but virtually seamless. However, Undine’s about-face in
this moment of supposed “frankness” does not result from any change in her own selfconception, or, for that matter, any new-found feeling of emotional safety. Rather, it is a tactical
move that registers her quick understanding of what Ralph wants: his desire for what he
perceives as her “freshness, her malleability” (Custom 64). As the narrator tells us later in
Custom when Undine first meets her third husband Raymond’s family, “she was used to such
feats of mental agility, and it was instinctive with her to become, for the moment, the person
whom her interlocutors expected her to be” (305).
The chief conduit of others’ desires, and thus of Undine’s own strivings, is her body.
Undine’s beauty blares off the page. In the “blazing” room in which she is first described,
“Undine’s beauty was as vivid, and almost as crude, as the brightness suffusing it. Her black
brows, her reddish-tawny hair and the pure red and white of her complexion defied the searching
decomposing radiance: she might have been some fabled creature whose home was in a beam of
light” (Custom 17). Undine is constantly using that beautiful body to stage her “youthful
flexibility. She was always doubling and twisting on herself, and every movement she made
seemed to start at the nape of her neck … and flow without a break through her whole slim
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length to the tips of her fingers and the points of her slender feet” (5). These bodily and
metaphorical twistings appear every time she works to attract someone—the “youthful
flexibility” of her body bespeaking the ever-youthful flexibility of her soul. The nature of the
sexual desire she manipulates in men, however, does not find its echo in herself. The narrator
explains that, despite having been married more times (and therefore had more sexual partners)
than most, Undine “was not ‘an immoral woman.’ The pleasures for which her sex took such
risks has never attracted her, and she did not even crave the excitement of having it thought that
they did” (279-280). Or, as The Daily News put it, “Her selfishness is not even tempered by
animalism.”88 Undine’s desires, in contrast to those of the men in her orbit (and, as I’ll discuss in
the next chapter, Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Angela) are acquisitive rather than sexual in nature.89
Like many, Ralph is attracted to her precisely because of this flexibility: “She was still at
the age when the flexible soul offers itself to the first grasp.” Of course, notwithstanding Ralph’s
acuity in pinpointing this key aspect of her personality, he also gets Undine wrong here in a few
key ways. First, Ralph’s will not be the “first grasp” on Undine’s flexible soul: Undine, though
he doesn’t know it, has been married once before, to Elmer Moffat in her home town of Apex.
Second, Ralph assumes that her flexible soul will be molded by his grasp. Her first marriage
belies this assumption, as, for that matter, do the next two. Throughout, Undine’s flexibility
remains constant, her soul perpetually offering itself to the next grasp. Third, and relatedly, Ralph
attributes Undine’s flexibility to her age, and therefore thinks it likely to fade quickly. It is linked
to her youth, to be sure: As I noted above, we are constantly reminded of “her youthful
flexibility” (5, my italics). Yet Undine remains in a sort of perpetual childhood. As Carol J.
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Singley observes, although Undine “absorbs information with lighnting speed, she is incapable
of extracting any lasting value for the lessons she learns"" (ed. Rattray 63).90 To Singley’s
observation I’ll offer a quick caveat: Her “increased experience” does grant her “a clearer
measure of her power” (Custom 314). Yet she never grows, and as a result never grows up. She
remains—notwithstanding her three husbands and child—in the half-formed state that enables
her machinations in the first place. Undine’s flexibility, in short, is the cause of her ceaseless
motion; learning and assimilating nothing, she strives for everything.
In service of this striving, Undine speculates, conceptualizing everything and everyone
around her as either investments or leverage—things that can be either bought and sold or enable
her to buy and sell on better terms. For the most part, she trades upon people’s affections. She
leverages her mother’s and father’s devotion to, and preexisting investment in, her to extract
dresses and opera tickets; she cultivates her relationship to her friend the Princess Estradina in
exchange for access to Estradina’s nephew (and, eventually, Undine’s third husband) Raymond;
and Ralph’s love of his son Paul—and her control of Paul—affords her the means to remarry.
The list could go on. To my eye, Undine’s speculating is most evident when it fails, as when she
loses the affections of Peter Van Degan, for whom she leaves Ralph Marvell. The narrator
describes Undine’s decision to initiate the transition from Marvell to Van Degan as “as clear, as
logical, as free from the distorting mists of sentimentality, as any of her father’s financial
enterprises. It had been a bold move, but it had been as carefully calculated as the happiest Wall
Street ‘stroke’” (288). Like Elmer Moffat a few chapters earlier, Undine sustains a loss in the
course of the normal vicissitudes of a rapidly fluctuating market, but her acumen remains intact.
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This is hardly new terrain: The novel’s critics have long understood Undine as a speculator.
Elizabeth Ammons was the first, writing in 1974 that Undine “speculates in husbands just as
husbands speculate in stocks, and she is skillful at it” (“Business of Marriage” 337). Undine does
indeed handle her husbands like capitalist ventures, using them to enrich herself, dropping them
(sometimes less quickly than she would like) when they either lose value or prove poor
investments. Ralph himself even makes note of this propensity, not in Undine but more
generally, while he is ruminating on the abstract possibility of marriage: “The daughters of his
own race sold themselves to the Invaders; the daughters of the Invaders bought their husband as
they bought an opera box. It ought all to have been transacted on the stock exchange” (61). More
recently, Martha Patterson argues in Beyond the Gibson Girl (2010) that Undine is herself
“subject to the valuations of a fluctuating marketplace,” and that she too speculates, though in
accordance, Patterson maintains, with an “outmoded proprietary ethic” (81, 101). Ticien Marie
Sassoubre in her excellent article “Property and Identity in Custom of the Country” (2003)
expands the field of play, arguing that Undine sees everything—the Dagonet jewels, the Chelles
tapestries, even her own beauty—as fungible, and constructs a “thin” sense of self on the basis of
that fungibility—“her lack of constitutive relationships to anything fixed” (696).91
Building upon Sassoubre’s contribution, I’ll spend the remainder of this section drawing
particular attention to the ways Undine understands and uses the fungibility of her own
personality, speculating not just in people and things, but in herself.92 If one of the chief
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“advances in modern literature” for Wharton was the understanding that “the bounds of a
personality are not reproducible by a sharp black line, but that each of us flows imperceptibly
into adjacent people and things,” Undine’s monstrosity lies in her willingness to change out these
people and things at a whim, to allow that which she desires to be as endlessly flexible as she is
herself (Writing of Fiction 10). Every time Undine gets what she wants, she finds the peak she
has attained overshadowed by some greater aspiration; and so she keeps wanting, her personality
constituted by one set of people and things only until she moves to the next rung, with the next
set of people and things. Put another way, the self doesn’t accrue in Custom; it deteriorates. And
though Undine never finds happiness or fulfillment in her harnessing of that deterioration, she
nonetheless turns it to her advantage.
Compare Undine, for instance, to another businessperson (and speculator) in Custom: her
first and fourth husband Elmer Moffat. Elmer works as an investor on Wall Street. A self-made
man who seems to have come from nothing (the narrator insists, at a couple different intervals,
that no one even knows his origins), Elmer spends the majority of the novel cutting various
deals, profiting in particular from the shady Ararat investigation and Apex consolidation. Like
Undine, Moffat manages his relationships in order to enrich himself. Like Undine, Moffat is
“half ridiculed, yet already half redoubtable” (Custom 157). Like Undine, Moffat’s “ignorance
was part of his terrible power, and it was hopeless to try to make him feel the value of what he
was asking her to give up” (Custom 456). And like Undine, Moffat is figured as a monster of
sorts, controlling a strange “underworld” of speculative transactions: “Ralph had never seen his
way clearly in that dim underworld of affairs where men of the Moffatt and Driscoll type moved
like shadowy destructive monsters beneath the darting small fry of the surface” (Custom 205, my

observes that, in both Custom and House of Mirth, “identity is speculative and depends on a combination of
inventiveness and chance,” and rightly, I think, identifies the American identity crisis in both novels as a result of
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italics). Moffat functions throughout the novel as a double to and counterpoint for Undine—the
self-made man to her self-made woman. Both use their speculative acumen to transform what
they have into more—more money, more things, more status.
Their methods and goals are remarkably similar, but with one key difference: Moffat’s
personality remains constant no matter his environment. Granted, when Undine sees him again in
New York, she thinks to herself that “his look seemed to promise the capacity to develop into
any character he might assume” (Custom 85). As the novel progresses, however, he seems to
become only more himself, reddening and broadening into a sense of his own power. Certainly,
he projects the same sense of himself regardless of his audience. At different moments he
explains separately to Undine, her father and Ralph that he “sees things big”; and that impression
grows with his repetitions, along with his proofs. When he suggests a “deal” to Ralph, for
instance, Ralph reports back to Undine:
“He strikes me as the kind of man who develops slowly, needs a big field, and
perhaps makes some big mistakes, but gets where he wants to in the end. … There's
something epic about him—a kind of epic effrontery.”
Undine’s pulses beat faster as she listened. Was it not what Moffatt had always said
of himself—that all he needed was time and elbow-room? How odd that Ralph, who
seemed so dreamy and unobservant, should instantly have reached the same conclusion!”
(202).
To put it briefly, the sense Moffat gives of himself remains constant, regardless of time or
interlocutor. He even always comports himself the same way, with “his usual hyperbolic banter
and his loose lounging manner,” “his half-humorous minor key” (Custom 198, 370, my italics).
As a result, Undine is frequently embarrassed by his behavior, noting in particular his inability to
accord himself to his environment. In contrast to Undine’s changeability, “[u]nder all [Moffat’s]
incalculableness there had always been a hard foundation of reliability” (198).
the new rich’s infiltrations (350).
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Whether it is innate or adopted, Moffat gains materially from his performance of
reliability. Because he must ask frequently for others’ money and aid in order to complete his
own transactions, he must project confidence in himself, his abilities and, most important, his
staying power. Performing that confidence and consistency makes others more likely to invest,
such that his steadfast personality—when paired with his actual success—attracts investors,
enabling him to enrich himself further. Undine, by contrast, enables her continued investments
by cultivating the sense of her changeability. Ralph marries her because he wants to impress his
values upon her “flexible soul,” and she similarly leads Raymond to assume that she will
assimilate to his way of doing things. Indeed, she incites Raymond to propose by pretending to
have already begun her assimilation, explaining to him that she must give him up in deference to
his family’s arcane sensibilities (Custom 325). Thus, whereas Moffat creates the conditions for
his speculations by giving others to believe in his reliability, Undine does so by giving out the
constant impression that the next man will be the one to permanently shape her personality. This
difference has to do with the differences in the instruments available to them: While Moffat
needs money, which he can then invest or re-invest, Undine’s instrument is herself (which she
also invests and re-invests). Each new turn of her flexible soul is a venture of sorts, to be put out
on the marriage market in search of a good return.
There is an intense irony here, in that Undine achieves this apex of American individualism
not by becoming more herself, but by becoming less so—by constituting herself relationally,
according to the things and people around her. Foundationally flexible, she periodically adapts,
and enriches herself on the basis of these serial adaptations. Of course, that foundational
flexibility itself indicates a limit to her relational identity-building; in order to retain her
flexibility, she cannot allow herself to be imbued with anything lasting, like scruples or values. It
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is not, however, as if there is anything particularly stable at her core that might be retained.
Undine is constituted not by any particular value, but by an itinerant, changing desire that
furthermore originates not in herself, but in the world around her. Accounting for one such
desire—to have Mr. Popple paint her—she says simply, “I want what the others want” (79). In
other words, those members of the upper-classes she victimizes in order to get what she wants
are themselves responsible for forming her specific and ever-changing desires—for things like
dresses, opera boxes and a certain kind of dinner—in the first place. So, in order to gain access to
what she wants, Undine molds herself according to what others want her to be. If Undine is a
self-made woman, she tells of how modernity enables—indeed encourages—women to make
their fortune and to achieve social standing: by iteratively unmaking themselves to suit the everchanging desires of others.
Several critics have suggested that in Undine, Wharton rewrites Lily Bart of her earlier
novel The House of Mirth (1905), imagining a version of Lily that might survive the punishing
environment of Old New York.93 Lily, as I discussed in the last chapter, often seems to “despise
the things she’s trying for,” which certainly marks her off from Undine; yet more than that,
throughout the novel she retains a sense of purity. Virginal to the end, she finally refuses the only
thing that might rescue her: marriage to that novel’s chief interloper, a Jewish man named
Rosedale. An acquaintance wrote to Wharton, “I do not, however, agree with some that Lily was
a despicable character. She was the slave of her environment, with a far finer nature than the
average girl in her class, and it was because of the soul within her, and not because of any
weakness of character, that she failed in her purposes.”94 Another reader wrote of “this ceaseless
endeavor of a fine, inherently pure, high nature, to rise above and dominate the unfortunate
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world within her and around her” (my italics).95 Undine has no such scruples, no such “soul
within her,” no sense of herself that precludes her from taking every opportunity she is offered.96
And so while Lily, like Helga, “responds to the unfortunate world in and around her,” Undine is
the agent and representative of that world, the personification of its ceaseless desires.

(Race) Suicide

Wharton famously wrote, “A frivolous society can acquire dramatic significance only through
what its frivolity destroys. Its tragic implications lie in its power of debasing people and ideas”
(Backward Glance 206-207). In the House of Mirth, to which this quotation refers, the frivolity
of the society does indeed destroy Lily Bart, and to great tragic effect, as I discussed in the
previous chapter. In The Custom of the Country, by contrast, Undine is the frivolity. And while
she does leave destruction in her wake, and a great deal of it, the novel hardly constitutes a
tragedy. To wit, Ralph intends throughout the book to write his own novel, but finds by the end
that his subject has lost its “lyric or tragic dimensions.” “He no longer saw life on the heroic
scale: he wanted to do something in which men should look no bigger than the insects they were.
He contrived in the course of time to reduce one of his old subjects to these dimensions”
(Custom 338). What then does Undine destroy in her frivolity? And in the absence of these
“tragic dimensions,” of what kind and scale are the novel’s indictments?
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In this section I argue that Undine’s own unstable identity destabilizes and thereby destroys
the identities of others. Working against essentialist notions that one’s personality is a complete
and stable thing that works from the inside out—“reproducible by a sharp black line”—Undine
reveals, extends and capitalizes upon the instability of her partner’s identities. As Sassoubre
shows, the identities of Undine’s first and second husbands are thickly constructed by virtue of
the things and people around them—like the Dagonet family jewels and the Chelles tapestries—
totems “the huge and voracious fetish they called The Family” (Custom 408). Undine, Sassoubre
explains, sees these constitutive objects as fungible. “The Custom of the Country traces the
impact of the destabilization of value, and ultimately meaning, on personal identity as volatile
economic conditions erode familiar social structures” (Sassoubre 688). For Sassoubre, “Undine
acknowledges the market she has been on since arriving in New York, but she is never an agent
in the market” (703). Here, I’ll argue the reverse: Not only is Undine an agent on this market; she
is an agent of this market, bringing her destructive flexibility to bear upon her husbands and their
families. Undine destabilizes not just the value of the totems that constitute her husbands’
identities, making them into objects that can be bought and sold; she destabilizes her husbands
themselves by virtue of her own “flexible soul.” Sassoubre writes that readings that emphasize
Undine’s success “miss the fact that despite Undine’s self-dramatization as a businessperson, she
is usually the one being manipulated” (701). The point is well-taken; yet, why must the fact of
being manipulated preclude the possibility that Undine might manipulate others in her turn?
Undine, I argue, demonstrates the threat being endlessly and iteratively manipulated and
manipulatable might pose to fixed, traditional societies and their denizens. The very flexibility
that constitutes Undine ends up infiltrating those around her.
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Undine’s destructive flexibility is aligned with what the novel represents as her racial
difference. Undine is explicitly and repeatedly raced throughout, separated out from the Old New
York and aristocratic French societies into which she marries. Most often, she is referred to as a
member of the “conquering” or “invading race.” Of course, by contemporary standards, it would
seem that Wharton is using the word “race” here metaphorically, and to a certain extent she is.
Yet it’s also important to remember the much broader strokes in which race was read and
rendered at the turn of the century and just afterwards—a time when the boundaries delimiting
whiteness and its privileges, participation within a white nationalist project chief among them,
were policed against incursion by individuals we would without hesitation call white today. As
Jennie Ann Kassanoff writes in her book Edith Wharton and the Politics of Race (2004),
“Wharton’s generation applied the term [“race”] liberally to a diverse array of possible
identifications … anything from national origin, religious affiliation and aesthetic predilection, to
geographic location, class membership and ancestral descent” (3, 4).97 Kassanoff’s is the longest
and most completist in a scholarly conversation surrounding Wharton and race—a conversation
that ranges between, on the one hand, arguing that Wharton was “deeply … immersed in a world
of protective white privilege, highly buttressed by class, that allowed her not to think much about
race—even as she wrote about it” (Ammons “Edith Wharton and the Issue of Race”, 70), and, on
the other, showing how Wharton, in certain texts at least, “offers a sophisticated, trenchant
critique of Old New York’s racial politics” (Hoeller “Invisible Blackness,” 51). In Custom of the
Country, I argue, Wharton demonstrates a heightened awareness of racial politics without
offering the “sophisticated, trenchant critique” she provides in her later work. Specially, in using
the term “race” to denote the differences between Undine and Ralph and Undine and Raymond,
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Wharton limns many of the same fears evoked by passing the color line—of miscegenation in
particular, and the sense that one race can be degraded by contact with another.
A member of this “conquering” or “invading race,” Undine and her “pioneer blood” are
best understood in direct contrast to Ralph and his set, who are of the “original,” “subject” and
“conquered” “race.”98 Ralph himself “sometimes called his mother and grandfather the
Aborigines, and likened them to those vanishing denizens of the American continent doomed to
rapid extinction with the advance of the invading race” (Custom 58). Christopher Gair writes
extensively of the novel’s use of racial signifiers, paying particular attention to how the narration
aligns Old New York with the American Indians, and Undine and her nouveau riche ilk with the
settlers who waged a violent campaign of destruction and domination against the land’s native
inhabitants.99 Undine is similarly figured as waging a campaign; yet she is hardly the first wave
of the assault. To the contrary, she is surprised to find already “the enemy in the act of
unconditional surrender. … That was not her idea of warfare, and she could ascribe the
completeness of her victory only to the effect of her charms” (71). Granted, her charms and
physical beauty are no small factor in the concession. More than that, though, the concession has
already been made. Unions like hers and Ralph’s, miscegenations of sorts, have been forming
since long before Ralph met Undine. By this point, it is a part of the very fabric of Old New
York. “Society was really just like the houses it lived in: a muddle of misapplied ornament over a
thin steel shell of utility. The shell was built up in Wall Street, the social trimmings were hastily
added in Fifth Avenue” (Custom 57). Of course, Undine’s own campaign is no less violent for its

Race,” pp, 75-77).
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imitativeness: In her ascent, she lays waste to the Marvell-Dagonet “reservation,” destroying
Ralph entirely and wresting their son Paul from his ancestors.
Undine is also figured as a race apart from her second husband, the French Marquis
Raymond de Chelles—though this time she is figured as a representative of a broadly construed
American “race.” Raymond first sees Undine in the aptly named Nouveau Luxe hotel in Paris,
where his friend Charles Bowen is waiting for him. Before Raymond gets there, Bowen is
meditating upon what he dubs the “phantom ‘society’” in the restaurant, constructed “with all the
rules, smirks, gestures of its model …. [in] slavish imitation of the superseded” (217). Bowen
sees the crowd at the Nouveau Luxe as a facsimile of Old New York voided of its essence and
transplanted abroad. Once Raymond comes to sit with him, though, these intra-American
distinctions are lost in the face of Chelles’ characterization of “your original race,” which is to
say, the American race writ large:
“This, in the social order, is the diversion, the permitted diversion, that your original race
has devised: a kind of superior bohemia, where one may be respectable without being
bored.”
Bowen laughed. “You’ve put it in a nutshell: the ideal of the American woman is to
be respectable without being bored; and from that point of view this world they’ve
invented has more originality than I gave it credit for.” (218)
Here all American women are flattened into the text’s earlier articulation of the American
“conquering race” of which Undine is a part: “imitating the imitation” in an effort “to be
respectable without being bored” (217, 218). Later on, Raymond will ascribe his and Undine’s
“mutual incomprehension” to her membership in this broadly drawn American race: “You’re all
alike … every one of you. … You come among us speaking our language and not knowing what
we mean, wanting the things we want, and not knowing why we want them…” (432).
Notwithstanding the nuances of Undine’s differing racial identifications, in both cases—with
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Ralph as with Raymond—she is figured as of a race apart, imitating and infiltrating the upper
echelons of the older races her husbands represent.
Intriguingly, though, Undine is not called upon to negotiate the mandates of racial
representation in the same way as her husbands. For Ralph and Raymond, racial representation is
a matter of self-abnegation. If one is always understood as representative of a group, individual
strivings are only permissible so long as they reflect well upon that group. By contrast, not only
is there no onus laid upon Undine to be racially representative; there is also no divide between
representation and individualism for Wharton’s “conquerors.” That is to say, Undine’s
individualist, capitalist drive towards “respectability and amusement” makes her racially
representative, as does her movement across racial lines, and her strategic obfuscation of her
past. Indeed, passing across these particular racial lines is, as we have seen, de rigueur for the
“conquering race.” When Ralph is visiting with Undine’s mother, he thinks to himself, “he had
early mingled with the Invaders, and curiously observed their rites and customs. But most of
those he met had already been modified by contact with the indigenous … . Ralph had never
seen them actually in the making, before they had acquired the speech of the conquered race”
(62). This ease of racial self-modification further calls attention to the similarities between
Undine’s identity performance and the practice of racial passing, even as it shows the lines she
crosses to be significantly less policed.
That is to say, Undine’s identity performance is akin to racial passing not because she
passes as—though she does pretend to be virginal and unmarried when she is neither, a fact that,
were in known, would impede both of her middle marriages—but because all the “small daily
deceptions, evasions and subterfuges” that constitute her identity performance give rise to similar
sets of fears about racial purity and its converse: the idea that the racial other might “infect”
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those around her. And like the racial passer, Undine’s identity performance deconstructs
essentialist notions about identity: that it is fixed, clearly differentiated and, most important,
invariable. Neither she nor her husbands will retain their original forms; all will instead take on
the modern flexibility Undine represents. In Crossing the Color Line: Racial Passing in
Twentieth-Century U.S. Literature and Culture (2000), Gayle Wald speaks of race as a
simultaneous evocation and destabilization of identity. “For me,” she writes, “the interest of
narratives of racial passing lies precisely in their ability to demonstrate the failure of race to
impose stable definitions of identity, or to manifest itself in a reliable, permanent, and/or visible
manner. Yet in inquiring into how subjects have negotiated race, we cannot lose sight of the
power of race to define” (ix). Keeping Wald’s final caveat in mind, I’d nonetheless like to call
attention to how Undine’s multifarious identity performance pits itself against essentialist notions
of identity as stable and inviolate, just as racial passing deconstructs essentialist notions that race
can “impose stable definitions of identity.” Undine not only calls attention to the flexible,
commodifiable nature of the self, but to the uses to which such a sense of self might be put.
Undine’s capacity to destabilize the identities of others is particularly manifest in her
relationships with her middle two husbands.100 Here I’ll tell the story of Ralph’s identity in three
parts. First, Ralph gets drawn in to Undine’s destructive orbit, his already unstable identity
rendered more so by Undine’s instability. Whereas Undine is highly flexible, constantly bending,
twisting and doubling in on herself in an effort to please her varying interlocutors, the affiliations
that constitute Ralph’s identity are more rigid and fixed. Unable to adjust quickly or fully enough
to Undine’s rapid changes and acquisitive desires—unable to bend enough—Ralph breaks; or
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really, Ralph is broken. These are the second and third parts of the story: The second tells of
Ralph’s realization of the instability Undine has wrought in his own personality; the third, of his
failure to sustain such instability, and thus of his (self-)destruction. Raymond’s story, here as in
the novel, will be considerably shorter, yet it relies upon the same mechanism, and brings out
may of the same themes: a speculative destabilization of identity that registers not just as a
betrayal of traditional notions of the self, but as a sort of race suicide, breaking the past for the
sake of a monstrous future.
For reasons that will become clear, Ralph is especially susceptible to Undine’s
machinations. After their encounter in the opera box, he thinks to himself:
She was still at the age when the flexible soul offers itself to the first grasp. That that
grasp should chance to be Van Degen’s—that was what made Ralph’s temples buzz, and
swept away all his plans for his own future like a beaver’s damn in a spring flood. To
save her from Van Degen and Van Degenism: was that really to be his mission—the ‘call’
for which his life had obscurely waited? It was not in the least what he had meant to do
with the fugitive flash of consciousness he called self; but all that he had purposed for
that transitory being sank into insignificance under the pressure of Undine’s claims. (65)
Here, Undine’s “flexible soul” destabilizes and commodifies Ralph’s identity as much as it does
her own. In merely contemplating Undine’s malleability and the dangers against which it must be
protected, Ralph loses his own sense of self. Or, to use Wharton’s language, “the fugitive flash of
consciousness he called self… all he had purposed for that transitory being sank into
insignificance under the pressure of Undine’s claims.” The effect remains throughout their
marriage; even after he is disillusioned, he works for her enrichment and entertainment, finding
that “Undine’s moods infected him” (145, my italics). So in deriving from her changeability the
mistaken impression of her malleability—that she might be formed or formable by him—Undine
makes Ralph’s identity not only equally unstable but also, and this is crucial, equally tradable—
which is to say unstable in the economic sense. In other words, Undine’s “flexible soul”
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effectively commodifies Ralph’s identity, such that it becomes a thing over which she might have
“claims.” In seeking to sell herself on the marriage market, then, Undine also becomes a buyer,
purchasing with her unstable identity Ralph’s status, connections, and the earning potential
augmented by his now-unstable identity.
As I have discussed, Ralph sells his soul on a mistaken premise. Undine’s “flexible soul”
cannot be molded. “A stranger—that was what she had always been to him. So malleable
outwardly, she had remained insensible to the touch of the heart” (Custom 178). Ralph’s mistake
is furthermore not merely an error of judgment; it also implicates him in Undine’s
machinations.101 Later, looking back on their marriage, he realizes that “he had been walking
with a ghost: the miserable ghost of his illusion. Only he had somehow vivified, colored,
substantiated it, by the force of his own great need” (176). Undine’s identity performance in this
sense is both an active stance and a passive acceptance of what he wants to believe. Her
flexibility fulfills Ralph’s “great need” both to be near her and to mold her in the image of his
“race.” And because Ralph’s desires fill in the blank spaces of Undine’s flexible soul, he
perversely engineers his own disillusionment, and thus, ultimately, his own destruction.
What Undine reveals is not just Ralph’s complicity in his own undoing; it is the mistaken
premise upon with Old New York society was built—that, to reverse Wharton’s formulation, the
bounds of personality are reproducible by a sharp black line, and that members of Old New York
families, with their “small, cautious, middle class … ideals, … coherent and respectable,” might
therefore protect themselves against “the chaos of indiscriminate appetites which made up [New
York’s] modern tendencies” even as they allied themselves with “the invading race” (Custom 58,
my italics). Even before Undine meets Ralph, his sense of self is already unstable, constituted as
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it is by the “people and things around [him].” Intriguingly, Wharton aligns this quality not to the
young man’s more “modern” tendencies, but with the dilettantism encouraged by his traditional
family. “Nothing in the Dagonet and Marvell tradition was opposed to [Ralph’s] desultory
dabbling life. … The only essential was that he should live ‘like a gentleman’—that is, with a
tranquil disdain for mere money-getting, a passive openness to the finer sensations, one or two
fixed principles as to the quality of wine…” (59). The stability of Ralph’s personality lies in that
of the things and ideals around him. Yet it is precisely this “passive openness” that allows
Undine to infiltrate not just his family, his home and his society, but his very sense of self. Here,
Ralph’s mistaken understanding of himself is the converse of his mistaken understanding of
Undine: He sees his “passive openness” and “tranquil disdain” as immutable qualities because
they have been passed down the generations; whereas they are actually signs of latent instability
Undine exploits. He doesn’t mold Undine; Undine unmolds him.
Take, for instance, the episode in which Undine has the jewels he and his family gave her
when they were married reset:
[T]he incident … had put in his hand a clue to a new side of his wife’s character. He no
longer minded her having lied about the jeweller; what pained him was that she had been
unconscious of the wound she inflicted in destroying the identity of the jewels. He saw
that, even after their explanation, she still supposed he was angry only because she had
deceived him; and the discovery that she was completely unconscious of states of feeling
on which so much of his inner life depended marked a new stage in their relation.
He was thinking of all this as he sat beside Clare Van Degan; but it was part of the
chronic disquietude that made him more alive to his cousin’s sympathy, her shy unspoken
understanding. After all, he and she were of the same blood and had the same traditions.
She was light and frivolous, without strength of will or depth of purpose; but she had the
frankness of her foibles, and she would never have lied to him or traded on his
tenderness. (170-171)
This passage bears witness both to the completeness of Undine’s triumph over those aspects of
Ralph’s identity that matter to her, and to her woefully incomplete understanding of those
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atavistic parts of his personality that she nonetheless also succeeds in compromising. Just before
this passage, Undine gains her point: When Ralph comes to confront her about her resetting the
jewels, “her tears and distress filled him with immediate contrition” (170). He ends up “abas[ing]
himself in entreaties for [her] forgiveness,” not the other way around, and by the end of the
episode Undine has not only reset the jewels, but created the conditions necessary for her to wear
them without rebuke. She has, as he puts it in the passage above, “lied to him” and “traded on his
tenderness.” This passage furthermore links these actions to Undine’s race. Clare, who is “of the
same blood” as Ralph, would never have done such things. By “destroying the identity of the
jewels” (a highly significant turn of phrase), Undine thoughtlessly wounds a key part of Ralph’s
identity—those “states of feeling on which so much of his inner life depended”—and then, in a
far more considered move, capitalizes upon that wounding. As Sassoubre points out, the “states
of feeling on which so much of his inner life depended” have to do with the ways the Dagonet
identity is intertwined with what they own. To destroy the identity of “the family relics, kept
unchanged through several generations” is to destroy something of the Dagonet identity that
constellates itself “thickly” around and through these relics. Yet it’s more than that. Ralph finds
that “that they were both family relics…scarcely mattered to him at the time: he felt only the stab
of his wife’s deception. … What pained him was the wound she inflicted” (170). I’d suggest that
the wound is the most painful element of the whole affair because the Dagonet identity, as
represented by and formed around the jewels, had already been compromised. Ralph feels most
the indignity that, having compromised his identity, Undine knows nothing of what was lost.
Meanwhile, Undine’s ability, propensity and desire to “trade on his tenderness” and, in turn, his
identity, is enabled by precisely her ignorance of his race’s foibles.
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That ignorance, paired with the flexibility and emotional manipulation also evident in this
episode, are highly effective weapons, and Undine wields them in order to “empty” Ralph of
everything except that which will facilitates her own desires (176). “His life had come to be
nothing but a long effort to win these mercies [“her nearness, her smile, her touch”] by one
concession after another: the sacrifice of his literary projects, the exchange of his profession for
an uncongenial business, and the incessant struggle to make enough money to satisfy her
increasing exactions” (173). By the end of their marriage, he is left with a collapsed body and a
“lacerated soul” (268). Even then, though, she leaves him, finally realizing that Ralph will not be
able to satisfy her “increasing exactions” no matter how hard he tries. Ralph eventually recovers
something akin to his old self, refilling the void Undine has left with the “adjacent people and
things” at hand—his son Paul and his book. “Undine’s act, by cutting the last link between them,
seemed to have given him back to himself” (343). When Undine sets her sights on marrying
Raymond du Chelles, however, she finds that she needs to “trade upon his tenderness” once more
in order to get enough money for the necessary annulment. On the advice of Elmer Moffat, she
effectively ransoms her own son to this end. Ralph, finally understanding how her ploy
formalizes the terms of their exchange, thinks ruefully to himself, “That the reckoning between
himself and Undine should be settled in dollars and cents seemed the last bitterest satire on his
dreams” (356). When Ralph learns in one fell swoop that he won’t be able to raise the money and
of his ex-wife’s primary deception—that she was married once before—he kills himself, thereby
enabling Undine’s remarriage.
Yet again, Undine’s ability to speculate in Ralph’s identity, this by time using his son rather
than the jewels as proxy, is enabled not only by her constitutional ability to treat everything as
fungible—to change the people and things around her as it suits her changing desires—but also
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by Ralph’s familial failings. The “full and elaborate vocabulary of evasion” cultivated by the
Dagonet-Marvells stop Ralph from contesting the divorce and Undine’s getting sole custody,
thereby enabling Undine’s scheme (345). “The weakness,” Ralph comes to realize, “was innate
in him” (Custom 346). More generally put, Ralph’s failing are those of his “tribe,” who prove
atavistically incapable of adapting to the tactics enabled by women’s newfound, albeit hardly
limitless, choices, control and power, even as they also prove incapable of insulating themselves
from the change. In this case, certain Undine will never come for Paul, the Dagonet-Marvells
forget that motherly feeling is not the only reason she might do so.
Undine’s act is eugenically monstrous; she risks sacrificing her progeny for her own sake,
ransoming Paul not even for her survival, but for her continued amusement. At first, this move
seems akin to the race suicide the so-called “New Woman” was often accused of perpetrating by
not procreating.102 Yet instead of mortgaging the future of her race in a bid for a self-sufficiency,
Undine does the opposite: She perpetuates her own, itinerant “race” by wresting her progeny
from the Old New York “race” that fathered him. Granted, as in her attempt to unmold Ralph,
Undine’s reproduction of her own flexibility is imperfect. Like Undine, Paul finds himself adrift;
unlike her, he is, Wharton implies, racially ill-suited to the perpetual motion on which his mother
thrives. Because of his Dagonet-Marvell blood—“for his own sake,” Ralph’s sister Laura
observes, “I wish there were just a drop or two of Spragg in him” (361)—he cannot adapt fully to
the ways of his mother’s race. The threat to essentialism Undine constitutes is thus incomplete;
she does not entirely unmake the racial essentialisms of Old New York. She merely destroys that
which she cannot unmake. The penultimate scene finds Paul wandering around a house filled
with the artifacts of other families. Except for his close relationship with his erstwhile “French
father” Raymond, the boy suffers from “scattered affections” and is thus immensely lonely (460).
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He doesn’t even remember his own father. If the Marvells and Dagonets accumulate identity on
the basis of the people and things around them, Paul, like his father before him, finds himself
emptied out. By robbing Paul of his associations, she calls forth in her son her own itinerant
motion and unmoored longings, “peculiarly typical,” as Wharton will later write, “of modern
America” (Uncollected Writings 157).
Undine’s “flexible soul,” and the threat it represents for the older “races,” meets its match
(even as it demonstrates its power) in her third husband, Raymond de Chelles. Raymond reminds
Undine of Ralph, but she finds his identity protected by a “code of family prejudices and
traditions” more “definite and complicated” even than the Dagonets’ (381, 382). In contrast to
Ralph’s dilettantism, Raymond has been expected from birth to take on the management of the
households of which he is a part. Undine, as a result, is markedly less successful in her attempts
to destabilize him. The situation leaves “Undine with the baffled feeling of not being able to
count on any of her old weapons of aggression. In all her struggles for authority her sense of the
rightfulness of her cause had been measured by her power of making people do as she pleased”
(418-419).While at first “she was persuaded that, under her influence, Raymond would soon
convert his parents to more modern ideals,” neither he nor his parents do any such thing (381,
my italics). And so it is not Raymond who is rendered more fluid, but Undine who is stabilized
by “the mysterious web of traditions, conventions, prohibitions that enclosed her in their
impenetrable network” (409).
Things go on like this until her movement is completely curtailed, every day promising to
be just like the last one. Realizing, then, that she cannot destabilize the day-to-day living and
wanting of the Chelles household with her own “flexible soul,” she rebels, seeking instead to
trade on their most prized possession: the Chelles family tapestries. At first, her efforts comes to
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nothing, except the final disillusionment of her husband: “If you’re capable of that you’re
capable of anything!” Raymond ejaculates. Finding herself in what she feels is an impossible
situation, she leaves, trading on her still vivid, albeit fading, beauty in order to marry Elmer
Moffat for a second time.
Yet Undine does finally succeed in trading on the Chelles’ identity, if not on the terms she
at first envisioned. Instead of selling the tapestries—these objects through which the Chelles
“thickly” construct their collective identity—in order to facilitate her own entertainment as she
originally intends, Undine buys them in order to augment and underline her status. And while
Undine is hardly the sole actor in this episode, she and other members of her “race” conspire to
wrest these totems from the Chelles family’s control. Undine creates the conditions necessary for
the exchange during her marriage to Raymond by having the tapestries priced. In other words,
she demonstrates to the fungibility of the tapestries—a fact so unthinkable for the Chelles family
that it seems to have actually gone unthought. When Raymond’s little brother marries a nouveauriche American heiress and the heiress’ father takes a “bad turn” on Wall Street, the Chelles
Family recoup their losses and remain afloat by selling the tapestries to another of Undine’s
“race,” her once and now-again husband Elmer Moffat, at which point they come under Undine’s
control. Of course, in surviving, the Chelles Family ceases to exist in the same form. The
tapestries operate much in the same way as a sigil of a House might; having divested themselves
of these emblems, the Family’s identity is irrevocably and immeasurably depleted.103
Throughout the novel, Undine is set up against other possibilities for these sons of the
older races, possibilities that would have been much more desirable from their parents’
standpoint. For Ralph, we have Harriet Ray and Clare Van Degan, members of his own race who
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would have helped him to perpetuate it; and for Raymond, we have those nameless, “amiable
[French] maidens obviously designed to continue the race,” but upon whom Raymond’s family
have “fail[ed] to fix his attention” (384). Instead, both marry outside of their race, and both,
ultimately, lose not just themselves, but also their reproductive futures. The Chelles’ familial loss
of identity is less pronounced and horrifying than Ralph’s loss of himself and his son, yet the
mechanisms are the same: a member of the “invading race,” having infiltrated theirs, destabilizes
their collective identity by trading in it, ultimately enabling their own self-destruction. Undine’s,
then, is not a race suicide. By the end of the novel, her interloping, “invading race” appear more
formidable than ever. Instead, Undine brings about the suicides of other races, in the process
reproducing that flexibility and fungibility that are constitutive of her own race not within a
single progenitor, but as unconfined force. A monstrous mother, she replicates her line by
disintegrating the foibles and attachments of “older” races to make way for the modern, which is
to say, that which is iteratively, desirously new.
If Ralph and Raymond, then, are sacrificed to the “frivolous society” Undine both
represents and helps to bring about, it’s not as if we really mourn them, or what they represent. In
Age of Innocence, Wharton’s 1925 “ironist’s elegy” to Old New York, Wharton’s reader will be
asked, in a sense, to mourn the loss (Evron 49). In Custom, however, these worlds read as airless
mausoleums, their destruction hardly to be regretted. As the reviewer at the New York Times
Review of Books put it, “if Undine is repellant, it cannot be said that human nature as reflected in
the pages of this novel is ever particularly attractive. The Marvells and Dagonets of Washington
Square are mere ghosts of a narrow past, futile, bloodless, out of touch.” Ralph and all he
represents are sacrificed to Undine’s frivolity, and while we regret the loss of this young,
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sensitive man, what he represents remains unmourned. The result then is not the “tragic
implications” of the House of Mirth, but a peculiar malaise with nowhere to land. We are
impelled towards neither the dystopic future Undine represents, nor the airless past she destroys.
Wharton thus creates a reader just as unmoored as her protagonist, seeking with her aimless
desire for something to fill in the empty space. We are taught to want as Undine wants—
iteratively and without end—because there is nothing on offer in this novel that might actually
meet our needs.

“A Monstrously Perfect Result of the System”

There is a strength and breadth to the novel’s indictment, which pulls not just Undine, not just
her husbands and admirers, but the entire society that enables her into its satirical orbit. By
overflowing the bounds of her identity, Undine disperses both selfhood and blame; her
machinations indicting the other characters as well as the larger American society the novel
purports to represent. In the speech in which he explains that Undine is “a monstrously perfect
result of the system: the completest proof of its triumph,” Bowen’s critique is thus pointedly
broad, indicting not just Old New York but the whole “genus …: homo sapiens, Americanus”
(Custom 166, 164). Reviewers of the novel were quick to acknowledge the novel’s send-up of
Undine and her “type,” slower to take in the larger scale of Custom’s indictment.
Certainly, Undine is the key instantiation and profiteer of this monstrous modernity—or, to
return to the New York Sun’s apt phrasing, its “ideal monster” (qtd. in Killoran 66). In
condemning Wharton’s anti-heroine, many contemporary readers and reviewers focused, as I
have in this chapter, on her emptiness, though not always by that name. Some referred to it as her
not get some vindictive pleasure in being the agent of the destruction of the Chelles identity.
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shallowness: “Undine Spragg is a young woman whose sole attraction is of the skin-deep kind,”
read the notice in the Evening Standard. “She is selfish, shallow and hard,” wrote the reviewer at
The World. Others, taking implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) from Undine’s name, describe
her as soulless. “Undine” is the eponymous protagonist of a fairy-tale novella published in 1811
by the German writer Frederich de la Motte-Fouqué.104 (Undines, incidentally, were also in the
public imagination at the time. A silent movie “Undine,” based of la Motte-Fouqué’s story, came
out in 1916, just a few years after Custom was serialized in Scribner’s; and one of Custom’s
reviews refers to “Undine—shades of la Motte-Fouqué,” indicating an assumption that at least
most the review’s readers would have gotten the reference (Custom ed. Emsley 434).) In la
Motte-Fouqué’s novella, Undine is a soulless water-sprite, capricious and destructive, who
marries in order to become human, and thereby to gain a soul. Contemporary reviewers took up
the suggestion, describing Wharton’s Undine as “cold, greedy, heartless, wayward, without a
soul” (The Saturday Review) and “a woman without heart or soul or mind or imagination …
personified material appetite” (The Oxford Chronicle). “There is no rag or vestige of soul in
her,” wrote the reviewer at The Morning Post; “she is an inhuman machine, and all we can
admire about this description of her is the perfect way in which the machine does work.” Undine,
for these reviewers, is a “perfect monster” not because she is filled with malice or immorality or
anger, but because she is “shallow,” “heartless,” and soulless—because, in short, she is empty.
In describing the scope of the novel’s indictment, some stopped there, at its excoriation of
Undine. In other words, even as review after review took up Bowen’s speech, many refused its
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implications.105 The reviewer at The World was explicit in this regard: “We are not so despairing
of things in general as to accept for more than a hyperbolic irony of our author's titular intimation
that this Undine, or the course of her career, represent really a custom of the country” (The
World).
The novel, however, was advertised by Scribner’s as a real representation of the nation: “a
graphic revelation of American society today” (qtd. in Vala 7); “the entire fabric of ‘society’ is
unrolled and spread out for view.”106 And some American reviewers did take up the invitation.
L.M.F. at the New York Times Review of Books, for instance, professed discomfort about the
breadth of the novel’s implicit indictments: “If all this be true, then the more rapidly that system
is changed the better, for Undine Spragg is the most repellant heroine we have encountered in
many a long day—so ‘monstrous’ that at times she seems scarcely human, yet so cleverly
portrayed that she is always real.” The reviewer at The Record-Herald similarly opined,
It is a rare thing, a vigorous criticism of American life expressed wholly in the terms of
literary art …. The sting lies in the title. Is it the custom of this country to indulge its
women too much, so that out of certain vulgar and masterful temperaments we create
exasperating parasites such as Undine Spragg? Mrs. Wharton implies that it is—that
American parents let their children rule them—that American husband keep their wives
ignorant of the business problems they should share—and that the result is such a
reckless, wealth-devouring woman as Undine and the vulgar ‘society’ she represents.
According to Wharton’s biographer R.W.B. Lewis, another reviewer went so far as to “declare
that the book constituted a slander on most American men and women” (351). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, reviewers abroad seized upon the novel’s broader implications more happily. At
the Northern Whig it was gleefully reported, “The American rears a parasite, is charmed by the
parasite, and has not the wit to see that his end with the parasite is the end of the oak with the
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ivy—the thing which he has trained will choke him.” The Dominion Wellington of New Zealand
wrote of Custom as “a story which is at once a forceful indictment of an utterly rotten system of
divorce laws, and a scathing and brilliant satire upon certain phase of American life.” The most
explicit on this front reads: “It is a brilliant study of twentieth century manners and morals, or the
lack of them … We in England may congratulate ourselves that we are not included in the
picture.”107 If American reviewers tended to ignore the breadth of Wharton’s critique, that
avoidance perhaps bore witness to the sting of her indictment.
Nor was this the only way Custom’s readers found themselves implicated and satirized by
the text. As Madeleine A. Vala points out in her article “‘A Grim Fascination’: Newspapers and
Edith Wharton's The Custom of the Country” (2013), throughout the novel Wharton lampoons
precisely those reading habits that would have led readers to the novel in the first place. The
nouveau-riche Undine lacks the ability to distinguish between high and low culture, “enabl[ing]
Wharton to mock Undine as an indiscriminate, uneducated reader” (Vala 7). Vala goes on to
argue that the advertisements by which Scribner’s publicized the novel rely upon precisely the
same lack of readerly discrimination. “Thus, while Wharton invites her reader to laugh at
Undine’s societal foibles, her novel’s sales depend on the kind of reader that she exaggerates in
Undine” (Vala 8). More than that, and as I have already briefly discussed, as readers we are
implicated by our fascination with Undine and her ascent, and our wanting what she wants. We
are lampooned, that is to say, by the fact of our representation.
And the reader’s enjoyment of this representation, as attested by the significant financial
success of Custom’s serialization, is no great recommendation either. Wharton will later write of
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this phenomenon with regard to Sinclair Lewis’ Main Street (1920) in her 1927 essay “The Great
American Novel”:
Mr. Lewis opened the eyes of the millions of dwellers in all the American Main Streets to
the inner destitution of their lives, but by so doing apparently created in them not the
desire to destroy Main Street but only to read more and more and ever more about it. The
dwellers of Main Street proved themselves to be like the old ladies who send for the
doctor every day for the pleasure of talking over their symptoms. They do not want to be
cured; they want to be noticed. (Uncollected Critical Writings 152)
Custom’s readers similarly seek not a cure, but acknowledgment and the experience of selfrecognition. If Undine’s machinations reveal “the inner destitution” of her readers’ lives, they
gain pleasure from the representation of that emptiness, not from the prospect that it might be
fixed. The novel itself even interpolates its reader’s desire through the newspaper gossip pages
Mrs. Heeney, who doubles as jester and scribe, collects throughout the novel. The write-up on
Undine’s time in Paris is particularly interesting in this regard.
It's a high-pressure season and no mistake, and no one lags behind less than the
fascinating Mrs. Ralph Marvell, who is to be seen daily and nightly in all the smartest
restaurants and naughtiest theatres, with so many devoted swains in attendance that the
rival beauties of both worlds are said to be making catty comments. But then Mrs.
Marvell's gowns are almost as good as her looks—and how can you expect the other
women to stand for such a monopoly? (249)
The cattiness and envy of “the rival beauties” stands in for the reader’s own. Here, Undine is
reaping the rewards of her machinations—her beautiful dresses standing in for her monetary
capital, her centrality to a “high-pressure season” attesting to her social capital. Her success
renders her at once despicable, enviable and “fascinating.” Identity and desire here intermingle in
an ambivalent readerly affect: Repulsed, we nonetheless want what she has and thus, in a sense,
to be who she is.

141

In a letter to Sara Norton, Wharton called Custom “my … Great American Novel” (Letters
146). Wharton later echoed this phrase, half-jokingly, in her estimation of Anita Loos’ Gentlemen
Prefer Blondes: “The Great American novel!,” she exalts, “at last!” The similarities between
Undine and Loos’ anti-heroine Lorelei are highly suggestive—and it is indicative that in naming
these two “Great American Novels,” Wharton singles out the same monstrous, acquisitive female
figure as the avatar of American modernity.108 Reviewers too understood Wharton as picking up
on a peculiarly modern type, reporting on Custom as the newest installment in a collective
fictional effort to account for this new, quintessentially modern type of femininity, whom I have
called the Woman We Don’t Want to Be.109 The reviewer at The Nation writes, “In her latest
novel Mrs. Wharton is concerned with a type of American womanhood which might be describes
as one of the stock figures of the newer fiction, if it were not for the consideration that Undine is
not a stock figure at all, but very much alive. The fact that the spending American woman is
always turning up in our literature must be taken as a sign that she is to be found in life” (Custom
ed. Emsley 422). And James Huneker observed in Forum, “Undine Spragg is both a type and an
individual,—she is the newest variation of Daisy Miller … quite the most disagreeable girl in the
newest fiction” (Custom ed. Emsley 434). A couple decades later, Edmund Wilson will dub
Undine “quite a successful caricature of a type who was to go even farther. She is the prototype
in fiction of the ‘gold-digger,’ of the international cocktail bitch (The Wound and the Bow 202).
And The World doubled down on the sense that Undines’ type might be taken from life:
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“Unformed, ill-informed and desperately adventurous, Undine Spragg is, beyond doubt, typical
of a certain class of social aspirants in America” (The World). Wharton, in brief, negotiates the
rapidly changing literary marketplace, and very successfully at that, by way of this quintessential
type of American modernity. And she seeks, pointedly, not merely to make money through this
negotiation, but to meaningfully contribute to the American landscape by writing “The Great
American Novel.”
That is not to say that Wharton was not also ambivalent about her subject. In the same
essay, “The Great American Novel,” Wharton writes, “the conditions of modern life in America,
so far from being productive of great arguments, seem almost purposefully contrived to eliminate
them” (Uncollected Critical Writings 153). In encapsulating the modern American experience,
Wharton implies, the appropriate mode is not the epic but the comic, the appropriate scale not
grand but aggressively parochial. “It is not because we are middle-class but because we are
middling that our story is so soon told,” she quips. Put another way, Wharton’s very aspirations
for her novel function as an indictment—of her subject, her readers, even herself. Undine’s
instability empties the novel out; and the indictment she represents overflows not just the bounds
of the self, but the bounds of the text. Undine’s “flexible soul” sullies us all.

diamonds he could ill afford to buy her … and left him for California” (Krepps to Wharton May 18, 1913, Charles
Scribner's Sons Archives, Princeton University, Box 195, Folder 13).
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IDENTITY, DESIRE AND THE DOUBLE
IN JESSIE REDMON FAUSET’S PLUM BUN: A NOVEL WITHOUT A MORAL
“You see, you have to be careful to withhold too much and yet to give very little. If we
don’t give enough we lose them. If we give too much we lose ourselves” (Plum Bun 145).
Passing is always an act of doubling.110 Of necessity, the passer fashions a second version of
herself, inventing a second personal history and tapping into a second collective one, finding a
second set of affiliations and, crucially, forging a second set of possibilities. Most passing novels
accordingly furnish their readers with sets of doubles. Nella Larsen’s Passing (1929), for
instance, centers Irene and Clare, both of whom could pass, though only the latter does
consistently. We might also think of the two little boys—one black (by the contemporary “one
drop” logic) and one white—switched at birth in Mark Twain’s The Tragedy of Pudd’nhead
Wilson (1894), or the Rich White Gentlemen in James Weldon Johnson’s The Autobiography of
an Ex-Colored Man (1912), whom several critics have suggested might himself be passing.
These doubles serve several purposes: They function as reminders of the doubling that has
already taken place in the pass; they illustrate what might have been for the passer; and they
underline the threat passing, seemingly such an individual (and individualist) act, putatively
poses for others. During modernity, the threat of passing felt particularly pressing; “At a time
when even Warren G. Harding, then a candidate for president, was rumored to have ‘black
blood,’ America’s fixation on the lurking possibility of ‘invisible blackness’ made race a site of
national hysteria” (Kassanoff 9). This hysteria obtains across the color line, fascinating and
disturbing black and white readers alike.111 A magazine advertisement for Larsen’s Passing
hammers this collective anxiety home: “There are thousands of Clare Kendrys and every woman
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who ‘passes’ is a possible storm center.” Here, the problem with Clare lies both in her doubling
and her multiplication: that she passes, and that she is hardly the only one to do so.
Jessie Redmon Fauset’s Plum Bun: A Novel Without a Moral (1928) is replete with such
doublings and multiplications.112 Angela finds doubles in her mother, who, like her, can pass but
does so only occasionally, without any “principle … at stake”; her sister, who cannot, despite
having “the same blood flow[ing] in [her] veins in the same proportion”; and her fellow art
student Miss Powell, who also cannot pass and as a result is ultimately refused the scholarship
she and Angela are both offered (Plum Bun 162, 79). Fauset herself, as is characteristic of so
many of the other texts this project explores, functions as a double of sorts for Angela: Both
grew up in Philadelphia, the only black women in predominantly white communities; both
became school teachers; both moved to New York City. Finally, Angela finds multiples of
herself in the lonely young women on the train, the “types” she so disdained at the beginning of
the novel, with whom she finds herself identifying at the end. These doubles and multiplications
offer counterfactuals of sorts—versions of femininity Angela might have inhabited—and
underline Angela’s unsettling and unsettled position on the basis of her own self-doubling.113
There is also the doubling in the nursery rhyme that structures the novel: “To Market, to
Market/ To buy a Plum Bun;/ Home again, Home again,/ Market is done.” The novel will
strategically deploy the doublings of “Market” and “Home” as Angela tries to find herself again,
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attempting to return to a home made unheimlich by its doubling and hers.114 And at the heart of
the novel, its foundational and most unnerving doubling, is that of the protagonist herself.
Angela Murray, a light-skinned black school teacher from a lower-middle-class black
neighborhood in Philadelphia, refashions herself in New York City as Angèle Mory, a white
student artist, ‘the daughter of “poor but proud parents” (Plum Bun 190). Angèle is a flapper to
Angela’s New Negro, desirous and acquisitive to Angela’s staid, albeit begrudging, black
respectability. Fauset first writes a version of Angela/Angèle in a short story entitled, fittingly,
“Double Trouble.” Published in 1923 in The Crisis and featuring a protagonist named Angélique
Murray, “Double Trouble” interrogates the social repercussions of miscegenation and adultery
for the children of such unions. Angélique inspires “looks of horror, of hatred, of pity” from
those who know her secret—not, as in Angela’s case, that she is passing, but that she is the child
of her mother’s adulterous affair with the father one of the “best families” of the area. She herself
only learns of her parentage near the story’s end, when she tries to marry a man who turns out to
be her half-brother. To him, before he knows, “she was like an unfamiliar but perfectly
recognizable part of himself”; she is first heimlich, then unheimlich (“Double Trouble” 31). The
story’s title comes from the witches’ speech in Macbeth, which is also mentioned in the story
itself. The double, we learn, presages tragedy. She’s trouble.
This chapter will explore the trouble to which the Angela’s self-doubling gives rise in Plum
Bun, and its effect on the moral universe of Fauset’s Novel Without a Moral. The double, I argue,
seeds an instability of identity, and a concomitant moral anxiety, that the novel refuses to fully
resolve. Angela doubles herself as Angèle in order to get what she wants, and in the process ends
up losing herself. The first part of this chapter will be taken up with an analysis of how Angela’s
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identity gets made and unmade through desire—what she wants of the world, and what others
want of her. By wanting the wrong things in the wrong way, Angela loses herself. Yet, as I show
in the next section, Angela loses herself on a mistaken premise: the happiness, power and
security she seeks were never on offer. Her position has always been, and will always be, a
precarious one. As the novel progresses, Angela is subjected to a sentimental education, learning
to want and to feel correctly, which is to say, relationally. As I show in the third section, Fauset
moves her protagonist towards a distinctly modern relationality—impelling her to identification
with the “type” and the crowd. The ending, which I explore in the final section, might at first
seem to reinsert the protagonist into the domestic fold. Certainly, the novel has long been read
this way—as a marriage plot that improbably reintegrates its heroine into black respectability.115
In fact, however, Fauset’s novel can only find resolution by extricating its protagonist from a
world that cannot handle the instability born of her racial illegibility. No matter what, at any
given moment Angela might be passing. Fauset thus returns her anti-heroine to respectability
without bring her back into the fold. Rather, the novel incorporates her instability, and the
anxiety to which that instability gives rise, into the moral universe of the novel. As with Stein’s
“Melanctha,” we are fooled if we think Fauset’s ending offers real resolution, much less a moral.
Instead, this “novel without a moral” leaves its heroine in a permanent state of precarity, and its
reader in a state of ethical ambivalence.
I’ll admit, it seems strange to end a project that seeks to offer a new perspective on
American modernisms with a text that, notwithstanding the peculiarly modern ways it toys with
moral discomfort and impels its heroine towards relationality, is nonetheless remarkably
conservative in its influences, construction and attitudes. The traditional story of Capital-MModernism, at least, tells of rupture and an insistent newness; and even as more recent scholars
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of M/modernism(s) have moved away from this story, there is nonetheless a sense that modernist
literary production should somehow feel more experimental or progressive than what came
before. This perhaps accounts for Jessie Redmon Fauset’s shaky position in the modernist canon:
Her oeuvre is widely acknowledged to contain sentimental and Victorian strains, and she herself
was a relatively conservative black woman. Fauset’s race and gender excluded her from certain
contemporary notions of American Modernism, and her conservatism—which is to say her
interest in the black middle-class experience and advocacy for black respectability politics—
separated her from zeitgeist of the New Negro Renaissance in the 1920’s. Fauset thus finds
herself on the outside of what we’ve traditionally understood as modernist literary production;
and to a certain extent she’s not even looking in.
As a result, much of the criticism in the nineties and early aughts surrounding Fauset’s
work, and Plum Bun in particular, found it had to defend her against mid-century declarations of
her conservatism—or, to be more accurate, mid-century dismissals of her work that weaponized
her conservatism against her reception. Fauset was not “rear-guard” or “Victorian” (Bone 1965),
“more sentimental than satirical” (Bell 1987, 107), they claimed, nor did her texts reproduce
traditional notions of feminine value, as Barbara Christian (1980) suggested. Instead, these
critics, including Anne Ducille (1993), Jean Marie Lutes (2002) and Susan Tomlinson (2002),
argue that Fauset’s oeuvre manifests a complex feminism that has been overlooked. In the past
decade, however, the critical conversation surrounding Fauset and her work has shifted once
more, returing to question of Fauset’s conservatism, taking it up without necessarily taking her to
task for it.116 My reading falls in with this more recent trend; I take as given Fauset’s
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fundamental conservatism concerning the place and values ascribed to femininity. Taking to
heart the lessons of these earlier (and much-needed) defenses of her oeuvre, I nonetheless find
much of interest in Fauset’s appeal to melodramatic and sentimental elements, not to mention her
clear desire for resolution, even to the point of straining the limits of verisimilitude. Fauset’s
work is far more layered and ironic than her first reviewers and critics understood; yet Plum Bun
is an undeniably conservative text—a “novel without a moral” that, as Charles Scruggs argues,
nonetheless insists upon an intensely moral universe.
In holding Fauset’s conservatism up to the light, I counterintuitively reincorporate her into
the modernist canon and the awkward moment in American Feminism this project describes. The
Woman We Don’t Want to Be, I’ve argued, is a key figure in American modernisms, condensing
the age’s anxieties surrounding women’s newfound choices. The play of collective anxiety and
individual possibility is on full display in Fauset’s Plum Bun. To be fair, Angela is hardly a
perfect example of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be. Instead of getting trapped in the circular
“endings” in which her counterparts, willingly or unwillingly, find themselves stuck, she
undergoes a sentimental education that ends by suggesting fulfillment, if not, I argue, resolution.
But Angèle, the social-climbing passer Angela becomes when she moves to New York and
changes her name—this woman who attempts to barter her color and sexuality for wealth and
security, who abandons her loving sister and instrumentalizes several of her other relationships—
is a near-perfect exemplar of this type. Conniving and sexual in all the wrong ways, a bad black
subject and an incomplete white one, she manages to extricate herself from the moral universe
outlined at the beginning of the text through her idyllic, respectable upbringing. She transports
herself, and her reader by proxy, into an ethical ambivalence. The novel's protagonist, to put it
another way, lures her reader into the ethical contortions of bad femininity and then leads us out
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of it—all while refusing to close up those societal fissures her misbehavior has exposed.
Notwithstanding—indeed, because of—the traditional values Angela reasserts at the novel’s
resolution, the novel itself demonstrates the lasting effects of The Woman We Don’t Want to Be
in disrupting a coherent moral universe. Just as Angela can never quite go “home again,” the
world too is reconfigured by her doubling.

Desire and The Double

Plum Bun tells of a young woman trying and failing to find herself. Cut off by her status as a
black woman from her social, professional and material aspirations, Angela Murray recasts
herself as Angèle Mory, actively encouraging the presumption of her whiteness. In thinking
through how Angela remakes herself in this section—and, for that matter, throughout this entire
chapter—I will begin and periodically return to a deceptively simple question: How does the
“double consciousness” Angela experiences change throughout the text? And what does this
change tell, first about the double consciousness of the illegible racial subject, and second of the
relationship between the double consciousness and desire—what we want, what we want to be,
and what, or who, we are?
Fauset never calls Angela’s a double consciousness per se, and I make no arguments here
as to whether she understood herself as articulating a different sort of double consciousness in
Plum Bun (1928) from that which W.E.B. Du Bois posits in The Souls of Black Folk (1903).
What I do mean to say is this: First, Fauset was in conversation with Du Bois; and second,
Angela exhibits a double consciousness that complicates and extends upon Du Bois’
formulation. The former point is clear: W.E.B. Du Bois was an important figure in Fauset’s life,
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just as she was in his. The two began exchanging letters in 1903, and they maintained an
intellectual and personal relationship for the rest of their lives. In 1919, Du Bois hired Fauset as
The Crisis’ literary editor. There are also parallels, somewhat more speculative in nature,
between Angèle’s affair with Roger Fielding in Plum Bun and a possible affair between Fauset
and Du Bois.117 Whether or not these speculations are true, Du Bois and Fauset were certainly in
personal and professional conversation throughout their lives. Fauset even wrote to Du Bois
about The Souls of Black Folk specifically: “Professor Du Bois I was going to thank you, as
though it had been a personal favor, for your book ‘The Souls of Black Folk.’ I am glad, glad
you wrote it—we have needed someone to voice the intricacies of the blind maze of thought and
action along which the modern, educated colored man or woman struggles” (Correspondence of
W.E.B. Du Bois 66).
Fauset, I contend, theorized those intricacies—“the blind maze of thought and action”—
using the figure of the female passer to sketch a different kind of double consciousness. In Plum
Bun, Fauset posits a far more complicated relationship to seeing and being seen, wanting and
being wanted—one that points to color, gender and, crucially, desire as confounding elements to
a DuBoisian double consciousness. I am hardly the first to offer an intersectional critique of Du
Bois’ work, though Fauset may well have been. Here, indeed, I am following a lead suggested by
Cheryl Wall in 1995 when she wrote, “Cautiously, [Plum Bun] anticipates what sociologist
Deborah King calls ‘multiple jeopardy, multiple consciousness’” (73). In other words, the goal of
this chapter is not to offer a critique of Du Bois. Instead, I use Du Bois’ double consciousness as
a jumping-off point from which to theorize Angela’s shifting understanding of herself.
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In an 1897 article for the Atlantic Monthly called “Strivings of the Negro People”—and
then in The Souls of Black Folk (1903)—W.E.B. Du Bois describes the double consciousness as
follows: “The Negro is … born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American
world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself
through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness,
this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by
the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (2). Fauset’s revisioning of a
DuBoisian double consciousness in Plum Bun at first seems to use the figure of the passer to
evade the problem Du Bois sets up entirely. If looking at oneself “through the eyes of others,”
one sees a white body, then that body is not, again to use the Du Bois’ language and theorization,
a “problem” that requires explanation or solving. When Angela first moves to New York and
begins passing in earnest (which is to say, with intent and preparation), she seems to experience
passing this way, as inhabiting fully her desires and herself without any double consciousness to
speak of.
But first, some context: Plum Bun begins with its protagonist Angela Murray’s
Philadelphia childhood. The Murray home is the picture of black respectability and the cultural
aspiration and ascension that comes along with it: The Murrays are a loving, church-going
family, with each generation making and achieving more than the last. In the upwardly mobile
black household in which Angela comes of age, Fauset stages the clash between the prompts of
American individualism and the demands of racial uplift. Angela in particular chafes against the
mandates of representation. For instance, during one of several discussions with her sister and
friends about what Angela dismissively calls “this whole race business,” she complains, “I’m
sick of this business of being always below or above a certain norm. Doesn’t anyone think that
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we have a right to be happy simply, naturally?” (Plum Bun 53-54). Happiness for Angela inheres
is an individual telos, and cannot be sought or found in a collective performance of identity. The
politics of racial uplift, by contrast, demand that individuals seek fulfillment on collective terms.
As Angela grows up, one of the only black women in mostly white schools and, light-skinned as
she is, often presumed to be white, she can’t help but notice the benefits that accrue to her when
people don’t know of her “colour.” After her parents both die in quick succession, she takes the
opportunity to leave her darker sister Virginia and move to New York, actively adopting the
mantle of whiteness and the name “Angèle Mory.”
During these first few weeks in New York, Angèle wanders around Fourteenth Street,
people-watching and making plans for her future. “Her living during these days was so intense,
so almost solidified, as though her desire to live as she did and she herself were so one and the
same thing that it would have been practically impossible for another onlooker like herself to
insert the point of his discrimination into her firm panoply of satisfaction” (90). Here, Angela’s
passing counterintuitively reincorporates her into herself; instead of doubleness, the text bears
witness to an outer presentation of self that aligns perfectly with interior, individualized
strivings. Desire, to put it another way, fills the gap between Angela’s interiority and her selfpresentation. There is an interesting play of authenticity here—one that will re-emerge in
different guises and to different ends throughout the text. Which, after all, is the “authentic”
version of this protagonist—Angela, who honors her racial affiliations, or Angèle, who honors
her desire? At this particular moment in the novel, Angela understands blackness and desire to be
mutually exclusive. Taking up her assumed whiteness accordingly results in a “solidif[ying]” of
“her desire to live as she did and she herself.” Angela’s understands her identity here as whole
and inviolate. Whereas before, she was “looking at [herself] through the eyes of others, …
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measuring [her] soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity,” now
there are no chinks in the armor through which an observer might “insert the point of his
discrimination”: “Her desire to live as she did and she herself” are flush. Already in this scene,
though, we glimpse ways a new kind of double consciousness might assert itself.
For Angela, passing and desire are interwoven through the lens of power. “The badge of
power was whiteness, very like the colours of the escutcheon of a powerful house. She possessed
the badge, and unless there was someone to tell she could possess the power for which it stood”
(Plum Bun 74). Passing, by this logic, is the first, essential step to power, itself both a means to
desire and an end. That power, however, is contingent upon more than the badge of whiteness;
and even in this scene, Angela seems aware of this qualification. Wandering around Fourteenth
Street, “She remembered an expression ‘free, white and twenty-one,’—this was what it meant
then, this sense of owning the world, this realization that all things being equal, all things were
possible. ‘If I were a man,’ she said, ‘I could be president,’ and laughed at herself for the ‘if’
itself proclaimed a limitation” (Plum Bun 88). All things, of course, are not equal. Soon Angela
will find herself constrained by her relative poverty and lack of powerful familial or social
connections, a position she finds herself in because she grew up in a lower-middle class black
community and because she abandoned that community through her passing. Angela is also
constrained by her femininity, and its own kind of double consciousness. A young woman’s body
in a public place is always on display, and Angela’s body, both for the reader and the random
passer-by, is particularly subject to speculation. At this point Angela doesn’t “realiz[e] that some
of these people looking curiously, speculatively at her wondered what had been her portion to
bring her thus early to this unsavoury company,” but she will realize it soon. She has, Fauset has
told and taught her reader, a strong “instinct for self-appraisal” (89, 13).
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Angela’s color, beauty and charm are her only cards. At first she thinks them trumps and
overplays her hand. Nowhere is this more evident than in her attempt to marry a rich white man,
an idea that comes to her “out of the void” during her first few days in New York (Plum Bun 87):
“Then all the richness, all that fullness of life which she so ardently craved would be doubly
hers. … It would be fun, great fun to capture power and protection in addition to the freedom and
independence which she had so long coveted” (Plum Bun 88-89). She fixes upon Roger Fielding,
a racist, wealthy white man from New York’s upper crust. Roger is fascinated by Angela and
they go on several dates, at which point she solicits advice from her new, white friends on how to
get him to propose. Her open pursuit of this aim marks her as an outsider. Her friend Martha
laughs at her when Angela first asks how to do it: “Such candour have I not met, no, not in all
Flapperdom, Angèle” (144). It is, however, only her openness that marks her out:
If I could answer that, I’d be turning women away from my door and handing out my
knowledge to the ones I did admit at one hundred dollars a throw. … The only answer I
can give you is Humpty Dumpty’s dictum to Alice about verbs and adjectives: “it
depends on which is the stronger.” … It depends on (A) whether you are strong enough
to make him like you more than you like him; (B) whether if you really do like him more
than he does you you can conceal it. … And you must make him want you. But you
mustn’t give. … It is a game, and the hardest game in the world for a woman, but the
most fascinating; the hardest in which to strike a happy medium. You see, you have to be
careful to withhold too much and yet to give very little. If we don’t give enough we lose
them. If we give too much we lose ourselves. (145)
The game Martha articulates is one in which Angela must cultivate strength in order to even be
able to barter herself for power and protection in the first place. The power Angela gains from
passing, in other words, allows her to play this game, but it does not furnish her with the tools to
win it. There is also the problem of the nature of the game itself. By Martha’s telling, Angela’s
desire plays against Roger’s. Later on, Fauset characterizes it this way: “Young will and
determination were pitted against young will and determination. On both excitement of the chase
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was strong, but each was pursuing a different quarry” (191-192). The difference in their quarries
will be highly significant: While Angela chases those things Roger represents, owns and can give
her, Roger chases her.
Of course, as Wharton’s Undine demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is possible not to
play by these rules—but only in the absence of a moral self. Undine, that is to say, manages to
compromise herself entirely—to give all of her “flexible soul” over to her partners—without
losing that bright, hard desire that constitutes her. And that is because in the game of power,
Undine both plays with and is constituted entirely by desire; the self, though it appears to be in
play, is in fact entirely empty—a mask and instrument for her strivings. Angela’s friend Paulette
Lister provides a model for these tactics within Plum Bun itself: “I’ve learned,” she tells Angela
the first time they dine together, “that a woman is a fool who lets her femininity stand in the way
of what she wants. I’ve made a philosophy of it. I see what I want; I use my wiles as a woman to
get it, and I employ the qualities of men, tenacity and ruthlessness, to keep it. And when I’m
through with it, I throw it away just as they do” (105). To a certain extent, Angèle is similarly
constituted, using her “wiles as a woman” to try to get what she wants, and demonstrating a
certain, undeniable “ruthlessness” towards her black connections in her efforts to keep what she
has. The white self she presents to Roger functions as a mask for and tool of her strivings; it is
not filled in with those affiliations and meaningful relationships that make from selfidentification a meaningful connection with a community.
This is part of what makes Angèle—if not Angela—such a perfect example of the Woman
We Don’t Want to Be: Like Undine, she contains a sort of emptiness at her core. This
hollowness is dramatized by the narrator’s insistence that, for Angèle, the outside works in.
When she puts on her red dress for her first date with Roger, for instance, she is characterized as
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“kindled from without” (199). Of course, the idea that identity might work from the outside-in is
best expressed via an essentialist understanding of passing itself. Angèle, the logic goes, fashions
her identity not on the basis of that which is interior—her “blood”—but by working from her
external appearance. Instead of fighting “the fallaciousness of a social system which stretched
appearance so far being,” she purposefully feeds into and reaps rewards from it (58). Yet even
that understanding of passing suggests presence: an exterior whiteness that fills in identity. In
Plum Bun we learn that, while Angèle takes up whiteness of necessity, what she actually desires
is an absence of color entirely: a more perfect void from which her desires might body forth.
After she enrolls at Cooper Union, she thinks gratefully, “for the first time she would be seen,
would be met against her new background or rather, against no background” (Plum Bun 93). One
could make the case that these are one and the same: Insofar as whiteness is the default, it
registers as absence not presence, the norm rather than the aberration. Yet as Kathleen Pfeiffer
notes, Angèle’s adoption of a position as “neither white nor black,” to borrow Langston Hughes’
famous formulation, renders her incapable of forging meaningful relationships on either side of
the color line (87). We found a similar emptiness in Undine, alongside a similar inability to have
lasting, deep relationships.
And as we saw with Undine, the void has its uses. If the emptiness at Undine and Angèle’s
cores precludes deep relationships, it also proliferates shallow ones and enables both to reap the
rewards of not being fully known. Whereas Undine’s partners project their own hopes of what
she might be for them into the void—a seeming transparency that, they eventually learn, is in
fact a lack—Angèle’s partners are drawn to her for her opacity—a “puzzling” illegibility they
take for depth (122). Indeed, it is precisely her passing that gives rise to her puzzling nature,
which in turn elicits attraction: “No wonder she was puzzling to Roger, for … she was
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swimming in the flood of excitement created by her unique position. Stolen waters are the
sweetest. And Angela never forgot they were stolen” (Plum Bun 123). As Angela tells her friend
and suitor Ralph Ashley at the end, after she has revealed her blackness, “‘There’s no longer a
mystery about me, you know. So the real attraction’s gone” (Plum Bun 372). Yet while Undine
seems perfectly happy in her strivings, Angela finds that her desires rob her of herself: “Mystery
might add to the charm of personality,” she thinks to herself near the end, “but it certainly could
not be said to add to the charm of living” (324). And while her friend Paulette claims to have “no
regrets and no encumbrances,” Angela is filled with them (105). When Undine fails, as she does
with Peter Van Degen, those failures necessitate only a re-appraisal of her tactics; her desires and
what she is willing to give of herself for those desires remain constant. When Angela fails,
giving too much of herself for too little, it presages a crisis not just of desire, but of identity.
That is to say, despite Angela’s passing—her working of identity from the outside in in the
pursuit of material desires—her success is compromised by her sense of herself as a moral actor.
She retains, in other words, the consciousness of a moral self, and one that is furthermore at odds
with her desires. The protagonist’s self-continuity is dramatized in the narrator’s persistence in
calling her Angela, even when all the other characters, including her own sister, are referring to
her as Angèle or Miss Mory. There is something, the text implicitly insists, inviolate remaining
of Angela throughout, notwithstanding her choice to double herself by passing. However, the
text equally dramatizes the destruction of Angela’s moral core. Roger proposes that she be his
mistress, suggesting what we might call a “kept woman” scenario, or what he calls “free love.”
At first, Angela refuses. “[S]he knew that she had reached a milestone in her life; a possible
turning point. If she did not withdraw from her acquaintanceship with Roger now, … she would
never be the same to herself. If she withdrew, then indeed, indeed she would be the same old
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Angela Murray, the same girl save for a little sophistication that she had been before she left
Philadelphia” (Plum Bun 177). Yet she ends up renewing her relationship with Roger, at cost to
her sense of self, because she misses his attentions, presents and financial help. “[W]hat she
hated most had been the shrewdness, the practicality, which lay beneath that resolve to hear it
out. She had thought of those bills … of her poverty, of her helplessness” (Plum Bun 183). Her
readmission of him to her life is, she tells herself, purely practical; and it is also a sacrifice of
herself—and her sense of moral certainty.
Ultimately, Angela finds a redemption of sorts for her pragmatic capitulations not in a
reassertion of moral certainty, but in what might seem to be precisely the opposite: her giving
way to her sexual desire. At this point in the novel, it’s not just that Angela’s desires are pitted
against her sense of self; Her material desires—for money, security, position—are also pitted
against her sexual desire for Roger. “A curious mixture of materialism and hedonism,” the
narrator calls it (207). In an effort to extract more from Roger materially, she reluctantly refuses
his sexual advances. Throughout, the novel depicts her material desires as mercenary and
regrettable, but also as logical, pragmatic and expedient. Sexual desire, on the other hand,
Angela understands as a “treacher[ous] …forc[e] of nature” that “insensibly” redirects her from
those practical considerations, making her see Roger as “more than a means through which she
should be admitted to the elect of the world for whom all things are made” (Plum Bun 198-99). It
is at this point in the novel that the reader becomes aware that power, desire and the self exist in
far more complicated relation than Angela at first thought.118 As a result, Angela finds herself at
a distinct disadvantage.
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Angela goes “to Market,” as per the nursery rhyme that structures the novel, thinking
herself a buyer, who will use her beauty, charm and assumed whiteness, along with the power for
which it stands, to secure marriage to a white man and the enhanced “power and protection in
addition to the freedom and independence” that comes along with it (88-89). In reality, though,
Angela is a commodity. Unlike Undine, who can render everything in her ken fungible, Angela
can control only the terms upon which she is sold, not even what she is offered in return. Angela
finds herself having “drif[ted] into an inexcusably vulgar predicament” because she assumes
Roger plays the game of desire by the rules of the fairy tales she grew up on and the romance
movies she watches as an adult, and that he will offer her marriage (226). Instead, he offers
limited and likely impermanent material security in exchange for sex. More surprising, she
ultimately accedes not as a calculated move—“there was no calculation back of [her surrender]”
(Plum Bun 204)—but because she desires him and, as it turns out, does not have the control over
her own sexual impulses she thought she had. As Ann Ducille so brilliantly puts it, “Roger’s
trump card turns out to be [Angela’s] own sexual desire” (“Blue Notes” 436).
The play here between power, desire and the self is intricate, certainly far more
complicated than early critics of the novel realized. Angela has enough power through her
passing to make her way towards some of her material desires. Playing the marriage game as she
had been told to do so might have given her access to more. As it stands at this point in the novel,
however, she is offered some of what she desired materially without any of the security she
thought would accompany that offer, her moral sense of self sacrificed to her material and sexual
desires, which are themselves also at odds. In short, the choice with which Roger presents
Angela, and her willingness to accept some of the parameters of that choice, throw both Angela
and her reader into the sort of ethical ambivalence I began this project describing. Angela’s
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moral predicament takes on a particular starkness when she mentally inserts an outside
perspective. She imagines the reaction of her Philadelphia housekeeper Hetty:
Before her rose the eager, starved face of Hetty Daniels; now she herself was cognizant
of phases of life for which Hetty longed but so condemned. Angela could imagine the
envy back of the tone in which Hetty, had she but known it, would have expressed her
disapproval of her former charge’s manner of living. “Mattie Murray's girl, Angela, has
gone straight to the bad ; she's living a life of sin with some man in New York.” And then
the final, blasting indictment. “He's a white man, too. Can you beat that?” (205-206)
Here as in “Melanctha,” Angela’s predicament is made clearest by the same sort of source: a
moralizing woman who has been given too little narrative space to be nearly as sympathetic as
the protagonist (and who is fearful of racial intermingling to boot). This moralizing perspective
reveals the protagonist’s behavior to be not just repulsive and reproachable, but enviable, even in
some ways admirable. To put it another way: Hetty’s phantom voice articulates “the envy back of
the … disapproval.”

Lessons in Precarity

There is, furthermore, a brutal logic to the contingency of Roger’s offer, and the precarious
position in which it puts Angela. Angela registers some of her predicament, wondering
plaintively to Roger, “What would become of me after we, you and I, had separated? Very often
these things last only for a short time, don’t they?” (Plum Bun 187). Yet that is only half of the
equation. In spite of her ingenuous faith that marriage to Roger would represent not just the
height of her ambition but the “pinnacle of safety,” any relationship with Roger would in fact,
and necessarily, have put Angela in a position of precarity (Plum Bun 159). The highly
publicized marriage and divorce of Leonard “Kip” Rhinelander and Alice Jones just three years
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before the novel was published is a case in point, highlighting in real time (and yellow
journalism time) the impossible romantic position of the racial passer. While I have found no
conclusive evidence that Fauset knew about the Rhinelander marriage, which made headlines in
1924, she would have been hard-pressed not to have noticed the 1925 annulment case; and the
majority of her readers would certainly have known about it. Indeed, Nella Larsen included a
reference to the case in Passing (1929) that banked on her reader’s prior knowledge of its
intricacies. Rhinelander v. Rhinelander peppered the daily rags in the mid-1920’s and gave rise to
a great deal of contemporary speculation—a test case for contemporary views on miscegenation
and passing, not to mention material and sexual desire.
It’s a fascinating and intricate story, of which I’ll offer only an abbreviated version here.119
Leonard “Kip” Rhinelander, the son of an incredibly wealthy and well-established New York
family, was twenty one, the age at which he could inherit his father’s fortune, when he married
Alice Jones. Kip could easily have been a model for Roger Fielding in background, though he
was evidently shy and spoke with a stutter, in marked contrast to Roger’s careless ease.
(Incidentally, Kip was Edith Wharton’s third cousin.) It is unclear why exactly Kip chose to seek
an annulment—his family was against the marriage from the beginning, as Alice was poor and
unestablished—but the annulment case was certainly presaged by the press’ discovery (it’s also
unclear whether Kip knew) that Alice had black ancestry. “Bride of Rhinelander Colored,” the
front page of The Daily News blared on November 14, 1924. During the court case, Alice’s
lawyers declined to litigate her race, instead claiming that Kip must have known of her black
ancestry because the two had been intimate. As proof, they offered letters from Kip referring to
their sexual encounters and they arranged for Alice to expose parts of her body—principally her
breasts and thighs—to the exclusively white and male members of the jury. Alice won the court
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case, forcing Kip to file for divorce. There is much to say about this fascinating case. We might
talk, for instance, about the lawyer’s—and ultimately the court’s—insistence that race is legible
on the body, and their use of that belief as the basis upon which to build a case. There is the
added complication that the defense argued that in Alice’s case, her race would only be legible
on certain, sexualized parts of the body, such that Kip must have known of her race even as the
jury might be excused for at first reading her as white. And there is the jury’s ultimate decision
against Kip: Angela Onwuachi-Willig argues that “the verdict … may be read as [his]
punishment for failing to meet expectations regarding his race, gender, and class identities”
(2403).
Here, though, I would like to emphasize two things in particular: First, this case, like the
novel, stages collective anxiety about individual strivings through a passer. It would be
misguided to impugn Alice with unseemly social ambitions; we have no idea why she married
Kip. Yet that was certainly the fear encapsulated in the Rhinelander case and the media’s
coverage of it: that a woman, and a black woman at that, might have deceived her lover in order
to enrich herself, using the very moral and racial codes meant to constrict her in order to attain
her ends. Onwuachi-Willig describes how Kip’s attorney “presented an image throughout his
opening statement of Alice as a conniving woman who had deceiving Leonard [“Kip”] by
representing to him and to others that she was of pure white blood and then had tricked him into
marriage through sexual lures” (2412). The attorney also pointedly called Kip Alice’s “love
slave,” “revers[ing] racial and societal roles between Alice and Leonard to emphasize Alice’s
purported control over a defenseless Leonard” (Onwuachi-Willig 2412). This is the threat not
just Angela, but also Wharton’s Undine and Loos’ Lorelei represent: that illegibility enables
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women to confound a social system meant to contain them, giving them too much control not
only over their own lives, but also the lives of others.
Second, I’d like to call attention to the precarity of Alice’s situation: Even having secured
marriage to a wealthy white man—what Angela construes as the “pinnacle of safety”— she finds
herself thrust in the public eye, deprived not just of the man she married, but of the security and
safety that was supposed to have been her lot. Even though she wins the court case, she gains no
commensurate security from the marriage; he still leaves her—they divorce years later in
Nevada—and she never remarries. Alice wins but she loses.
Plum Bun simultaneously belies and acknowledges these possibilities for Angela. There are
two refrains that appear over and over again in Angela’s interior monologue—mottoes of a sort
for her passing. The first reflects the precarity of Alice’s situation: Several times she thinks to
herself some variation of “What would they think of me if they knew” or “what would they say if
they knew?”; “Would these people … begrudge her, if they knew, her cherished freedom and
sense of unrestraint?” (107, 92). The “they” is diffuse and specific. It encompasses her
acquaintances and lover, but also those random white observers who, despite not knowing her,
have the power to protest her very existence in all sorts of public spaces. The answer with Roger
is clear from one of their first dates, when he makes a server eject a group of black people from
the restaurant where he and Angela are dining. If he knew, he would abandon her.
The second motto, “afterwards I can atone for it all,” also appears several times throughout
the novel, most poignantly just after she cuts her sister. Just before Roger proposes their
arrangement, he leaves town, telling Angela he wants to have a conversation with her when he
returns. She naturally assumes he’s planning to propose. Around the same time, her sister Jinny
tells her she is coming to New York and asks Angela to meet her at the station and help her
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navigate this new city. Roger is set to return the day Jinny will arrive, but he won’t be able to see
Angela again until the following day, so she agrees to meet her sister. To her dismay, she runs
into Roger at the station as she is waiting for Jinny, and he insists upon waiting with her for the
friend she claims to be meeting. Knowing that Roger will know she is black if she greets Jinny,
Angela pretends not to know her. Reflecting on the event that evening,
[S]he thought: “If I had spoken to Jinny, and acknowledged her, what good would it have
done me or her either? After it was all over she would have been exactly where she was
before and I would have lost everything. And I do so want to be happy, to have a good
time. At this very hour to-morrow I’ll probably be one of the most envied girls in New
York. And afterwards I’ll atone for it all. I’ll be good to all sorts of people; I’ll really help
humanity, lots of coloured folks will be much better off on account of me. And if I had
spoken to Jinny I could never have helped them at all.” (162)
“Afterwards I can atone for it all” (162). Even after she begins sleeping with Roger, she adds her
black classmate Miss Powell, from whom she has also strategically distanced herself, to the “list
of those people whom she would some day aid,—when everything had turned out all right”
(194). As the Rhinelander case makes clear, marriage is not the guarantee Angela fantasizes it to
be. “What would they think of me if they knew” is in many ways the opposite of “afterwards I
can atone for it all”; yet the two work in tandem. The illegible racial subject reaches her
imagination not just across the “veil” of the color line, but also through time, to two possible
futures: one in which one’s blackness is revealed, and one in which whiteness will be not just a
“passing” state, but assured by an array of white connections. “If they knew” and “afterwards I
can atone” are the doubled timelines of the passer; conceptualizing herself through the eyes of
others, Angela holds both in mind. In this sense, the double consciousness of the passer
necessarily exists on a precarious, temporal plane.
For Du Bois, the teleology of double consciousness is away from itself. He calls double
consciousness a “gift” that nonetheless engenders “no true self-consciousness.” “The history of
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the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood,
to merge his double self into a better, truer self” (2). Fauset manifests something akin to this
hope for her protagonist: The narrative impels Angela away from her double self and towards a
hybrid “better, truer” self that integrates her outward appearance, (some of) her inner strivings
and her racial ties. This hybridity is achieved by way of what Fauset construes as appropriate
self-identification—“there will be lots of times when in spite of myself I’ll be ‘passing’ … but …
from now on, so far as sides are concerned, I’m on the coloured side” (Plum Bun 373)—and the
right kind of desire, detached from her earlier material yearnings. Yet, no matter what, Angela
will always sometimes be passing. The double consciousness of the illegible racial subject,
whether she is actively passing or not, must surmount or circumnavigate her necessarily doubled
temporality in order to attain full selfhood. In the novel’s resolution, as we’ll see, Fauset will
find a way of offering her protagonist this gift. First, though, Angela must learn not just to
present herself differently to the world, but to desire different things, so that, once again, “her
desire to live as she did and she herself” can align.

A Sentimental Education into Modern Relationality

This is the sentimental education Fauset offers her protagonist: Angela learns not just to behave
differently on the basis of her desires, but to desire—and to feel—differently. As a point of
clarification: Angela’s feeling and wanting wrong here is in many ways the flipped image of
Helga’s “wrong feeling” in Chapter Two. Whereas Helga feels too much, understanding the self
only in relation, Angela feels too little, bucking relationality in order to get what she wants. As
the novel progresses, Angela’s inability to get all she wants—“power and protection in addition
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to the freedom and independence”—from her performance of whiteness, not to mention the cold
comfort of what she is able to secure, teaches her to want different things—community,
acceptance and emotional comfort—which she then must seek in different ways. Particularly
intriguing, though, is the way this turn towards relationality manifests in the end. By the novel’s
close Angela has left her home country, her sister, her friends, and gone abroad to pursue her art
career. As I’ll show, the sentimental education to which Fauset subjects her protagonist impels
Angela towards a modern relationality. Angela finds herself in relation not just to her old
community, but to the “type” and the crowd. By “sentimental education,” then, I mean to
indicate much of what I described in Chapter Two: a pull towards feeling right as a way of
building the self in relation, and making one’s way towards moral action and communitybuilding. I am also, however, riffing off of Gustave Flaubert’s L’Education sentimentale (1869),
a brutally-told bildungs roman that chronicles a young man’s loss of his illusions and ambitions.
Writing of the novel, Flaubert’s biographer Geoffrey Wall calls it an object lesson in “how to
smuggle their old Romantic contraband into a modern realist novel” (298). In Plum Bun, Fauset
achieves the reverse: smuggling modernity into a novel that in other respects straddles the
künstlerroman and the marriage plot. Impelling her heroine towards wanting and feeling right,
Fauset leads Angela into relation with the “type.”
Angela begins the novel full of personal aspirations and notably devoid of emotion. “She
was naturally cold,” the narrator tells us (198). She leaves her sister in Philadelphia, for instance,
with remarkably little regret, while Jinny weeps for her departure. For her lack of emotion, Jinny
and the narrator accuses Angela of masculinity and an unseemly whiteness:
The tears ran down [Jinny’s] cheeks. Angela, unable to endure either her own pain or the
sight of it in others, had all of a man’s dislike for tears. “Don’t be absurd, Jinny! How
could I live the way I want to if you’re with me. … [W]e might as well face the facts.
Some of those girls in the art school used to ask me to their homes; it would have meant
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opportunity, a broader outlook, but I never dared accept because I knew I couldn’t return
the invitation.” Under that Jinny winced a little, but spoke with spirit. “After that, Angela
dear, I’m beginning to think that you have more white blood in your veins than I, and it
was that extra amount which made it possible for you to make that remark.” (Plum Bun
80)
In her article on “The Limits of Identity in Jessie Fauset’s Plum Bun,” Kathleen Pfeiffer draws
out the literary-historical implications of Jinny’s sentimentality, particularly manifest here in its
contrast to Angela’s heartlessness. Fauset, Pfeiffer shows, identifies Virginia’s blackness with
sentimentalism, and Angela’s taking up whiteness with modernity. The “transition ... from
nineteenth-century values to twentieth century promise … is metonymized in Angela Murray’s
passing,” Pfeiffer writes, “aligning her rejection of blackness with a rejection of the sentimental
tradition of domestic fiction” (82, 84). To put it another way, Fauset impels her heroine
backwards in a literary framework, away from the ethical contortions of modern living and
towards a clearer, and pointedly more emotional, moral framework. It is a novel without a moral
that nonetheless reasserts Angela’s existence within, and subjection to, the dictates of a moral
universe.
Certainly, Angela doesn’t reason her way out of her passing, even though it does not end
up providing her the happiness she had hoped it might. She instead feels her way to decisive
moral action, ultimately disclosing her blackness as part of a highly emotional response to
injustice. The episode takes place when she comes to visit Miss Powell, the only other black
student in her art community. Miss Powell has been awarded the same prize as Angela, but the
prize committee has since retracted it, upon learning that Miss Powell is black. The other
students, they claim, wouldn’t want to associate with her, and the prize committee was
“interested ‘not in Ethnology but in Art’” (361). A few reporters are badgering Miss Powell, and
when it becomes clear that she and Angela aren’t particularly close, one says, “I’m not blaming
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you, Miss Mory. You are acting in accordance with natural law.’ … It was foolish reasoning and
fallacious, yet containing enough truth to make it sting. Some icy crust which had formed over
Angela’s heart shifted, wavered, broke and melted” (348). Angela tells the reporters that she too
is black, and refuses the prize in solidarity. Her announcement is achieved in the least
pragmatic—if most efficient—manner possible. Her declaration necessitates her giving up the
fellowship she receives to go to Paris (though she keeps the money) and ensures, since it will be
in the papers, that everyone will know immediately. “‘She was a fool,’” Miss Powell’s mother
wryly puts it (348). In contrast to the innate coldness and pragmatism with which Angela began
the novel and began passing, our heroine ends up emotional, foolish, and seeking not money or
power or even freedom, but relationality.
Yet alongside this bid for interpersonal relationality, we also see a more generalized and
diffuse relationality with explicit links to the modern experience. That is, Angela’s sentimental
education manifests not just in her reinvigorated individual relationships, but in her shifting
relationship to the concept of the “type.” Throughout the novel, Angela understands the world in
and through “types.” When she enters her class at Cooper Union for the first time, when she
watches people watching the race man Van Meier (a likely stand-in for Du Bois) lecture, even
when she walks around Fourteenth Street during her first days in New York, Angela is constantly
dividing and classifying people around her in these terms. Her relationship with the type,
however, changes over the course of the novel. At first, she sees (or really, wants to see) the type
as entirely separate from herself:
It was Spring, and the Square was full of rusty specimens of mankind… discouraged
down and outers. “I am seeing life,” thought Angela, “this is the way people live,” and
never realized that some of these people looking curiously, speculatively at her wondered
what had been her portion to bring her thus early to this unsavoury company. “A great
picture!” she thought. “I’ll make a great picture of these people one day and call them
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‘Fourteenth Street types’.” And suddenly a vast sadness invaded her; she wondered if
there were people more alive, more sentient to the joy, the adventure of living, even than
she, to whom she would also be a “type.” But she could not believe this. (89)
As this passage demonstrates, designating someone a “type” can perform a sort of
representational violence, flattening them out into a set of recognizable characteristics against
which the representer understands herself. In Angela’s painting of “Fourteenth Street types,” she
will “depic[t] the countenance of a purse-proud but lonely man, of the silken inanity of a society
girl, of the smiling despair of the harlot” (Plum Bun 111). There is some depth here but no
breadth: The “type” contains not multitudes; it instead emphasizes that which is already legible
from the outside.
There is a peculiar irony at play for Angela, as the practice of typing relies upon precisely
those suppositions that have most damaged her: the myth that interiority is legible on the body—
or, to use Angela’s own framing, “the fallaciousness of a social system which stretched
appearance so far beyond being” (58). As Amy Robinson puts it, passing “place[s] the
inadequate dichotomy of visibility and invisibility with an acknowledgement of multiple codes
of intelligibility. ... For the ‘problem’ of identity... is predicated on the false promise of the
visible as an epistemological guarantee" (716). In other words, seeming to be something does not
guarantee that one actually is that thing; and the “‘problem’ of identity” revolves around the
possible failure of this epistemological premise. Yet by taking up this essentialist belief and
epistemic certainty in her art, Angela is able to position herself as “more alive, more sentient to
joy, the adventure of living” than those she paints. The artistic practice of typing thus puts her at
a distinct advantage over her subjects and in clear opposition to them—an advantage and
opposition she (rightly) fears she might lose. This phenomenon, incidentally, allows Angela to
momentarily flip double consciousness outwards instead of inwards. Now she “looks on in
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amused contempt and pity,” not the other way around (Du Bois 2). Angela, however, is never
able to inhabit the position of “observer” fully.120 Even at this point in the novel, she fears that
she too might be a “type.”
As time goes on and Angela learns to feel and to want better, she also comes into fuller
relationality with the “type.” This transition occurs not on the basis of any freedom or happiness
she has gained through her passing, but by dint of another consequence of her passing: her
intense loneliness.
Loneliness such as that offered by the great, noisy city could never be imagined. To
realize it one would have to experience it. Coming home from work Angela used to study
the people on the trains, trying to divine what cause had engraved a given expression on
their faces, particularly on the faces of the young women. She picked out for herself four
types, the happy, the indifferent, the preoccupied, the lonely. Doubtless her classification
was imperfect, but she never failed, she thought, to recognize the signs of loneliness, a
vacancy of expression, a listlessness, a faintly pervading despair. She remembered the
people in Union Square on whom she had spied so blithely when she had first come to
New York. Then she had thought of them as being “down and out,” mere idlers, good for
nothing. It had to occurred to her that their chief disaster might be loneliness. Her office
was on Twenty-third Street and often at the noon-hour she walked down the dingy Square
and looked again on the sprawling, half-recumbent, dejected figures. And between them
and herself she was able to detect a terrifying relationship. (239-240, my italics)
This passage documents a significant transformation. Here Angela acknowledges not just her
limits—“doubtless her classification was imperfect”—but her similarity to those she chronicles.
In fact, she actively seeks similarity, looking “particularly on the faces of young women” like
herself, and feeling greatest certainty in her classifications when she sees that “chief disaster” she
herself shares. Her typing is a project not just of recognition, but of “self-recognition.” There is
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attraction here, too—a pull of like to like. Yet Angela’s self-recognition is often unflattering; at
times she “detect[s] a terrifying relationship.”
If Plum Bun enacts for its heroine a shift away from individuality and towards relationality,
this shift becomes peculiarly modern when conceived in relation to the type. Angela seeks selfrecognition in the crowd; and she does so not to ward off the isolation and loneliness she feels,
but to find companionship in those feelings. Indeed, in the end Fauset instrumentalizes Angela’s
interest in types to move her further away from her personal relationships. She is awarded the
money that will enable her to go to Paris on the basis of her portrait “Fourteenth Street Types,”
born of her disdain for these “down-and-outers” and perfected through these forays into
recognition and self-identification with these types. In other words, Angela’s identification with
the type will ultimately facilitate her extracting herself from the all her remaining ties. Angela’s
modern self-recognition, her alignment with a group, only individualizes her further. It furnishes
her with the money to leave not just her community, but the stressors of the American “race
problem,” entirely. Van Meier, the great “race man” whose lecture Angela attends in the middle
of the novel, advocates “the acquisition not so much of a racial love as a racial pride. A pride that
enables us to find our own beautiful and praiseworthy, an intense chauvinism that is content with
its own types, that finds completeness within its own group, that loves its own as the French love
their country, because it is their own” (218-219). Typing, he insists, can be deployed in the
service of racial pride. Yet Angela’s “intense chauvinism that is content with its own types”
counter-intuitively leads to her simultaneous rapprochement with, and withdrawal from, her
community.
In Plum Bun Fauset suggests that the type and the legibility it provides might allow one to
better—if never fully—understand oneself. The novel dramatizes the same struggle that is at the

172

heart of this project: that of finding a “we”—a collective among which these protagonists may be
placed, even if only by negation. This struggle derives from the way the “type” both invokes and
frustrates collectivity. The type is representative, but gives rise to no solidarity. The type is at
once collective and solitary in nature. “She said to herself, ‘There is no sorrow in the world like
my sorrow,’ and knew even as she said it that some one else, perhaps only in the next block, in
the next house, was saying the same thing” (310). The type represents not just the hope of being
like others—and thus of participating in a shared experience—but the fear of that very same
thing—of being or being seen not as an individual, with individual doubts and longings, but as
merely one more instantiation of the age. Collective anxiety and individual strivings collide in
the type. The threat of the type is that you are not special; its lure is that you are not alone.

In Search of a Resolution

It is telling that Fauset must rely upon several coincidences and a few byzantine turns of fate in
order to effect a resolution for her heroine. So a synopsis, as brief as possible, of the novel’s
second half: Roger leaves Angela cruelly after the two spend several months as lovers. By this
point, she has effectively cut ties with her entire community, including her sister, and made no
new deep friendships. Realizing, then, that whiteness does not hold the promises she thought it
did, Angela tries to formalize her doubleness, hoping to insert herself into the black community
her sister has cultivated in New York while still passing in the context of her white friendships.
This effort is ineffective, to say the least. She cannot inhabit both of her subject positions
simultaneously. At the same time, though, Angela begins to pursue Anthony, a young man from
her art class who loved her from the beginning, but for whom she knew she would have to
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sacrifice too much in terms of material comfort. Angela’s desire for Anthony is notably staid
compared with her feelings for Roger. One might analogize it to that of the “Negro lad and lass”
of Fauset’s poem “Stars in Alabama,” published in the Crisis the same year Plum Bun was
released. “A Negro lad and lass/ Cling hand in hand, / And passion, hot-eye, hot-lipped,/ Lurks
unseen.// But in the evening,/ When the skies lean down,/ He’s but a wistful boy/, A saintly
maiden she,// For Alabama Stars/ Hang down so low,/ So low, they purge the soul,/ With their
infinity” (Shadowed Dreams 100-101). It’s not that sexual desire is non-existent for Angela and
Anthony; as in the poem, it is managed and contained.121 Angela’s desire for Anthony, in other
words, is the right kind of desire. Anthony represents many things for Angela—duty, a reprieve
from her loneliness, and, as we will see, a return of sorts to the racial fold—but not sexual or
material desire.
When she first tries to renew their relationship, however, Anthony refuses her despite his
continued attraction, admitting that he has been passing (she only tells him later that she is too)
and that he is engaged—to her sister Virginia, as it turns out. It is not a love triangle, but a square
in which no one is truly happy: Angela and Anthony love each other but can’t be together
because of his engagement to Virginia; Virginia does love Anthony, but would choose Matthew,
a young man from Philadelphia who used to pursue Angela, over Anthony if she knew he were
interested in her—which, it transpires, he is. While this is all being worked out through various
fortuitous coincidences and fateful misunderstandings, Angela wins the prize to study art in Paris
and reveals her blackness as described above. The love square breaks too as a result of Angela’s
judicious feeling and happenstance. She feels impelled to return home before she leaves, and
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there, crying because the new owner won’t let her into her old house, she runs into Matthew.
Matthew invites her in to console her, and in their conversation she persuades him to pursue
Jinny, without breaking Jinny’s confidence. The next day, not knowing if Matthew will go to see
Jinny, she leaves for Paris. A few months later, on Christmas, Anthony shows up at her doorstep.
The novel ends, “‘There ought to be a tag on me somewhere,’ he remarked apologetically, ‘but
anyhow Virginia and Matthew sent me with their love’” (379).
This is in many ways a satisfying ending: Angela’s difficulty attaining Anthony’s love
punishes her for her passing; Anthony’s arrival in Paris provides a sense of resolution—not to
mention a reward for our heroine’s return to the racial fold. Yet it’s unclear what Anthony’s
arrival means for Angela’s future. There is no indication that she and Anthony will ever marry.
It’s also unclear whether the couple will return to the United States. After all, there is no room in
American society for Angela’s hybrid self; Paris, on the other hand, was reputed to offer black
Americans in particular a wider zone of freedom and possibility. The critic Valerie Popp also
usefully points to Anthony’s own transnationalism: “[His] Brazilian heritage renders the
conclusion of Plum Bun multiply international; not only does Angela relocate to Paris, but she
marries a non-American as well. It is through this double relocation, I want to suggest, that the
reestablishment of a domestic space is truly made possible” (141, Popp’s italics). The marriage is
only presumed, if that, yet the point still stands: Plum Bun’s resolution is pointedly multinational
and multiply international. The “reestablishment of a domestic space”—or, in the parlance of the
nursery rhyme that structures the novel, returning “home again”—necessitates a double
dislocation from the United States and its tortured relation to American blackness.122 This
dislocation does what Angela’s passing at first promises. It evades the strictures of double
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consciousness b detaching the couple from those who might “loo[k] on in amused contempt and
pity” (Du Bois 2). But for how long, and under what circumstances? In offering this seemingly
fortuitous resolution, Fauset leaves much unresolved, refusing to bring her heroine all the way
home—to reintegrate her into a world that will render her hybridity impossible.
The double consciousness of the illegible racial subject is a tight-rope walk of expectation
and desire that balks at resolution. In place of wholeness—and the security the marriage plot
offers—Fauset offers her heroine a tenuous hybridity that can only exist in spatial and temporal
suspension. This is why it is important that Fauset offers only the suggestion of marriage to
Anthony, not the promise of it: Angela can only achieve resolution in the absence of a clear
future. This is a marked difference from how novels of manners tend to end. Normally, the
heroine is given a very specific set of gifts for her struggle: marriage and security, and the
presumption of children and happiness. Fauset improbably gifts her heroine the present, a
momentary reprieve from narrative time. The double consciousness of the illegible racial subject,
the novel implies, can be ministered and managed only outside of the United States, and only in
the absence of a future. In place of the marriage plot’s normal and normative rewards, and in
place of the cyclical plots to which the Woman We Don’t Want to Be is subjected, Fauset offers
her heroine a caesura, a hiatus from feminine narrative time.
At the end, Anthony pointedly calls her neither Angela or Angèle, but Angel—a bid not
just for hybridity, but for the conservative wish that this novel does not entirely fulfill: that one
might remake oneself anew and whole through love, through learning to feel and to want right.
The search for the self, like the nostalgic attempt to return home, is always a fool’s errand. Yet,
as Fauset shows, we are all such fools. The novel ultimately documents the impossibility of
returning home—which is to say, to the same sense of self and the order that sense of self
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provided. And so the novel documents a search for an authenticity that was never really there to
begin with. Plum Bun is a detective novel of the self, shorn of adequate solution. A Novel without
a Moral. Fauset’s subtitle is a reference to Vanity Fair: A Novel Without a Hero. Throughout the
latter novel, Thackery ironically casts for a hero who never shows up. In Plum Bun, Fauset loses
her heroine. And when she finally restores Angela to herself, she does so without entirely
resolving those issues that broke her in two. The threat the double represents is not gone; it is
merely managed.
I began this project with a quotation from Dorothy Parker, who wrote of light verse writers
like herself, “We sneered in numbers in loping rhythms at the straight and the sharp and the
decent. We were little black ewes that had gone astray; we were a sort of ladies auxiliary of the
legion of the damned. And boy, were we proud of our shame!” In Plum Bun, too, Fauset makes
reference to this bible verse. The moment comes just after Angela learns of Anthony’s
engagement: “[S]he was a little girl back in the church again in Philadelphia; the minister was
intoning, ‘all we like sheep have gone astray’” (300). The story of the Woman We Don’t Want to
Be tells of this straying, sometimes gleeful, sometimes regretful, “from the straight and the sharp
and the decent.” In this final text, our anti-heroine returns to the fold at the end, breaking the
cyclical temporality of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be by stopping the clock. She abdicates
some of her control without abdicating it all, regains some sense of right feeling without feeling
too much. When the novels leaves off, she is successfully walking, for the moment, the peculiar
tight-rope of femininity that is her lot. In other words, by finally occupying a middle ground
between characters like Helga, Melanctha and Parker’s own Hazel on the one hand and Undine
and Lorelei on the other, Angela manages an attenuated heroism. This is a strange conclusion:
the mid-point of our anti-heroines turns out to be the heroine—understood, in the final
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conservative gesture, not as the woman who finds or forges her identity perfectly and completely,
but as the woman who is deserving of love. Fauset’s novel of wayward femininity finds its hero.
It does not, however, find its moral—for what moral universe can withstand “all we … gone
astray,” this “ladies auxiliary of the legion of the damned”?
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1963: AN AFTERWORD

Mary McCarthy’s best-seller The Group—set in the thirties, written in the fifties and published
in the sixties—straddles several of the nation’s key inflection points. McCarthy’s protagonists
graduate in 1933, the year prohibition ended and F.D.R., newly sworn in, begins enacting his
“New Deal” in response to the Great Depression. The novel ends with the character Kay Strong’s
death and funeral in 1940; she falls out of a window watching for war planes. When one of the
protagonists’ mothers observes that “Kay was the first American war casualty,” her daughter
retorts, “‘That’s a ridiculous way of putting it.’ But,” the collective narrator adds, “in a ridiculous
way it was true” (The Group 464). McCarthy wrote the novel throughout the fifties, publishing
the third chapter in 1954. That chapter, “Dottie Makes an Honest Woman of Herself,” came out
in The Partisan Review, sandwiched between articles by Irving Howe and Hannah Arendt. It was
the first time a diaphragm was mentioned in print. Harcourt Brace then published the novel as a
whole in 1963—a sort of annus mirabilis for American Feminism’s second wave. That same
year, Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar, and the Department of
Labor presidential report on the status of American Women were all released. In the Columbia
Literary History of the United States, Catherine Stimpson contends that these “four texts
quickened [a feminist movement that] had seemed dead” (1064).
Yet despite The Group’s instrumentality to the nascent feminist second wave, Mary
McCarthy’s writing gestures backwards. The temporal setting and style of The Group, not to
mention her well-publicized (and oft-fictionalized) marriage to Edmund Wilson, only fed the
impression that she was something of a modernist hold-over. In his “Remembrances of an Old
Friend,” Arthur Schlesinger put it this way:
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I hazard the hypothesis that Mary McCarthy was essentially a child of the 1920s. She
inherited and embodied the rebel spirit of that mischievous literary decade, the aesthetic
concerns, the satiric bent, the revolt against censorship, prohibition, and other forms of
puritanism, the faith in drink and sex and personal freedom, the indifference to politics,
the delight in iconoclasm, the contrarian and contra mundum reflex that could be easily
confused with radicalism…. All these were elements in the literary sensibility of the
1920s. (ed. Stwertka and Viscusi 202)
To be fair, Schlesinger is hardly the most sympathetic reader of McCarthy—her works or her
person.123 She would doubtless have contested his claims that she was “indifferen[t] to politics”
and had “faith in drink and sex and personal freedom.” McCarthy had an extraordinarily active
political life, even as she protested faith in very little. The Group is a case in point: It is a highly
political novel, though as what Norman Mailer would sneeringly dub a “lady book,” it refracts
those politics through feminine sensibilities.124 And it lampoons faith of all sorts—in Socialism,
F.D.R., scientific knowledge, and a sense of progress more generally. In an interview she gave
The Paris Review as she was finishing The Group, McCarthy calls it a “a novel about … the idea
of progress seen in … the feminine sphere[,] the history of the loss of faith in … the idea of
progress” (62). Nonetheless, Schlesinger is fundamentally right: In her anti-nostalgic cataloguing
of 1930’s femininity—her close friend Hannah Arendt described it as “a definite statement of
that period, but looked at from a very great distance” (Between Friends 145)—McCarthy does
show herself to be “a child of the 1920s” in two senses. First, The Group implicitly mourns the
very faith in progress it mocks. It mourns the naivety of McCarthy’s own freshman year in 1929,
before the crash, when a Vassar education seemed “a threshold to possibility” (“The Vassar Girl”
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In the four pages that constitute his “Remembrances of an Old Friend,” Schlesinger is most dismissive of her
intellectual affinity with Hannah Arendt. After explaining that McCarthy “was more interested…in the drama of
politics” than in “politics per se,” he points to “a certain uncharacteristic weakness for meta politics, visible in her
enthusiasm for Hannah Arendt, though I rather supposed that it was a sympathetic personal chemistry that led Mary
to take Hannah Arendt’s Hegelian-Heideggarian abstractions so seriously” (ed. Stwertka and Viscusi 202-3).
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197). Second, and of particular importance for my purposes here, in The Group McCarthy takes
up one “elemen[t] in the literary sensibility of the 1920’s” in particular: Namely, she takes up
and collectivizes the modernist anti-heroine—what I have called the Woman We Don’t Want to
Be.
In this brief afterword, I will trace the legacy of the Woman We Don’t Want to Be in
McCarthy’s best-selling novel, interrogating what happens to this questionably feminist figure at
the cusp of the sexual revolution. Much will remain the same between McCarthy's anti-heroines
and their modernist progenitors—the possible psychic abnormalities, the affective ambivalence,
the autobiographical echoes and the staging of blame—even as McCarthy’s embrace of a
collective heroine raises the possibility not just of identification, but of representation, even
solidarity. More broadly, I’d like to suggest that this type’s afterlife not just in The Group, but
also in the Feminine Mystique and The Bell Jar, those other “quickeners” of the second wave,
indicates a deeper set of affiliations between texts written by women between the end of the first
wave of American Feminism and the beginning of the second. It should perhaps come as little
surprise that the modernist anti-heroine haunts later efforts to describe and account for American
femininity writ large, yet our current periodization practices downplay this continuity. By
considering this type’s recurrence in later texts, I sketch a different literary-historical arc, one
that gives primacy to the way women authors—and so-called middlebrow authors in particular—
spoke to and borrowed from each other across the mid-century.
The modernist anti-heroines this study has assembled are all relatively attractive, relatively
young (which is to say, of a marriageable age) city-dwellers. Either possibly mentally ill (think
Stein’s Melanctha) or definitely Machiavellian (think Wharton’s Undine), these protagonists
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Mailer’s main argument in “The McCarthy Case” seems to be that the novel can’t possibly be political without
being also masculine, making his complaint that “this sparse gallery offers a flaccid spring-board from which to
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make all the wrong choices—and I use the word “wrong” here normatively, to encompass both a
contemporary moral code and the practical considerations that arise from it. The modernist antiheroine thus repulses the reader even as we find ourselves—oddly, counter-intuitively and only
by half—compelled by her cyclical progress, sympathetic to her aims, even envious of her ends.
She is the emblem of how the possibilities newly open to women, like access to education,
financial freedom, travel and sexuality, might threaten a putatively rational society—even as she
is nothing more nor less than the product of that society. Indeed, all too often, she is a perfect
instantiation of its systems of punishments and rewards—a symptom, even as she is the cause of
so much destruction.
McCarthy’s heroines share all of these attributes. They are relatively young, relatively
attractive city-dwellers. Their lives are as cyclical as their modernist progenitors—McCarthy
even complained that, because “these girls are all essentially comic figures, … it's awfully hard
to have anything happen to them” (Niebuhr and McCarthy 88)—and as readers we are
simultaneously compelled and alienated by their recursive progress. In this sense and in others,
The Group toes the line between evoking sympathy and repulsing the reader.125 The threat of
mental illness, as I will discuss presently, is there from the novel’s beginning, even as that threat
does not exempt any of the group from blame. Finally, these half-sympathetic, half-repulsive
young women are replete with moral failings. As the reviewer Harold Gardiner wrote when the
novel came out, “What [McCarthy] has communicated, I think without realizing it, is that this
group of privileged young things is corrupt. …The group is composed of what I can only call
moral cretins” (318). Of course, she does realize it. One could generate a litany of personal
failings and malfeasances using only McCarthy’s own language; all are brutalized, if not by an

jump into a major novel of the thirties” a little too on the nose.
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individual voice, then by the group, which functions as a sort of collective narrator. Pokey, for
instance, is described as “the problem child of the group, very rich and lazy” (5). Lakey
considers Kay “a cruel, ruthless, stupid person who was marrying Harald from ambition” (9,
McCarthy’s italics). “Libby, as everyone knew, was an unrestrained gossip and gabbler” (17).
And Polly, Libby thinks to herself, has “the smell of seeing better days” (276).
Kay Strong, “cruel, ruthless, [and] stupid” as she is, is a particularly good example of the
ways The Group engages many of the qualities common to the modernist anti-heroine. The de
facto main character of a novel that has no main character, Kay dominates five of the fifteen
chapters and provides all but one of the significant occasions, in her wedding, party and funeral,
for the rest of the group to meet up. Thoughtless, opinionated and obnoxious, Kay is the first to
do everything except have a child: the first to have sex, to live with a man, to marry and to die.
She has “a ruthless hatred of poor people,” and “was not really strong for the idea of equality;
she liked, she had to confess, to be superior” (115, 76). Worst of all, she has an unshakeable faith
in her husband Harald, who is not just pompous and needlessly cruel, but also drinks too much,
cheats on her, beats her and eventually commits her to a mental institution without her consent.
In a book replete with villains, Harald is among the best, which is to say the worst. Yet
Kay, by choosing him, is blamed for bringing him into the group. There’s a horrible sense
throughout the novel that by being just slightly more precocious than the others, she got what she
deserved. The collective narrator intones at her wedding:
The main point was, Harald was a natural gentleman—though inclined to show off in his
letters, which was probably to impress Kay, who was inclined to drop names herself and
talk about people’s butlers and Fly and A.D. and Porcellian and introduce poor Harald as
a Yale man when he had only gone to graduate school in New Haven. … That was the
side of Kay that the group did its best to deprecate and that drove Lakey wild. A lack of
125

Jaime Cleland argued that McCarthy employs an “aesthetics of embarrassment,” a phrase that evocatively
sketches this play of identification and distancing.
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fastidiousness and consideration for the other person; she did not seem to realize the little
social nuances. (14)
In this passage, everyone is demeaned: Kay, Harald (though not, it turns out, as much as he
should be) and the Group. This is indicative: Blame for Kay’s position—not just her
institutionalization but also, before that, for her very way of being—will circulate among
characters, with herself and Harald bearing most of the load. When Harald says, brutally, at the
end of the novel, “living with a woman is like living with an echo, a loud echo in Kay’s case,”
the claim is all too revealing of his own personal failings; and yet, like the suggestion that Kay
was the first war casualty, “in a ridiculous way it was true” (484, 464). Throughout the text, Kay
is Harald’s echo, parroting his beliefs and reflecting back to him his opinions of himself and of
her. When she explains contraceptive etiquette to Dottie, for instance, she merely repeats what
Harald has told her. When he gets fired, she says, “I know that you’re a genius and that I’m just a
B-average person. That’s why I can coast along in life and you can’t” (109).126 Kay fills out the
contours of her personality with Harald’s beliefs.
It is because she is an echo that she makes such an ideal victim of Harald’s ideas and of
Harald himself, even as she evokes little of the sympathy to which the victim of such a man
would normally give rise. When Harald institutionalizes her against her will, he doesn’t have to
lie. He reports to the doctor that she had a psychic break and that she brandished a knife at him.
Both are true. She did brandish a knife at him—she later tells Polly it was an attempt to bring
him to his senses because he was beating her—and she does, in a sense, have a psychic break—
though one might ask if it is indeed a break if it is in response, as she intimates, to Harald’s
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It’s hard not to think of Wharton’s Ralph Marvell and his desire to “mold” Undine in when Harald writes to his
parents, “that vitality of hers is necessary to me; it wants form and direction, which I think I can give her’ (104). Of
course, Harald is much more successful than Ralph, and Kay somewhat less reprehensible than Undine. In both
cases, though, the attempt to provide direction to the “unformed” woman widens the radius of implication to anyone
who purports to do the molding.
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brutality. Yet in an age of armchair psychology, Kay was being diagnosed from the start; we are
thus primed to see Kay’s witness as not entirely reliable, her psyche as potentially pathological,
even as her account of events seems the most likely.
Kay’s claim to mental health becomes all the more tenuous when, after Harald finally
comes to retrieve her from the mental institution, she decides to stay. Harald’s erstwhile mistress
Norine, another Vassar ’33 graduate but not a member of the group, provides a third version of
Kay’s break-down. Harald, she explains,
was lacerated by guilt because he’d treated her like hell toward the end, not
understanding that her aberrations were clinical. … They never settled on a final
diagnosis. But a lot of basic things were the matter. Sex. Competitiveness with men. An
underlying Lesbian drive that was too firmly repressed. Thwarted social strivings. … So
she transferred all her ambitions to Harald … And all the time she was driving him to
make money, she was ruthlessly undercutting him because of her penis-envy. (446)
By Norine’s lights, Kay’s position is nobody’s fault. Kay is merely sick, a catalogue of Freudian
disorders. “Her aberrations [are] clinical”; she was always going to break down at some point.
Or, really, (and this idea seems to exist simultaneously), it is Kay’s fault, or rather, the fault of
her “ambitions,” “underlying Lesbian drive,” and “penis envy”—in short, the fault of her broken
psyche. In the end we’re meant mostly to believe Kay; yet the novel leaves open the possibility
that she is either mentally ill in addition—a victim, to be sure, but also a cause—or else
otherwise unreliable.
In her application for a Guggenheim grant to support the writing of the novel, McCarthy
wrote, “The book is a history of contemporary ideas as well as of social mores, but these ideas
are studied only as they impinge on love and family life. In fact, in a certain sense, the ideas are
the villains and the people their hapless victims” (qtd. in Gelderman 252). Kay is an ideal
example of this phenomenon. A victim of the very ideas she holds, her institutionalization and
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eventual death reflect upon and implicate not just her, but Harald, Norine, the group and the very
atmosphere they build and breathe together.
Crucially, though, Kay is not, like the modernist anti-heroine, the main character; rather,
she is one of a collective. Comprising eight instantiations of what McCarthy called “the Vassar
Girl,” the Group is an amalgam portrait. In writing this collective narrator, I contend, McCarthy
constructed and multiplied a specifically modern type. This was a well-considered undertaking.
McCarthy spent over ten years writing the novel, a process she began in 1951 when she
submitted the first of two Guggenheim applications for the purpose and published an article
entitled “The Vassar Girl” in Holiday magazine. “The Vassar Girl” constitutes McCarthy’s first
attempt to come to terms with this particular “model of American woman” (On the Contrary
204). In this effort as in The Group, McCarthy combines personal reminiscence, statistical
representations and reporting, ending with musings on “the adjustment-to-life question,” which,
she assures us, “is typical of Vassar and perhaps, more generally, of feminine insularity and selfcenteredness” (213). Several of The Group's reviewers described the novel as little more than a
sociological study, and while I prickle at the derision with which those claims were often made,
the claims themselves are, I think, fundamentally accurate.127 McCarthy sought, as she told
interviewers, intimated in essays, and wrote in her Guggenheim application, to write “a ‘true
history’ of the times” (qtd. in Gelderman 253). In service of this goal, she drew as accurately as
possible a portrait of this type, through whom would be refracted “all the novel ideas of the
period” (qtd. in Gelderman 253). In constituting “the Vassar Girl,” in other words, McCarthy
sought not only to amuse her reader and to pare “this model of American woman” down to size;
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See Hicks (1963) and Mailer (1963). Mailer is characteristically dismissive on this front: “Her book fails as a
novel …,” he writes, “but it is enormously successful as sociology. It will continue to exist as a classic in sociology
long after it is dim and dull as a novel, it will survive in Soc Sci I at every university and junior college: the specific
details are to be mined by the next twenty-five classes of PhD.”
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she sought also to construct a real type—one who existence and struggles would bear witness to
a real historical moment.
“The distinctive mark of the novel,” McCarthy explains in “The Fact in Fiction,” “is its
concern with the actual world, the world of fact, of the verifiable, of figures even, and statistics”
(On the Contrary 250). In The Group, McCarthy does not reduce her protagonists to a set of
recognizable characteristics; to the contrary, she expands and deepens the type by cataloguing ad
nauseam the things, ideas and desires that surround them. The Group is awash in those facts that
collectively constitute the post-graduate lives of these Vassar Girls: the brands of dress they wish
they could buy, the feeding schedules to which their children adhere, the color of their curtains
and their arguments about the benefits of margarine versus butter. Just as, according to
McCarthy, “you can learn how to make strawberry jam from Anna Karenina,” you can learn how
to breast feed from The Group (On the Contrary 259). “That woman,” the critic Brendan Gill
once said of McCarthy, “has done for the pessary what Herman Melville did for the whale” (qtd.
in Gelderman 252-3). Indeed, in 1959, a character in Philip Roth’s Goodbye, Columbus will ask
his partner to “get fitted,” explaining that he knows about the procedure and the Margaret Sanger
clinic because he has “read Mary McCarthy.”
McCarthy’s love of fact occasions the narrator’s gossipy tone; she—and it is definitely a
she, or else a feminine they—occasionally calls the reader “you,” evoking the conspiratorial
chattiness of a woman’s magazine. Yes, as one particularly stodgy reviewer complains, “the
book is 95-per-cent feminine gossip,” yet gossip in an author like Austen, McCarthy maintains,
is nothing more or less than “feminine facts, so to speak—and a very painstaking census-taking
of a genteel class within the confines of a certain income range, marked off, like a frontier”
(Gardiner 318, “Fact in Fiction” 262). The Group, too, is a “pain-staking census,” in which the
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protagonists are not merely inundated with fact, but also statistically representative. In the article
“The Vassar Girl,” McCarthy writes, “A census was taken, and it was discovered that the
average Vassar graduate had two-plus children and was married to a Republican lawyer” (200).
Accordingly, the average of McCarthy’s protagonists in The Group is married to a Republican
lawyer, having had one child and likely to have a second—even though, as the collective narrator
says at the beginning, “they would rather be wildly poor and live on salmon wiggle than be
forced to marry one of those dull purplish men of their own set, with a seat on the Exchange and
those bloodshot eyes” (The Group 12). Their careers—which are, like those of their real-life
counterparts, largely abandoned by the end—are sampled from that same survey, the alumnae
newsletter, and those of her own classmates.
The “Vassar Girl” is not merely a constellation of factual points; she is also a cultural
talisman. And the “Vassar Girl,” McCarthy writes, “can stand for whatever is felt to be wrong
with the modern female: humanism, atheism, Communism, short skirts, cigarettes, psychiatry,
votes for women, free love, intellectualism” (On the Contrary195).128 The modernist antiheroine, too, is a symbol of “whatever is felt to be wrong with the modern female.” Yet because
she is a singular, not collective, figure, the threat she represents is to a certain extent contained.
She threatens contamination in her propensity to spread blame and to warp those around her; yet
the possibility that she might be representative of a larger phenomenon is just that: a possibility.
It remains latent throughout the modernist period. With The Group, however, McCarthy makes
that particular threat explicit by multiplying her “Vassar Girl,” and thus guaranteeing that the
shortcomings, foibles and moral failings of each individual protagonist would reverberate
beyond her story. And as Nancy K. Miller points out, by having her protagonist share “women’s
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secrets” like, for instance, how to obtain birth control, she renders that intimate knowledge not
just shareable but actionable.129 In collectivizing the anti-heroine, in other words, McCarthy
makes “The Vassar Girl” representative—a site if not of solidarity, then at least of useable
recognition. The novel’s predominantly male reviewers certainly took it this way, and were duly
horrified. For female readers, however, the Group’s representativeness was a gift—a description
of their disappointments and struggles, a realist account of their bodies and their lives. While
Betty Friedan deconstructed “the problem that had no name,” Mary McCarthy described it, ad
nauseam, in ways it had never been described before. She reported upon their lives, and, in her
attention to what those lives actually looked like, how they were filled and qualified, showed that
they were not aberrations, but of a type—which is to say, typical.
This is hardly, however, the second-wave feminism of lore. Nor would McCarthy have
taken up that mantle. She once famously told an interviewer that feminism was “bad for women
in its self-pity, shrillness, greed.”130 Elaine Showalter puts it particularly bluntly with regard to
The Group when she writes, “the chorus of women’s voices in her fiction creates a veritable
symphony of self-hatred” (214). This symphony reaches an intriguing pitch in the final chapter,
in which Kay falls or jumps from her window looking for warplanes and Lakey, the “green-eyed
beauty” of the Group, returns from Europe with a lesbian partner. Whereas Kay’s death registers
not as a tragedy, but merely “a cruel irony … that [her zeal of preparedness] should have caused
her death!” (467); “The group felt, with one accord, that what had happened to Lakey was a
tragedy” (480). Kay’s death is ignominious and deeply physical, recalling, for instance, the failed
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McCarthy echoes this sentiment in The Group: “Tiddly as she was, Priss could tell that she and her friends,
through no fault of their own, had awakened economic antagonism. Vassar girls, in general, were not liked, she
knew, by the world at large; they had come to be a sort of symbol of superiority” (30).
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Miller goes on to argue that, notwithstanding the irony of McCarthy’s own anti-feminism, The Group was “an
important document in the record of women’s struggles for control over reproduction, and by that token, the
domain—discursive and physical—of their private lives” (180).
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The interview was given in 1984, to Carol Brightman at The Nation.
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suicide of Dorothy Parker’s “Big Blonde” Hazel Morse, who is found “lay[ing] on her back, one
flabby, white arm flung up … her stiff hair hanging untenderly over her face” (648). In a similar
vein, the group must decide whether to bury Kay in a “brassière.” “Fortunately,” the collective
narrator intones, “Kay had never worn a girdle” (462). The joke, of course, is on everyone:
Lakey for being tragic, Kay for not being tragic, the Group for thinking this way about these
people—their friends, themselves.
The joke will also, it turns out, be on Harald, who at the very end of the novel explains to
Lakey that their superiority—his and Lakey’s—make them the only ones capable of experiencing
tragedy in the first place: “‘To be superior,’ he [says], ‘of course, is not only a prerequisite for
tragedy; it is tragedy. Hamlet’s tragedy. We are forced to lower ourselves in our commerce with
dolts, which sometimes gives us a feeling of hollowness, as if it were we who were hollow, not
they’” (486). In The Group, it is often the most ridiculous, hateful characters who are given to
the most pertinent observations.131 The idea of Harald’s superiority, by this point in the novel, is
laughable; Lakey spends the final pages toying with him as if to highlight the lie. “Yet,” as
McCarthy wrote in her Guggenheim application, “the book is not meant to be a joke or even a
satire, exactly, but a ‘true history’ of the times despite the angle or angles of distortion” (qtd. in
Gelderman 253). And indeed, despite being ridiculous, detestable and delusional, Harald is also
right: The tragedy of The Group lies in their hollowness. However surrounded these characters
are by things, they are empty at the core. Several contemporary reviewers complained about this
quality of The Group, as did Elaine Showalter; yet none allowed that it might be have been
design. I, however, would like to end with the suggestion that this fundamental emptiness—and a
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It is interesting, for instance, that Norine, another ridiculous figure and another outsider, is given what we might
call the “thesis” of the novel: “‘You still believe in progress,’ she said kindly. ‘I’d forgotten there were people who
did. It’s your substitute for religion, Your tribal totem is the yardstick. But we’ve transcended all that. No first-rate
mind can accept the concept of progress anymore’” (442).
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refusal of tragedy on any other terms—is the most pertinent, and the most unsettling, legacy of
the modernist anti-heroine in The Group.
Norman Mailer ends his infamous hatchet job of The Group, “The Mary McCarthy Case,”
with a verdict:
Mary McCarthy is judged Guilty of Meretriciousness and equally: Guilty of conspiring
not to give the goose away, which means thus, Guilty of refusing to reveal that the
genteel lords and ladies who manage America are the psychic descendants of Conrad’s
Kurtz. “Ah, the horror, the horror,” and she will not take a burning look.
In a sense, he is right. McCarthy’s heroines are not the descendants of Conrad’s Kurtz, but of
Stein’s Melanctha, Larsen’s Helga, Parker’s Hazel, Loos’ Lorelei, Fauset’s Angèle—the scourge
of despicable femininity that encapsulates, to borrow McCarthy’s words, “whatever is felt to be
wrong with the modern female” (On the Contrary 195). They are not the hollow men, but the
hollow women, trying to make themselves in a world that calls into question whether anyone—
much less women—can make themselves at all. We find similar efforts at self-making, along
with similar failures and punishment, in Plath’s The Bell Jar and Friedan’s The Feminine
Mystique, both also products of the fifties that came out in the sixties. The Group and The Bell
Jar both attempt, in their rumination and cataloguing of ailments, an answer to the question
columnist Elizabeth Breuer asked in her 1925 article on “Feminism’s Awkward Age”: “What,
then, is the matter with us?” Only Friedan refuses the question, locating the source of “the
problem with no name” not within, but without.
The story we tell of twentieth-century American literary production and its periodization is
a masculine story. Its key, delineating dates are those of wars that took place almost entirely on
other continents, in which few American women fought and of which few felt meaningful
effects. Yet American women’s modernisms too get bounded by the wars, and bounded off from

191

the “post-war” or “post-45” period and the postmodernism that emerged around the same time.
In this project I’ve roughly accorded myself to these temporal limitations, but here I’d like to
suggest that it might be otherwise, and that attending to the anti-heroine specifically, and
women’s literature more generally, usefully complicates our sense of modernity’s tenure on
American soil. In this revisioning of American literary history, modernity’s key question is this:
“What, then, is the matter with us?” (my italics). For women, this question remains salient well
beyond 1945.
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